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This thesis consists 0£ two major sections. The first part is a 
description 0£ the intellectual framework which underpinned the aesthetic 
thinking and cultural policies of the Nazis in the period 1933-39. The 
second section is an analysis of a selected number of paintings and build­
ings in order to uncover the contradictions which were embedded in these 
cultural artefacts. This part 0£ the analysis sets out a brief historical 
resume, of some early attempts at the creation of a mass-based art, and 
explores the transformations which this process engendered in the traditional 
modes of European high art.
This analysis of Nazi art attempts to relate both ttae form and the 
content of the artefacts to the wider context of the clash between the 
Nazi movement as a mass based populistic political phenomenon and its 
later retrenchment in the form of a highly stratified caste system based 
upon the totalitarian concentration of power in a strong absolutistic state.
The:final section attempts to encompass certain extra-aesthetic 
phenomena such as parades, rallies and war memorials, in order to illustrate 
this working out of the basic contradiction in Nazi aesthetics throughout 
the whole fabric of t!heir political spectacle.
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Introduction,
"For three centuries the attempts to realise a normative classicism 
were no more than brief, artificial constructions speaking the eternal 
language 0£ the state, the absolute monarchy, or the revolutionary bourge­
oisie dressed in Roman clothes".
Guy Debord(i)
This thesis has two major aims: firstly to describe in fairly close 
detail the theory and practise of the Nazi regime in the realm of the arts 
between the years 1933-1939. Secondly to analyse why this practise was a 
failure. In using the term 'failure' however, two major assumptions are 
being made. (i) The Nazi practise in some way fell short of its stated 
aims. (ii) There exists a comparative set of practises which can be re­
garded as more 'successful'.
. Thus the opening section of this thesis is an attempt to give 'these 
'successful' artistic practises some content, so that we will be in a 
position to move on to the Nazi period with some comparative information 
at hand. Behind the whole of this opening section will be the central 
category 0£ a cultural/artistic revolution which has always accompanied 
in a muted fashion, until recently, the more closely documented economic 
and political revolutions of 19th. and 20th. century Europe. However the 
category of cultural revolution is even more central to the analysis since 
in many instances I have taken the rhetoric of the Nazis at £ace value, 
which means that one has to consider seriously their claims that they were 
creating a revolutionary form £or German culture. I want to relate this 
'failure' by the Nazis at artistic revolution to some other historical 
moments when cultural revolution was the order 0£ the day, in order to 
shed light on the difficulties they experienced. The examples I have chosen 
are almost all from occasions when socialist politics and avant-garde 
artistic experimentation attempted some kind 0£ harmonious sysnthesis.
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At £irst sight it might appear that to bring together an analysis of 
Nazism and the other two traditions must inevitably be tinged with irony 
and tragedy since the erents which took place in Germany during the 
thirties offer perhaps the most complete example of the liquidation of 
these two latter traditions at the hands of the former. The most immediate 
link between them would seem to be the obvious one 0£ exile, terror and 
the concentration camp. What I hope to establish, however, is that a much 
deeper connection was operating between these ilree elements. The political 
and physical suppression by the Nazis of the German labour movement and 
the artistic avant-garde was a variation (albeit the radical right-wing 
one) of the continuing historical project to locate and produce a 
'revolutionary' form £or the culture and art of Europe. The Nazis form 
a third term in a trinity of such attempts which have aimed at being rid 
once and fbr all of the culture and art of bourgeois industrial capitalism, 
This is why I maintain that the Nazi 'revolution' has to be analysed and 
finally judged alongside other such attempts which have taken place within 
European history.
In the latter half of the thesis I have restricted my analysis of 
actual Nazi art products to the areas of architecture and painting. But 
I obviously see these as examples of a much more general problematic con­
fronting the traditional forms of European high art. What is the impact 
of, and what are the transformations engendered in those forms by, the 
process of political revolution? How radical are the implications for 
high art of the term 'cultural revolution'? To con£ront truthfully either 
of these questions it is necessary to look closely at what took place in 
the tradition of the artistic avant-garde, a tradition which the left and 
the right have ignored at their peril. At the same time there has been 
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a failure by 1he avant-garde to generate any consistent political implic­
ations £rem their artistic practise, and this has resulted in their 
being confined to a 'ghetto 0£ the spirit', a situation increasingly 
dominated by barren formalistic experimentation. This anguished contain­
ment is the result 0£ their failure "to search £or the real historic 
occasions when such a supercession (of bourgeois art) becomes possible; 
the moment when the masses arise and seize their destiny in.their own 
hands." (2)
Thus, in this opening section, I want to situate the Nazi cultural 
practise within this wider historical and theoretical context. 'Whatever 
the distorted nature of the 'debate' which took place about art during 
their rule, they still had to address themselves to this central problem­
atic: how would Nazi cultural practise both suppress and transcend 
bourgeois modes 0£ art? Their failure to resolve matters successfully was 
not a partial phenomenon, only to do with aesthetics, but was symptomatic 
of their total reading 0£ the trajectory of the Nazi movement and its 
inability to go beyond capitalism as the major organising principle £or 
the whole society. Their failure in artistic matters was part 0£ a general 
revolutionary failure which had its roots in their social and economic 
policies. The art they produced was a shoddy, archaic version 0£ 1hat of 
the bourgeoisie. As one commentator said after the dust 0£ 1933 had settled 
"Can the explanation be that, like the concept Volk, (the national social­
ist revolution) is merely a wish projection, a fiction disguising an 
unchanged reality? There are few signs in contemporary Germany that a 
revolution, in the technical sense of a transfer of power from class to 
class, has taken place. 11 ( 3)
The French Revolution
During the Jacobin phase of the French revolution, and particularly 
with David, the chief artistic representative 0£ that political tendency, 
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various tentative alternatives to the tradition of 'high art' were tried 
out. During his artistic and political career, a variety of 'solutions' 
were attempted in answer to the central problem of the relationship of 
the 'people' to an art which claims revolutionary status. His central 
concern was to find a form £or the art object that would be adequate to 
the social and political dimensions of the Jacobin revolution. David is 
important because he is the first to raise what I think are the three major 
dimensions of the problem we are dealing with:
(i) The relationship within the art object berHeen the revolutionary form 
and revolutionary content.
(ii) The transformation of the social conditions under which artistic pro­
duction takes place.
(iii) The problem of the role of the state towards a revolutionary policy 
for the arts, i.e. its role as mediator between artist and the people and 
also as the generator of a new art form in the role of patron and aesthetic 
guardian of the revolution.
1. The Revolution of Content:
Before tackling David's response to these problems we must look at the 
nature of painting in France prior to the Revolution. Before 1789, David's 
major problem had been one of appropriating the visual language in which 
French painting had been cast and redirecting it £or other ends. His task 
had been, within the area of painting, one of breaking the hegemony of 
the then dominant class, the landed aristocracy, and transforming it into 
a weapon which would articulate the aims and interests of the rising 
middle class. At this stage it had largely meant the manipulation of neo­
classical iconography, of operating within this tradition and yet at the 
same ti.me subverting it. This strategy was still possible because the
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nee-classical language was still able to encompass and express the outlook 
0£ this rising class. It was able to contain within it the possibility 
of such a redirection. The classical mode was still a viable vehicle £or 
the two classes to fight out their conflict. Before the work performed by 
David, French nee-classical painting had provided the landed aristocracy 
with an idealised and mystified vision of their situation within the 
totality of French society. We can see this by briefly comparing the 
'neo-classicism' of Watteau and David (illustration 1:0: i)
In paintings like this, the aristocracy were able to ir.1agine 
the::iselves inhabiting a realm of pure hedonism and play. The scenario, 
which is always developed in these paintings, is consistently set within 
the bounds of an idealised country park, where the inhabitants seem to 
brush shoulders with pagan and nee-classical elements. The gardens and the 
people depicted in them appear to be entirely self-sufficient, having 
little or no connection with a geographical or social surround, either in 
terms of an inflow of wealth or of the 'export' of power or government. 
(In the Watteau painting depicted above, the characters are leaving this 
idealised playground £or even greater heights of pleasure,) David's 
intrusion into this nee-classical realm of pure pleasure at first does not 
attempt to rupture the myth by the introduction of elements from contemp­
orary reality, he simply makes his point by shifting his ground within the 
general -errain of classical imagery.
(Illustration No: 2) By espousing the Roman element of ancient history 
and also by the twin operations of (i) formally and compositionally 
purifying the depiction of the myth, amd (ii) banishing the values of 
playfullness in favour of sterner values such as struggle, dedication and 
sacrifice, he was able to subvert the form and make it serve the aims of
t.l
•io·
the rising middle class. These aims took the form of a demand for the reform­
ing of the state and society, plus a thinly disguised plea for their 
political take-over. This message was both clear and concise, transparently 
obvious to the Parisian bourgeoisie who £locked to admire the painting when 
it was first placed on display. Classicism, as a vehicle £or the dialogue 
between the two opposing classes, was still viable and had not yet reached 
its crisis point. This was to happen only when the explosive content of 
the slogans 'Liberty - Equality - Fraternity' were made clear. Only £orty- 
£ive years later when Delacroix again used the classical mode £or his 
painting on the ceiling of the Galerie d'Apollon (this time to proclaim 
a blatantly reactionary message). no-one grasped the political message em­
bedded in the writhing figures. Classical iconography had become a private 
hermetic language, no longer able to articulate generally its hatred of 
the 1848 republic. "Wholly absorbed in the production of wealth and in 
peaceful competitive struggle, it no longer comprehended that ghosts from 
the days of Rome had watched over its cradle. But unheroic as bourgeois 
society is, it nevertheless took heroism, sacrifice, terror, civil war and 
battles of prople to bring it into being. And in the classically austere 
traditions of the Roman republic its gladiators found the ideals and the 
art forms, the self-deceptions that they needed in order to conceal from 
themselves the bourgeois content of their struggles •• " (4)
2. The Problem of the State:
David's wholehearted identification with the Jacobin state led to a further 
development of this dialectic between form and content, and at the same 
time raised the problem of the role 0£ the revolutionary state and its 
attitude towards the artistic policies appropriate to a period of social 
revolution. I£ the painting of the past was identified with an aristocracy
f A
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now deposed, what form should the 'new art' take? What was the line which 
the revolutionary state should adopt towards the problem of painting and 
art generally? David's first 'solution' was to push the development of the 
pictures' content. In 1790 he was asked to paint a picture which would 
immortalise the transference of power from one class to another. His 
response was the painting 'The Tennis Court Oath'. (Illustration No. 3 ) 
What he does here is to simply clothe his Roman actors in modern dress. 
The principles of the painting's composition, the painting style, are all 
text-book exa"!lples of everything which the Royal Academy had stood for, 
"only the clothes have been changed; •• " The Jacobin state's response was 
to call upon artists to illustrate and depict both revolutionary heroes 
and those high points of exemplary political activity. The Assembly and 
the Committee for Public Safety conceived o£ the role o£ the arts as 
twofold: (i) To stand as a record of its best moments and its greatest 
heroes, e.g. 'The Marat'.
(ii) As a form of pedagogy, both to instruct aid inform the 
people of their revolutionary duty.
"The Committee of Public Instruction has considered the arts in all the 
relations that should make them contribute to the further progress of the 
human spirit,,to propagate and transmit to posterity the striking ex­
ample of a vast people, guided by reason and philosophy, bringing back on 
earth the reign of liberty, equality and the laws. The arts then should 
primarily contribute to public instruction......... the genius of the arts should 
be worthy of the people it enlightens." (5)
Thus from the outset the state demanded an art of the exemplary 
revolutionary situation and of the exemplary revolutionary citizen. It 
was a demand £or the simple changing 0£ content, a demand which because 
of the seemingly harmonious unity of art-object and political practise
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allowed the state to transmit its desires directly to the artists without 
contradiction: "The day after the assassination of Marat, the anniversary 
of the 14th July, the opporD.mity presented itsel£ before the Convention 
to express the people's sorrow. It's spokesman, a certain Guiralut, said 
'Oh shameful crime! A patricidal hand has struck down the most fearless 
defender of the people. He had dedicated himself to libery. Our eyes still 
search for him among you. Representatives! Oh horrible spectacle! He lies 
on his death bed. Where are you David?.......... there is still another picture 
for you to· do •• ' 1 Yes I shall do it, cried David, deeply moved. 1 ( 6)
At this stage the state's demand £or an adequate revolutionary art which 
was 'public', and the desires 0£ the revolutionary artists stand in a 
harmonious untty. The problem is that a hundred and twenty years later 
the state's conception 0£ a 'revolutionary art' had unfortunately remained 
static. It still required an art which was an illustration , o£ the revol­
ution, an art which quickly turns into portraits 0£ leaders and statues 
0£ dead saints. This deceptive harmony had one disruptive £actor however, 
the 'people'. The problem of 'the people' was to elicit a different response 
from David, one which he was to keep separate from his 'revolution of 
content'. At this early stage of his development the response to his new 
audience is tame: "The people who pressed in to see 'The Oath' included 
workers and peasants, as well as educated folk'.(7)
3. The Conditions of Artistic Production:
The final aspect 0£ David's attempt to create a revolutionary art simply 
by-passes altogether his work within the frame of the picture, and the 
creation of art-objects. I think that I have shown that his development 
0£ the content of his paintings went no further than the limitations of 
the Jacobin state of which he was a supporter. These limitations were also 
to remain those 0£ tre revolutionary state. However he tackled the problems 
of the conditions under which artistic production took place and especially 
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when he grappled with the problem 0£ a mass-based art, he produced a series 
0£ totally different solutions. The problems which confronted him at this 
point can be summarised thus:
(i) How to invent a means 0£ artistic distribution to by-pass the old 
Academy dominated structures?
(ii) How to invent and create a new public £or 'art', and also destroy the 
old one?
(iii) How to make' 'art' popular?
Only one 'theme is absent from this list, but is I think implicitly contained 
in these three formulations: What should the attitude 0£ the revolutionary 
artist be to the culture and art of the past? David's first concern was 
with the institutional framework 0£ the practise of painting, with the 
artistic community. In this area he is very definitely a child 0£ the En­
lightenment. His targets are privilege and prejudice. These must be swept 
away and reason applied 1D the organisation 0£ artistic activity. The key 
slogan here is equality 0£ opportunity. At least the Academy must undergo 
radical reform, and the practise of the arts opene:JlUpto those with talent: 
"Oh, you talents lost to posterity! Great men left in neglect! I will 
placate your spirits, you shall be avenged: it was your misfortune, illus­
trious victims, to have lived under kings, ministers, Academicians". (8)
What started as a reform of the Academy, however, ended up as an 
all out attack upon its existence. During 1792 David set up his Commune 
of the Arts, which was intended to recruit painters from the whole of 
France and from every section of the population. By 1793 the Academy was 
abolished and the 'Popular Society of the Arts', under the leadership of 
David, was set up in its place. Again this was seen as an important step 
in the democratisation of access and of.practise; an attempt to make art 
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accessible to those workers and peasants who had crowded in to view the 
'Tennis Court Oath'. But 'the people' were seen as an homogeneous mass, 
and the fact that the society was not immediately crowded out with peasant 
painters did not strike him as peculiar. The Jacobin philosophy was a 
strange mixture of components, and whilst there was certainly a broadening 
out of the artistic profession making it accessible to the lower sections 
of tie bourgeoisie (the jury set up to judge paintings would include 
'farm-workers, shoe-makers, soldiers as well as artists') the true general 
démocratisation of tie arts never took place under its auspices. The * 
brief governing the activities of the 'Society of the Arts' stated: "the 
arts so far only pandered to the taste of leisured people; now they must 
make their appeal to the men who work". (9)
Thus David tried to solve our three initial questions by democratising 
the institutions for the recruitment of artists, and to this end he att­
empted to bring 'the people' into the administration of these institutions; 
but the notion that painting itself was a class-based practise and would 
be shattered totally byvthe mtrance of the people never occurred to him. 
High art was still seen as universally acessible.
The la»t aspect of David's work which I want to examine concernsrthe 
radical formal, experiments he undertook in order "to appeal to the men 
who work", It is at this point that a completely different set of alternatives 
present themselves, alternatives that were to prove the most radical and 
far reaching in their implications for the rest of the century, and the 
full significance of ,hat he was doing never fully revealed itself to 
David at the time. One of the problems which the brief of the 'Popular 
Society of the Arts' directed itself towards was the 'relation 0£ art 
to the broad masses'. The search for truly meaningful popularity led him to try 
to ditch/by pass the whole idea of an art of revolutionary illustration. 
It was to this end that he started to organised the revolutionary festivals, 
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which initially were to be staged in Paris, but were intended to become 
a feature of every large t>wn in France. David saw these festivals as: 
"a national art with mass participation". (1 O) "The national festivals 
are instituted £or the people; it is fitting that they participate in 
them with a cormnon accord and that they play the principal role there". (11)
These festivals were of course dressed upm the clothes of the 
Enlightenment, and were to reach their high point in the Parisian 'Feasts 
of Reason'. Having recognised this however, they can only be fully 
comprehended if a number of things are borne in mind. Firstly they were 
instigated as an art-form that emerged from the aesthetic realm; secondly 
they were an art-form that had as its expressed intention the creation 
of a true mass-base. Thirdly they are just one part of a whole battery of 
measures of this·: type taken to revolutionise French culture generally. 
Thus they must always be seen alongside such things as the restructuring 
of the calendar, the plans drawn up by David for the rebuilding of ill 
the major French cities on a general plan of amenities and sanitation,etc. 
These mass festivals are also the complement of his attempts to design 
republican clothes and uniforms, ESpecially his project to introduce a 
standardised, rational suit 0£ clothes for civilian wear. This push for 
the complete reorganisation of life and culture did not,only stop at the 
present, but, as implied earlier, was to extend to the past as well. Its 
destruction was seen as essential to this grand plan, as a way of freeing 
the present from the grip of past culture.
"Project submitted in 1800, by Petit Redel, Inspector-General 0£ 
Civil Structures to the Salon.
516 Destruction of a church in the Gothic style, by means of £ire. In order 
to,mnimise the dangers which this kind of operation entails, the piers 
are to be hollowed, near the bases, at a height 0£ two stone courses. As 
stones are removed, half their volume is replaced by dry wood. This is 
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continued tlroughout. Kindling is then inserted, and £ire set to the wood. 
When enough 0£ the wood has burned, it gives way under the weight of the 
masonry, and the \-hole structure collapses in less than ten minutes,"(12) 
David's career during the French revolution is important because 0£ 
the wide range 0£ responses that were elicited £rem him in relation to 
the problem 0£ the relation 0£ art to the revolutionary movement. These 
responses can be reduced to a number 0£ issues:
(i) The problem o£ what takes place within the £rarne: the change o£ 
form (in David's case it is restricted more to the content than the 
style) as artistic implications are generated by revolutionary political 
practise,
(ii) The role and the position of the state as the bearer o£ the ideals 
and values of the revolution.
(iii) The conditions under which artistic production takes place, esp­
ecially the institutional framework surrounding art. Again, as I have 
indicated, reforms which merely limit themselves to democratisation 0£ acc­
ess a1d do not understand the class-based nature 0£ all 'high art' can only 
have a limited contribution to make in the development 0£ a revolutionary 
art.
(iv) Finally the problem 0£ the e££ect which the eruption 0£ the 'mass', 
'the people' and 'the proletariat' upon the political arena has upon the 
idea 0£ what constitutes a mass-based art £orm.
David provides an early, but very concise outline 0£ the strategies 
which could be adopted in the search £or a revolutionary art-form. At 1his 
stage it would be fruitless to argue whether the mass festivals 0£ the 
revolutionary period were proto-Nuremburgs or socialist festivity. They 
constitute two variations upon a single underlying problematic £or the 
arts in a revolutionary period and as such remain potentialities, possible 
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directions for· 1he arts to take under the impact of mass revolutionary 
movements, whether of the radical right or o£ the left.
Hodern Solutions:
"I say it is the aims of art that you.must seek rather than art itself." 
W. Morris £, 
"Novels did not always exist in the past, nor must they necessarily exist 
in the future." W. Benjamin ll·
One of the most prominent features of the artistic practise in Western 
Europe during the 19th, century was the rise, and the persistence of the 
avant-garde, which was to resultin its gradual domination of the realm 
of high art. Damned initially, the avant-garde in its decline has gradually 
become synonymous with the high art tradition it set out to destroy and 
supplant. At the beginning of this thesis I suggested that as far as 
artistic matters were concerned, the Nazis were addressing themselves to 
a central problematic located within western art; £or them this was 
typified by the persistence of the avant-garde. The presence 0£ this loose 
tradition in Europe ever since the rise 0£ the Romantic movement is a sym­
ptom 0£ the deep separation which arose in this art between the realms 
of 'private' and 'public'. In a sense the Nazi 'revolution' was a settling 
0£ accounts with this thorn in the side 0£ western culture. Their solution 
to this problem was to take the form 0£ a one-sided, political obliteration 
in the name of creating a truly collective German culture. This culture 
would be characterised by:
(i) Having none of the features 0£ the art of the avant-garde.
(ii) It would somehow be its poJ!ar opposite; that is, a form 0£ regenerated 
culture that would come into being because the totality of the social con­
ditions under which art was produced would be transforrr.ed.
In this section I want to try to locate and analyse some of the 
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features of this avant-garde, and at the same time try to bring out what 
I feel to be its ghostly opposite: an opposite which in its absence 
haunted the experience of this tradition and was the holy grail of the 
Nazi artistic revolution.
Characteristics of the Avant-Garde:
Any hard, er inflexible, use of the term 'avant-garde' is a major 
step towards fetishising what was essentially a very loose tradition. This 
tradition, which nore often than not took the form of a state of mind, was 
a set of unspoken assumptions, which were held by individual artists at 
different stages of ileir artistic careers. There is a constant process 
in many of the major artistic figures of the 19th. century of persistently 
sliding in and out of this spiritual homeland: of espousing its values 
and of petulantly disov.'lling them. Having said this, certain definitional 
characteristics can be picked out as symptomatic of this tradition. The 
major 'objective' feature of the avant-garde was that it provided a means 
whereby certain sections of the artistic and cultural bourgeois intelli­
gentsia were able to naintain the idea of separation fron the values and 
culture of the dominant class, from which they originated, In terms of the 
values espoused by this tradition, which historically appears for the first 
time with the rise of Romanticism, they rested firmly upon the rejection 
of any utilitarian or instrumental notions of the universe and of man. 
At various times it opposed the penetration of the social order by these 
values, and identified their permeation as the work of the commercial 
operations of the industrial bourgeoisie . Within the realm of the aesthetic 
which the avant-garde exalted over all others the production of 'beauty' 
was underpinned by hedonism amd extreme individualism. Whilst 1he objects 
produced were almost always closely linked with the expression of a personal 
reality, a personal vision, the avant-garde's dominant reference was the 
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exploration of the subjective, of 'pure' sensation, by use of an increas­
ingly private and closed system of symbolism. With the menbers 0£ the 
avant-garde there are a plethora of private visions but few public stan- 
<lards. In addition to this, various ideological strategies were adopted 
to shore-up, or escape from, this marginal and isolated existence, e.g. 
primitivism, nostalgia, exoticism, despair, and self-annihilation. Thus 
in almost every case the practise of the arts within this tradition would 
mean:
(i) That art, both as object and activity, would be subjective and private. 
(ii) It would entail ideologically one of a number of species of radical 
refusals of the 'world of the bourgeois'.
Certain features flowed out of the marginal position accorded to the 
aesthetic, especially in the attitude of the artist towards the public 
domain. The area of generalised social activity became a forbidden zone 
£or art which was either to be condemned or at least kept at bay by a . • 
spiritual distanciation. The avant-garde artists throughout Europe came 
to inhabit a ghetto of the soul , which at certain moments was to find 
even a geographical expression. However these qualities 0£ refusal and 
rebellion lead straight back to the public realm whether it was to spit 
on it or at the site of their 'lost' audience. Any form 0£ re-entry into 
this area could only be genuinely acheived if the domain its elf were to 
undergo a radical alteration. Hence the continual nervousness 0£ the avant­
garde in its relationship with the 'outside', and the frequent use 0£ such 
phrases as 'compromise', 'bad-faith', 'sell-out', etc. The artists of the 
avant-garde shared that common tendency of the dislocated European intel­
ligentsia to view the domain of the private individual as being the only 
area where an authentic mode of existence was possible, whilst the public 
was to become equated with that which was alienating and non-valid. 
However, as Marx pointed out, the mental split into public and private 
spheres were only the phenomenal forms 0£ a dialectically linked unity.
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Even in the 1840' s Baudelaire was still able to enco;npass both ends or· 
this dialectic in artistic matters: "Romanticism means modern art that 
is intimacy, spirituality, aspiration for the infinite expressed with all 
the means open to the arts."(3) "Hitherto art is inseparable from utility" 
(4) "How to exploit one's privacy, and the insights which it allows, and 
yet at the same time escape from it." (5)
The Public Realm:
I£ we can characterise art of the European avant-garde through the 
following features, then we can at the same time conceptualise the type 












Within the socialist tradition, there also lies, at least at a theoretical 
level, the possibility of a revolution producing a situation where these 
dialectic opposites are superceded. However at the present stage of the 
argument I want to look at the nature of the concepts in the right-hand 
column, since they bear most strongly upon the Nazi project,
In terms of our schema the one thing that has united both the radical 
right and the left is the centrality of the linking concept of political 
action as a means of breaking down, and replacing, the avant-garde art »— 
which is seen as so symptomatic of bourgeois society. Destruction of the 
conditions which.produce this art is equated with a revolution encompassing 
every aspect of society. Every one of the categories in list B automatic­
ally raises implications about the nature of the society in which such 
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characteristics would be displayed. Public implies that the art objects 
deal with general and universal topics, as well as being in some way 
connected with the general institutions of the society, Communal implies 
that they are capable o£ being shared by the whole of society, in fact 
that there is a genuine community, including a cultural one in which all 
can participate equally. Objective implies that the material of art, its 
form and its content, has practical ends, in that it is capable of entering 
and shaping reality in terms of a commonly held vision. Finally the categ­
ory popular implies that both audience and producers share a common reality 
and that there is a continual movement between the producers and receivers 
of such art. Now on almost every count bourgeois society in the 19th, 
century was incapable o£ producing such a structured domain £or artistic 
practise. In every society o£ Western Europe in the 19th. century the 
rise o£, and the domination by, the industrial bourgeoisie had been a two­
fold project:
(i) Firstly there was a revolutionary phase dedicated to sweeping away the 
remnants of feudalism.
(ii) The introduction and elaboration o£ an economy devoted to-the un­
fettered production o£ commodities and the acetylation o£ capital.
This project took on a variety o£ forms, and was acheived by the 
forging of various types o£ class alliances; but central to its aim was 
the political task o£ capturing the state and the social, task o£ reorgan­
ising society in order to guarantee its economic aims as a class. The ' 
problem was that after the establishment o£ its rule, and after the'her6ic' 
revolutionary phase had passed, the bourgeois state was never able to 
acheive a general status £or the whole of society. The bourgeoisie - were 
never a general class and if interested at all in art tended to clothe 
themselves in imagery and the symbolism o£ the class they had just usurped.
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This threefold project, embracing the political, the social and the 
economic reorganisation of society, resulted in the gradual penetration 
of all s:,cial relationships by economic and commercial values; life was 
reduced to a set of'unheroic' values which contrasted strongly with the 
spirituality and non-utilitarian nature of Post-romantic art. Thus the 
artistic critique of bourgeois society was directed against the poverty 
of the spirit and the sterility of life which bourgeois society had 
brought into being. Again Marx put his finger on the gulf between the 
bourgeoisie's image of themselves in art, and the nature of the world they 
had created: "Is the view of nature and of the social relations which 
shaped the Greek imagination and Greek art possible in the age of auto- ' 
matic machinery and railways, of locomotives and electric telegraphs? 
Where does Vulcan come in against Roberts and Co.? Jupiter as against the 
lightning rod, and Hermes against the Credit Hobilier ? What becomes of 
the goddess Fame by_· the side of Printing House Square?" (6)
The answer was that they were stuck of the facades of banks, par­
liament buildings, Opera houses and war memorials. Thus the avant-garde 
artist of the 19th. century could adopt any one of three strategies towards 
his position of marginality and ineffectiveness upon the world at large. 
Firstly he could try and ignore bourgeois society (l'art pour l'art),- or 
he could join it, or he could attack it. Those who attaupted the last 
strateg 1 and tried to explore a kind of art which at least modified the 
features of our list A,- were thrown back to the recurrent list of problems 
that we found had confronted David at an earlier period.
(i) How could a new audience for one's art be created, and, by implication, 
an audience that would transform the public realm, through political action, 
towards the features in list B.
(ii) What were the implications for the practise of art itself which this 
shift of audience entailed? Could the old ways be retained, or would the 
whole -thing have to be recast anew? Will, in the opening words of
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William Horris, only the 'aims or..'art' be left intact?
In answer to these questions it would be safe to say that within 
19th.century painting only certain members of the realist school really 
consciously tried to develop, a new aesthetic to meetthese demands. The 
realist attack upon bourgeois society was centered around the unreality 
of 'their' art in contrast to the type of society they were bringing 
into existence. This took the form of reconsidering the style and the 
content of painting, but all the time holding the frame of the picture as 
a constant. Thier radicalism was extended only so far as advocating the 
elevation of the everyday, the mundane, and the working class as topics 
suitable £or the hallowed space within the frame. This process can be seen 
in the notes which Hadox-Brown made to accompany his painting 'Work' : 
"At that time (1852) extensive excavations were going on in the neighbour­
hood, and, seeing and studying daily as I did the British excavator, or 
navvy as he is designated, in the full swing of his a:tivity •.•• it appeared 
to me that he was at least as worthy of the powers of an English painter 
as the fishermen of the Adriatic, the peasant of the Campagna, or the 
Neapolitan lazzarone •••• 11 (7)
In this type of outlook, the media of painting is accepted and 
unquestioned, the radicalism of the art becomes a matter of its content, 
that is the depiction of the bearers of the new reality, i.e. the working 
class in their present misery. The simple illustration of this'forgotten' 
class, and the world they were helping to forge, was considered to be a 
sufficient method to puncture bourgeois 'unreality'. In England the furthest 
that any radicalisation of form went was in the famous trench-digging ex­
pedition led by Ruskin, whilst in France Courbet busied himself with pulling 
down monuments erected to tyrants. With the gradual decline of the realist 
thrusVthe avant-garde enters the period of hectic formal experimentation, 
which superficially breaks off contact with the subject of the realist
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critique o£ bourgeois society. From this point onwards any alliance between 
the avant-garde and the socialist movement will have implications that are 
much more radical than the simple revolution of content.
The fork of the Avant-Garde:
The reverberations of the Hay events in Paris in 1968 have led in the past 
few years to a fundamental change in the stance adopted by the tradition 
of Marxism towards the history and experience o£ the inter-war period 
artistic avant-garde. The increasing dissatisfaction with the dogmatic 
application of the theory of Socialist Realism has resulted in a searching 
reappraisal of the radical potential contained within the experience of 
the various movements which made up. the■inter-war tradition. The result 
has been a process o£ recovery, which has especially focussed upon those 
movements which deeply influenced the debate that took place within the 
Marxist tradition during this period. With hindsight we can now see the 
crucial significance of the £our major movements of this period: Futurism, 
Dada, Surrealism, and the post-revolutionary avant-garde in Russis, loosely 
referred to as Constructivism (8). The gradual recovery of these debates 
has clustered around two major points raised by these movements. Firstly 
the radical implications of their experimentation with the traditional 
forms of high art, and secondly the political repurcussions which this 
.
experimentation had upon the nature of the socialist revolutionary project. 
In this section of the thesis I want to examine just two of these movements, 
Futurism and 'Constructivism'. The reasons for this are:
(i) They provide an excellent test case to see what happened to the trad­
ition of the avant-garoe in a pre/post revolutionary situation, enabling 
one to follow in, :lose detail the transformations brought about in this 
tradition as it went 'public'.
(ii) Futurism, in its Italian form, has almost always been dismissed as 
an aesthetic sub-species of Fascism through its eventual post-war identi- 
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£ication with the cause of Hussolini. This has somehow been taken to 
reveal the totality of its truth as an artistic movement and also by 
implication the truth 0£ the whole inter-war avant-garde. However, in 
Russia, futurism was to come down firmly on the side 0£ the revolution. 
This ambiguity of political implication should allow one to isolate the 
rational core of the movement and genuinely identify its radical potential. 
(iii) Thirdly, it will alow an interesting comparison with the artistic 
theory and practise which was adopted by the N'azis in Germany and which 
was so opposed to the tradition which had produced Futurism,
Thus the aim of 1he following section is to try and build up a 
picture of two related artistic movements (each of which displayed contra­
dictory political tendencies) which together were able to produce a series 
of essential dialectical movements, culminating , in the context of revolu­
tionary Russia ,with a truly radical programme £or the arts. The two 
movements are intimately linked because it was only with the pushing through 
of the 'laboratory' phase of Italian Futurism that the tradition of the 
avant-garde could realise its deeply radical function within Russia.
Italian Futurism:
Operating from 1909 to 1918 under the rhetorical banner 0£ 'aesthetic 
modernisation', what was initially a localised, national response to a 
crisis in Italian culture was to become a generalised response throughout 
the European artistic avant-garde, ' which was able to articulate and
clarify certain thernes and problems that were surfacing throughout this 
tradition. The general social determinants bearing upon Italian futurism 
obviously coloured large areas of their demands, and the style in which 
they were presented, Italy was late in terms of industrialisation, and it 
was not until the 1890's and early 1900's that any major advances in this 
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direction were made. During these few years coal production, the manufac­
ture of steel and the rate of industrial urban expansion took of£, and 
began to impinge upon the general consciousness of the people. The local­
ised responses present in Italian futurism, especially its strident nation­
alism, are clearly a function of this belated industrialisation and can 
adequately account for that strand in the movement which desired to see 
Italy tal<e its place in the club of major industrialised nations. But 
when we look at its culture, then Italy was in a very different position 
from the rest of Europe, and it was their attack upon traditional Italian 
culture that enabled a localised critique to gain the status of a general 
artistic one. Italy's internal backwardness was most vividly illustrated 
by the situation of Italian art: "In Italy, art occupied a unique social 
position, because the country had become a:l'lluseum for tourists, economically 
parasitic. Hence, to destroy the art of the past •.• presented itself as a 
prime political task to Harinetti." (9)
Art had become one of Italy's chief conunodities, and the consumption 
of its past through museums, 'frle renaissance cities, etc. was a major 
component of the economy. For 'frle 'new' to emerge, this past would have 
to be swept away. Thus under the heading o£ 'modernisation', the Italian 
futurists embarked upon a programme of artistic experimentation, combined 
with a virulent social critique which was to throw its net over a much 
wider area than simply the aesthetic. Almost all the themes present in 
Italian futurism exhibit this general tendency to move from purely aesthetic 
concerns, through to a type of enbryonic cultural politics.
The themes of Italian futurism can be condensed down into £our major con­
cerns:
(i) The Problem of the Past:
The futurists' attmpt to settle their debts with the past manifested itself 
-2 7-
in a seething contempt for the sclerotic cultural heritage which had 
become synonyr.ious with the 'art' of Italy, This artistic disgust soon 
broadened out into a general contempt for the values and social formation 
which had been responsible for it, finally arriving at an apolcalyptic 
contempt for the whole spectrum of European high art, especially Romantic 
symbolism, so typical of much of the art of the 19th,century, (the 
'slither' of romanticisPl' as Harinetti called it.). Only a generalised 
obliteration of fee past, of its art, its values amd also the societies 
upon which these u1timately rested would allow the manifestations of the 
'new' to take place. "So, let them come, the gay incendaies, with charred 
fingers! Here they are! Cone on! Set fire to the library shelves! Turn 
aside the canals to flood the museums! ••• Oh the joy of seeing the glorious 
old canvasses bobbing adrift on those waters, discoloured and shredded! 
Take up your pitik axes and hammers and wreck, wreck, wreck the veritable 
cities, pitilessly." (10)
Quite correctly, endless comr.ientators have pointed out that the 
burner of museums was to end up as their guardian under the aegis of 
Mussolini; but they then hastily move on the make the assumption that 
statements like the one above can be safely ignored as aesthetic froth. 
The problem was that it was precisely such apocalyptic outbursts as these 
which infected and galvanised a whole generation of European artists on 
the eve of world war I. Marinetti's strange blend of international 
nationalism, was to lead him to proclaim the superiority of Futurism over 
other contemporary art movements in almost every major city in Europe. 
The result of his influential canvassing was to lead to the emergence of 
national versions of the Futurist demand to : "sing of the great crowds 
excited by work, by pleasure and by riot." (11)
Futurist equivalents appeared in France, Germany, Russia and England. 
He had obviously succeeded in locating a general feeling of discontent and
anger.
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ii) The Programme .for T-odernisation1
Again there '.vere certain regional elements in the Futurists' programme
for aesthetic modernisation. In the context of a rapidly industrialising
Italy, •,rhat they were calling for was a radical shift ivl. the content of
Italian art. A shift that would be based upon the world of factory pro­
duction and the new technology, which had as its central metaphor the 
modern city, and a final brea1< with an art that was based upon a rural 
model, taking 'nature' as its chief topic. "Living art draws its life 
from the surrounding environment. Our forbears drew their artistic inspir­
ation from a religious atrr,osphere which fed their souls; in the same way 
we must breathe in the tangible miracles of oontemporary life - the iron 
network of speedy communications which envelope the earth, the trans­
atlantic liners, the dreadnoughts •••••How can we remain insensible to the 
frenetic life of our great cities and the exciting new psychology of night 
life." (12)
Superficially this would appear to be nothing more than a re-vamped 
version of Hadox-Brown's realist project, if it only weren I t for the fact 
that form, as well as content, was to be thrown into the melting pot. 
The Futurists were among the first to realise that the structure of modern 
life was to call into question every aspect of the practise of European 
high art: "the amazing growth of our techniques, the adaptability and 
precision they have attained, the ideas and habits they are creating, 
make it a certainty that profound changes are impending in the ancient 
craft of the beautiful." (13)
The programme of modernisation required the production of entirely 
new forms of expression, as the only way to achieve an adequacy with the 
'heroic' quality of the new social content: "Sculpture must learn one 
absolute truth: to construct and try to creata,now, with elements which 
have been stolen from the Egyptians, the Greeks or Michaelangelo, is like
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trying to draw water from a dry well with a bottomless bucket." (14)
The forms of art had to be recast because it was no longer possible 
to operate inside the old aesthetic skin which had been outpaced by reality.
(ill) Formal Experimentation:
Space precludes a detailed exposition of the formal experimentation which 
the Futurists pushed £orward within a bewildering variety of' media. I can 
only indicate the general line of attack. Suffice it to say that their 
experimentation took place in painting, sculpture, poetry, architecture, 
music and the theatre, as well as other more general cultural phenomena 
such as food, clothing and sexual relationships. T.mat united all these 
Futurist experiments was a common historical schema which linked, in a very 
simple, unitary manner, the general social formations of an 'age' with the 
more specific areas of the style and content of art-objects. This linkage 
was made in order to arrive at a moral judgement-of the whole life of a 
society or civilisation.Thus, in looking at the past they were able to 
condemn both the art object and the sensibility which had gone towards 
preducing it. In terms of art, , both what was said, and the manner in which 
it was said, were to be penetrated by the modernism of the Futurists. The 
implication, which was certainly articulated in the later manifestoes, was 
that a whole new artistic sensibility was in the process of being created 
by the surface explorations displayed by, say, Futurist painting. In this 
‘ way the arts would be able to both grasp and perceive the new reality
which lay behind this push £or the 'new': "To paint a human figure you 
must not paint it, you must render the whole of its surrounding abnosphere. 
Space no longer exists: the street pavement, soaked by rain beneath the 
glare of electric lamps, becomes immensely deep and gapes to the very centre 
of the earth····the sixteen people around you in a rolling motor bus are 
in turn and at the same time one, ten four, three; they are motionless and 
they change places; they come and go, bound into the street, are suddenly 
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swallowed up by the sunshine, then come and sit before you, like persistent 
symbols of universal vibration."(15)
The formal devices which they tried to incorporate in their work were 
the result of this new concept of reality, and were centered upon certain 
aims. Firstly the pervasive influence of speed (perhaps the most character­
istic element of the 'new' reality conceived by the Futurists); secondly 
the general interpenetration of objects; thirdly simultaneity, both of 
events external to the spectator of the work of art and also within the 
emotional and spiritual life of this spectator. The result of these em­
phases ,.,,as to devalue the art object, putting more importance on the 
emotional state of the artists and their audience. In fact Futurists' art 
objects remain surprisingly dull and awkward compared to the fury of the 
sentiments which lay behind them. They are in fact the remnants of a fight, 
the objects left behind after the battle is over.
(iv) The new Sensibility:
Behind the feverish experimentation there lay buried what, I think, is a 
decisive break with the whole of the aesthetic thought and practise of the 
19th.century avant-garde. The most important element is the final rejection 
of the idea of art as simply depiction, illustration or reflection; art 
as something which always travels alongside reality, commenting on it, 
but always remaining separate and distinct. This grew out of the ten^ 
dency of the Italian Futurists to see art as a form of activity, a mode 
of action.£!!. the world. Hence there is a:movement away from the idea that 
it is the art object which is the most 'privileged', the most 'sacred' part 
of the aesthetic process. Instead, the most important element is the state 
of mind of the artist and his ability to impose the new sensibility upon 
the spectator. Thus aesthetics becomes a means of acting within the world 
and, more importantly, of changing it: "I now declare that lyricism is the 
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exquisite faculty of intoxicating oneself with life, of filling life with 
the inebriation of oneself. The faculty of changing into wine the muddy 
water of life that swirls and engulfs us." (16)
Aesthetic activity now vaults beyond the production of objects for 
consumption and contemplation, and becomes above all a way of life which 
aims at transforming the world around the artist. This Futurist sensibility 
rejects the values of contemplation, peace or harmony, rather it is a way 
of life which is posited on spontaneity, deliriun and violence: "Already 
in the first steps of Futurism, in the mere character of its work, it is 
clear that its efforts were directed not so much at the creation of aJ1 
artistic dogma replacing symbolism, but rather to setting the human psyche 
as a whole into commotion, spurring on this psyche to the maximum possible 
degree of creativity, elasticity, to a break with all canons and the 
belief in absolute values." (17)
This \las the vital work done by the Futurists; the laboratory phase 
so important to the formation of the Constructivists' demands £or a genuine 
revolution in the arts. The two most important results of their activity 
when all the rhetoric of the 'new' is cleared away were (i) The break with 
the idea of art as something situated in the absolute, oy being of a 
transcendent nature. Theirs was a realism of the psychic landscape of life 
in modern technological capitalism. (ii) They separated aesthetic activity 
from the production of art-objects, thus allowing the 'aims of art' to 
become the object of a prograr.une to truly socialise the arts.
The Russian Avant-Garde:
In looking back over the work of the Futurists they can be seen as part 
of a general tendency within the avant-garde to dem.ystify the whole of 
European high-art aesthetics. The problem confronting the Futurists in 
Italy, after their ideological work of demolition, was to find an arena
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£or the practise of their creed of aesthetic activism and here they never 
really tackled the problem 0£ locating the new audience. The laboratory 
of destruction which they had established opened up potentialities for the 
avant-garde in other contexts, but they themselves were always unable to 
capitalise on it. It needed the dimensions of political and social 
revolution in Russia £or these potentialities to fully realise themselves.
If we return to our opening example of David, then it will be remem­
bered that in coming to terms with his new audience, the 'people', he 
tried a nur.1ber of radical solutions. These were:
(i) Democratisation of the institutional framework for the recruitment 
of artists, plus the structures for the sale and distribution of works of 
art.
(ii) An aggressive attack upon the culture of the past.
(iii) The organisation of mass public festivals, spectacles, plus the 
erection of national monuments.
(iv) The production of 'useful' objects as an alternative to 'art' objects. 
(v) Radical schemes for the reorganisation of urban environments.
After the revolution of 1911, the artistic avant-garde in Russia was 
again to take up some of these solutions, but were to start from a position 
the ground-work of which had been laid down by the Italian Futurists. 
Prior to the revolution the Russian avant-garde had absorbed and restated 
two crucial concerns, working -,under the in£uence of the Italians: 
Firstly there was the Russian version of the demand £or the 'modernisation 
of aesthetics'. Like the Italians this took the form 0£ a condemnation of 
the culture of the past as being inadequate to fue changed nature of 
Russian society: "Only we are the £ace of our time. The horn of time is 
sounded by us in literary art. The past is cramped. The Academy and Pushkin 
are less comprehensible than hieroglyphs. Throw Pushkin, Dostoyevsky,
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Tolstoy etc, etc, from the steamer of life. "(18)
Secondly they inherited the nationalistic element of Futurism in that 
they tried to haam.r.'er out a truly Russian style, free from imported artistic 
inlfuences. (Throughout the 19th.century, Russian high art, like that 
of Italy, had been totally colonised by the influence of France.) This 
search for a national style was also a search £or an authentic audience. 
Ironically this Futurist nationalism in the period prior to the revolution 
produced a wave of primitivism, or rather 0£ peasant worship. In such 
painters as Goncharova, Larionov and Malevitch, advance formal techniques 
were wedded to the depiction of authentic Russian topics. (Illustration 
No. 4 )
Thus immersion in the ideas 0£ Futurism prior to the revolution had 
a number 0£ important e££ects upon the Russian avant-garde. Firstly, the 
search for a fresh, authentic audience (the'real Russian people') had led 
the artists to concentrate on rural, peasant themes, so that even before 
1918 they had begun to pose the question 0£ what was the 'correct' 
audience towards which their art should be aimed. 1918 was to substitute 
the urban proletariat £or the peasantry. Secondly it had detached a whole 
generation £rem classical Russian culture. They had to some extent settled 
their debt with the past even be.fore the revolution. This had resulted in 
a rapid and extensive period 0£ extreme formal experimentation, which 
was ripe for 'socilaisation' on the eve of the revolution. Lastly the 
Italian emphasis upon art as activity had struck a syr.ipathetic nerve 
amongst the Russians. The revolution was to exaggerate this tension between 
art-object and art as activity, with the majority embracing the latter 
tendency as a means 0£ generalising 'creativity' amongst the population 
at large.
"An important result 0£ this search for the 'people' was an increasing 
-34-
love for, and awareness of, the potentialities of popular artistic forms: 
"Not a restriction, but an expa..'lsion of programme, a protest against 
formal, art-for-art's-sake because art is for the people, for the masses ••• 
Art is £or the circus and the circus or for art." (19)
Popular art forms in Russia became a central model, against which the 
drawbacks of high art could be measured. They provided an example for the 
way out of artistic isolation and marginality, and gave direction to the 
attempt to generate a truly public and popular form £or the arts in the 
period of revolution.
In dealing with the post-revolutionary Russian avant-garde I have tried 
to centre the argument in two ways. Firstly it is impossible to give full 
account df, the plethora of personalities and movements which flourished 
in the years 1918-1933.Instead I have tried to pick out those tendencies 
which resume the themes we have been examining up to now. Secondly I have 
chosen those movements and personalities which illustrate the central prob­
lematic as it affected Nazi Gennany, and here I have tried to select 
correspondences^which occurred in the artistic experiences of both countries. 
The history of the two countries shows that they were locked into a set 
of similar concerns in the realms of art: ·· 
(i) What is the content and nature 0£ socialist art; what is the content 
and nature of Nazi German art.?
(ii) The mode in which art and politics interpenetrated each other,, and 
an elaboration 0£ the inverse relationship which Benjamin has pointed 
out, ie. Fascism renders politics aesthetic, whilst Communism responds 
by politicising art. .
(iii) The results upon art in both countries of the logic of involvement 
in mass-politics, and the way in which the search for the new audience 
progresses, be it the 'mass', the people, the working-class, or the Volk.
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A: Hass Fetes and the Theatre
The transparent structure and .function of bourgeois theatre (the pro­
scenium £raie, the specialised buildings £or its performances, the fourth 
wall opening out onto a world 0£ illusion, the symbolic division between 
audience and actors in their mutual isolation from each other) made it 
an immediate target £or some kind of radical reconstruction. After the 
revolution most of th,ese characteristics 0£ theatre were attacked in two 
major ways:
(i) The entry of the people into the organisation 0£ both theatres and 
productions.
(ii) The reorientation 0£ the whole institution 0£ theatre towards festiv­
ity, ie. the attempt to realize literally the idea of 'a play'.
The first of these tendencies was largely elaborated by the director 
and theoretician, Heye.rhold.Before the revolution he had begun to develop 
an idea of the theatre which was in direct opposition to that of Stanis- 
lavsl<i, who had dominated Russian theatre up until this point.Against a 
theatre based on naturalism and an intensive psychologism, Meyerhold put 
forward ideas which stressed the theatre's anti-naturalistic, anti-psychol- 
ogistic potentiality. His basic premise was that theatre had to accept 
the £act that it was theatre, and not some kind of naturalistic copy 0£ 
the world. It had to 'lay bare its device·. He attacked the idea of the 
play as consisting 0£ the gradual linear unfolding of action plot through 
subjective revelation. On the contrary truthful, theatre consisted precisely 
of its'objective’nature; an objectivity based upon 'pure' movement and ex­
ternal gesture, with everything bound together^by elements taken from the 
circus and the music hall. This synthesis of purely formal elements and 
popular genre had been directly in line with Marinetti's demand that 
variety theatre should be taken seriously by high artists:
-36-·
"7. The Variety Theatre offers the healthiest of all spectacles in 
its dynamism of form and colour (simultaneous movement of jugglers, 
ballerinas, gymnasts, colourful riding masters, spiral cyclones of dancers 
spinning on the points of their feet). In its swift, overpowering dance 
rhythms, Variety Theatre forcibly drags the slowest souls out of their 
torpor and forces them to run and jump.
8. The Variety Theatre is alone in seeking the'audience^s cbllab6ration. 
It doesn' t remain static like a stupid voyeur, but joins noisily in the 
action, in the singing, accor.panying the orchestra, communicating with 
actors in surprising actions and bizarre dialogues. And the actors bicker 
clownishly with the musicians." (20)
The political potentialities of this type of theatre, especially 
given the fact that the circus was one of the most popular fornsjof en- 
tertainr:1ent in Russia, were quickly realised by Heyerhold. His first 
response was to push even further-his ideas about the 'objective' content 
of the productions, an objectivity which he considered to be an artistic 
parallel to the revolutionary creation of a 'new life'. This combination 
of social and artistic vision drew heavily on the communal vision of the 
time which saw the revolution as ushering in a life that would be rational, 
factory based, and revolving around the industrial proletariat. This was 
the origin of the system which he called 'bio-mechanics', which was to be 
the central organising concept of his new theatre: "All psychological 
states are determined by specific physiological processes. By correetly 
resolving the nature of his state physically, the actor reaches the point 
where he experiences the excitation which communicates itself to the 
spectator and induces him to share in the actor's performance •.• From a 
sequence of physical positions and situations there arise^'points of 
excitation' whfch are informed with some particular emotion. Throughout
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the process of ’rousing the emotions’ the actor observes a rigid frame­
work of physical prerequisites." (21)
The first effect of the ’entry of the people’ upon Meyerhold’s new the­
atre, was derived from sharing what he considered to .be the nature of the 
future society being constructed by the proletariat. Bio-mechanics 
symbolised,through the strict externality of the actors' movements, the 
components of the future Communist society, ie. mechanisation, rationalis­
ation and industrialisation, At this stage the franework of the traditional 
theatre was held constant, only the action on the stage was 'bio-mechanised'. 
By 1923, however, Heyerhold had begun to take apart almost every feature 
of traditional theatre, especially the division which kept audience and 
actors in strict separation. His first experiments were organising massive, 
tightly choreographed displays of 9"'fl,Ulastics: surely the Most 'perfect' 
realisation of his theory of bio-mechanics, and perhaps the most enduring 
form to have emerged from the early period of the revolution. 
(Illustration N'o. 5 )
His other approach was much less bound by his theoretical system and 
attempted to adapt his ideas for very specific agit-prop aims. This 
development was to bring out much more clearly his love of popular art­
forms, especially the influence of the Russian circus. Perhaps the most 
audacious of his fusions of avant-garde experimentalism, popular genre 
and political •work' was in his 1923 production of Sergei Tretya'<ov's play 
'The Earth Rises'. All that remains of the production is an eye-witness 
account of the evening's performance: 
unusual picture presents itself. The audience who wait for the beginning 
of the performance are not walking about deeply absorbed in talk....No. 
This foyer has nothing to do with the old theatre. You enter and at once 
must come to a halt, for the waiting public, in stiff ranks four and six 
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deep are marching up and down in strict military step, stamping on the 
ground···. The stage is not divided from the auditorium and you can 
see everything right from the beginning ...• there are no wings, no decor­
ations, no moveable scenery, nothing at all.
A military signal announces the start of the performance. At once some 
motor cars rush diagonally through the auditorium and over a connecting 
bridge onto the stage. They are followed by a company of cyclists in 
uniform. (There follows a riotous depiction of the revolution and civil 
war)....Finally, the first red flag is hoisted and is soon followed by 
countless others··· The Communist revolution is triumphant. Fiery speeches 
are delivered, the 'public' strikes up the 'Internationale'. 11 (22)
The transformation of · the theatre of illusion into a form of mass 
participation was to produce another set of results similar to those of 
Meyerhold. These fetes started in 1918 and were held on a regular basis 
throughout Russia until about 1925-26. The theoretical basis for these 
festivals was almost exactly the same as that formulated by David. They 
were intended as a form of mass participation in which the working class 
could celebrate, in an unmediated fashion, the high points of its self­
liberation. The chief organisers of these events, Evreinov and Annenkov, 
were trying to create an artistic form that would enable the separation 
to be transcended 
of art/life, artist/Working-class^and create a situation in which these 
separations would be transcended to produce a communal fusion, a moment 
of socialist festivity. In all of these events the tradition of aesthetics 
as reflection and individual contemplation are completely obliterated in 
a collective celebration. Almost alone mongst the Russian avant-garde 
these two held on to the concept of pleasure as being central to the 
revolutionary project and for this they caught the anger of not only the 
party hacks but of their fellow artists as well, Probably their most 
famous event was the re-enactment of the storming of the Winter Palace, 
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staged first in 1919: "Hachine guns crackle, rifles £ire, and the artillery 
th:mders •. ,There is a continuous din for two or three minutes.. ,but suddenly 
a rocket goes up and everything instantly becomes quiet, so that the air 
can be"filled with new sounds. A chorus of 40,000 voices is singing the 
'Internationale'. Five-pointed red stars start to light up the darkened 
windows of the Winter Palace. An enormous red banner is raised above the 
building itself .•• ' (23) (Illustration No. 6 )
In their unorganised and chaotic nature, in their emphasis upon 
festivity and in the non-mediated participation they remain the perfect 
contrast to their Nazi counterparts, the Uuremberg rallies.
B: Halevitch and the 'end' of easel painting
Although severely criticised by his fellow artists during the period under 
discussion for 'residual mystical tendencies', the development of Halevitch 
(and also Tatlin) with his final resistence to an overhasty reduction of 
art into 'pure' practicality,brings out clearly the contradiction beVjeen 
the Utopian image of the future communist society and the specific hist­
orical conditions existing in the Russia of the time. Malevitch realised 
that he had to keep this dialectical tension alive; between the 'utopian' 
aim of his art and the project of constructing communism. He refused to 
collapse his work, one into the other, as ma..iy others in the avant-garde 
were to do.
Halevitch's painting before and after the revelution is a text book 
example of the process of an avant-garde artist going 'public'. Before 
1918, Makvitch had absorbed and passed through the standard set of in­
fluences operating at that time. Starting with a species of derivative 
expressionism, he had worked through the influences of Cezanne and the 
French Cubists, arriving at a peasant primitivism by 191 O. The remaining 
period before 1918 had seen a rapid movement through abstraction, with the 
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three basic formal com^tents of painting; line, form, and colour, quickly 
becoming the 'sole' content of his work. By 1918 he had exhibited his famous 
'White on White' series, which clearly marked a limit:inwhich this type 
of easel-abstraction could go, During the 1918-1919 period, Halevitch 
abandoned painting altogether and began to construct what seemed to be 
three-dinensional versions of his paintings, the 'Architecktoni'. 
(Illustration No. 7 )
These objects occupy a place somewhere between painting and arch- 
tecture; they are real 'materials occupying real space', and as such are 
an important stage on the way from abstract representation to practical 
realisation. By 1920 he had taken control of the provincial art school 
at Vitebsk, and had rechristened it UNOVIS (Project for the New Art). 
It was here that he began to elaborate his theories of Constructivism, 
with the development of a number of practical projects, all of which he 
regarded as lying beyond 'mere' painting.
The UNOVIS group, under'his direction, began to formulate the theory 
that the 'new' geometrical forms discovered during the period of abstract 
painting and the Architecktoni, were to provide the basis £or the re­
construction of the world along co.'TIJ"llunist lines. These abstract forms 
would be practicalised by being made to enter life and actively participate 
in its reconstruction: "Let the overthrow of the old world be inscribed 
on the palm of your hand. Wear the black square - the sign of the world 
economy. Draw the red square in your studio - the sign of the world revol­
ution in art. Clear the square of world space of the chaos residing there." 
(24).
Whilst this might appear as a demand £or the immediate 'practicalis- 
ation' of art, of a unity of aesthetics and utility, a transcendent core 
was to remain which would require the realisation of a society which was 
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organised beyond utility: "Unovis distinguished between the conccptrof 
functionality, meaning the.necessity £or the creation of new forms, and 
the question of direct serviceableness. They represented the view that the 
new form is the lever which sets life in motion, if it is based on the 
suitability of the material and on economy.........the painter was formerly 
secluded from the world, so he concerned himself with compositions, that 
is with the combining of various factors. Uowadays ...he constructs, that 
is he creates substance. Composition is a bunch of different flowers. 
Construction is the safety-razor, composed of different parts." (25)
Thus, in the philosophical system of Halevitch and Unovis the 
geometrical forms they developed became both lever and spring in the 
creation of the new order. The tension which Halevitch's vision was 
capable of producing can be seen in the bewildering combination within 
Unovis, of, on the one hand, extreme utopian projects such as Lavinsky's 
city built on springs,and the flying towns of Xrutikhov, and on the Other 
the designing of an Unovis teapot by Halevitch. The vision remains poetic 
but realisable. Perhaps the most notorious of their schemes was the re­
designing of the streets and houses of Vitebsk, the results of which were 
described suring a visit by Mayakovsky in 1920: "A strange provincial town. 
Like many others in the western areas - built of red-bric..: •.••but this ■ 
town is especially strange, Here the main streete are covered with 
white paint on the red brick. And on the white background green circles 
have been added - orange squares - blue triangles.
"This is Vitebisk in 1920. The brush of Xasimir ltialevitch has been roaming 
on its walls··· And suddenyl again; violet ovals, black squares, yellow 
squares! The geometry seems the same.
But no.
For the rose circle has a violet one added below, growing out of two black 
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squares.
Above menacing brush strokes: A sultan.
At the side of an even grirr.mer stroke: A swcrd. 
A third one: lfoustache.
Two lihes of a text.
A ROSTA poster!
Here the demarcation line between left and 'left' is found. The revolutionary 
left and the last aesthetic grinaces of the aesthetic 'left'····there: 
Suprernatist confetti spread out on the streets of an amazed town, here: 
geometry as the penetrating call of a purposeful expression ••· "(26) 
Halevitch's Suprematists' theories contained two major.ideas.
(i) Firstly there is the undoubted impact of the revolution upon even the 
most rarified practitioner of abstract art. His work moves out of the 
picture-frane and off the easel, and tends towards entering into the recon­
struction of life. "Art must become the content of life, since only... in 
this way can life be beautiful."
(ii) Secondly, and running counter to this trend there was a wariness about 
overhastily ta<ing up a 'destruction of art' position. He realised that to 
do this would leave him with no resources and no means of resisting simply 
becoming the aesthetic wing of the next five year plan. A red work ethic 
was not the equivalent of a Utopian poetics, nor its realisation as his 
critic Mayakovsky was tragically to discover. This was why Malevitch and 
the members of mroVIS always maintained that Suprematism was the next stage 
for social life to progress towards after the establishment of Socialism.
JC: Tatlin and Engineer Art
For many years after 1918, Tatlin was regarded by those artists of the 
avant-garde who supported the revolution. as a kind of exemplary opposite 
to the work of Malevitch and UNOVIS. Like Malevitch, he too moved out from 
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the rarified atmosphere of formalistic experiment in painting, finally 
adopting a position which defined art as a set of activities which had to 
be practical, social and 'materialistic'. In arriving atthis position he 
was to lay dO\m. the major tenets of wmt later was to be known as ':Prod- 
uctivism'. However. like falevitch, he was eventually led to reject this 
simplified materialisation of art in favour of a kind of romantic pract­
icality. Tatlin, more than any other of the Russian artists (with the 
possible exception of }:ayal<ovsky) worked through the contradictions 
contained in the term socialist art. He was to gradually shed those comp­
onents inherited from Italian Futurism, such as mechanolotary, and an 
admiration for a kind of fantasized American urbanism, in his attempt to 
achieve a genuinely socialist position that would be valid within the 
context of Russia.
Before 191l, Tatlin's development had been influenced by two crucial 
events:
(i) As a traditional easel painter the impact of seeing the work of the 
French Cubists and the Italian Futurists;
(ii) The subversion of these purely painterly concerns by the 1918 revolution. 
The first experience was to have the effect of throwing his painting style 
into the melting pot and was to lead him to question the limitations of 
purely easel-painting, ie. the frame, the content and the social situation 
of the art-object. The second experience was to lead him to question 
fundamentally the role of the painter, launching him into a radical crit­
ique which would entail the complete deconstruction of traditional painting 
in favour o£ much broader social definition of the 'artist·. In many ways 
he follows the same line of development that we saw in Malevitch. Under 
the impact of Cubism, paint and canvas are left far behind. What tal<:es 
their place is a series of corner reliefs, which are completely non­
figurative. They were constructed out of 'everyday' materials such as 
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metal, glass and wood; scraps of materials literally picked up out of 
the gutter. The result was again forms which seem to lie inbetween 
painting and architecture. This must be seen as a vital laboratory phase 
in Tatlin's development. In these reliefs the artist is playing with 
modern materials, learning their strengths and tlx!ir weaknesses, trying 
to explore new forms which are expressions of potentialities as yet not 
realised by their 'masters' in the real world, the engineers and tech­
nologists.
The revolution convinced Tatlin that this laboratory type 0£ aes­
theticism had to be surpassed, and that this would only be possible if the 
traditional role of the artist was ditched altogether. So far his penetra­
tion of the social world had only been attempted from within art, but £or 
any palpable achievements to be realised the whole location of the 
aesthetic would have to be shifted and transformed. He was to sum up 
his development, up to this point, in the following way: "The foundation 
upon which our work in plastic art - our craft - rested, was not homo­
geneous, and every connection batween painting, sculpture and architecture 
had been lost: the result was individualism, ie. the expression of purely 
personal habits and tastes ...••the investigation of material, volume and 
construction made it possible for us in 1918, in an artistic form, to begin 
to combine materials like iron and glass •••the results of this are models 
which stimulate us to inventions in our work of creating a new world, and 
which call upon the producers to exercise control over the forms encountered 
in our everyday life." (27)
At this stage, Tatlin, like many o£ the Russian intelligentsia, equated 
the image of a Communist society with the total rationalisation, and the 
complete mechanisation of life. They had absorbed Lenin's slogan that 
Socialism = soviets+ electricity. Initially the realisation 0£ this image 
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meant for Tatlin the adoption of an extreme utilitarianism (in the sense 
of utility), in which, by obeying the 'social corrrnand', the artist would 
become a procitce^r like everyone else. But more especially he envisaged · 
this kind of absorption into production as meaning that the artist would 
become a kind of engineer, working with materials he had chosen, but in 
conformity with the social need. His early formal experiments (ironically 
intended for only 'corners') could only enter the world if the artist 
himself fully became a member of that world. The implication of this 
for Tatlin was that he must enter the factory and take his place along­
side the mass of producers. His 'art' must be based upon the principles 
of a revolutionised engineering and architecture, since these areas were 
always made up of inherently practical activities. Between 1918 and 1920 
all these tendencies were fused into c ne single project, the monument to 
the Third International. This became the first 'utopian' pinnacle of Tatlin's 
attempt to socialise his art and make it go 'public'. The non-realisation 
of this project forced him to rethink his whole position; in a sense to 
retrace his position in order 1b find a less utopian pathway. Given the 
premises he was now workingunder, there were only really two directions 
in which he could move:
(i) Becoming attached to a factory in the role of a design consultant; 
(ii) Hoving into education as a design teacher.
He was to try both of these routes, first supervising the building 
of workers' clubs and their interiors {ie. the design of chairs, textiles 
and economical methods of heating). After this he 'took charge of the design 
section of the Petrograd Art School. It would appear that at this point 
Tatlin had achieved his ambition, that was, to become anonymous under the 
banner of utility. The contradictions within the Russian situation were 
not to be so easily resolved. A utopian aesthetic core of his vision 
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remained and was to trouble him throughout the twenties. With the advent 
of Stalinism and his subsequent disgrace, he seems to have completely 
reconsidered his whole attempt to utilitarianise,.to 'abolish' it, By the 
middle of the 1930's he realised that the other grouLps who had ta.v,en up 
and developed his principles of Engineer art were having a great deal of 
difficulty locating any site for aesthetic activity under the new regime. 
They had been hasty in their identification of art and politics, leaving 
themselves at the mercy of a hostile state which had absorbed politics 
totally under its aegis. After the rise 0£ Stalin, Tatlin appears to 
have retreated into a kind of nutty eccentricity, devoting tv1elve obsessive 
years to the perfection of Letatlin, his air-bicycle. This should be seen 
not simply as artistic licence, but as a response to what he saw as a one­
sided resolution of the aesthetic dialectic in favour of utility. On being 
questioned about Letatlin he said:
Interviewer: "Tell me what -this is; a work of art or a tecr.nolcgical product?" 
Tatlin: "I don't want people to take this thing purely as something util­
itarian. I have made it as an artist •..•• Now in spring we are going out 
with tents and were going to start trying it out on the slopes. But, also, 
I really want to emphasise the aesthetic side of the thing. Now art i>s 
going out into technology." (28)
,D: Productivism,
The final strategy that I want to explore in this introduction is that 
of 'Productivism'. The Productivists never really formed a coherent 
group: rather they represent a general pervasive tendency which had 
some influence on almost every one of the avant-garde artists of this 
period. It is a crucial tendency because it represents the polar 
opposite in aesthetics of what I will be tackling in the later sections 
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of the thesis. Its truly radical component was that, although it lacked 
a sophisticated theoretical underpinning, there was through the efforts 
of these artists the idea that ultimately they were working towards 
the real abolition of the division of labour as spelt out by l'iarx in 
the 'German Ideology'. Their attempt to abolish art as a specialised 
class activity, and the difficulties they encountered, should be closely 
cor.1pared with the !Iazi 'revolution' which tried to lead polities and 
social life to the aesthetic.
Productivisrn originated in Tatlin's idea that within a socialist 
society art must become a type of socially useful activity. The 
logic of this position went as follows:
(i) in bourgeois society, art and the artist are permeated with 
the values of that class and, in addition, are objectively 
in a situation which serves this class ie, individualism, 
plus the cult of performing a socially useless activity. 
They were generally agreed that there must be a qualitative 
break with this situation, surruned up in the phrase 'the ending 
of easel painting'.
(ii) the basis of this bourgeois aesthetic structure is the extreme 
specialisation of the practise of art, with the result that it 
occupies a marginal position viva vis society. This again was 
summed up in the phrase 'the separation of art/life'.
(iii.) socialist art will overcome this division and, at the same 
time, end the practise of art as a specialisation removed 
from the needs of society. To do this, art must be both 
socialised and politicised.
"Forward - to the overcoming of this alienation (art/life) 
Forward - to the union of the artist and the factory. 
And never backwards - to pure easel work, or backwards
t to little pictures?" (29).
Thus he basic heme of he ariss of he Productivist group had 
two dimensions. Firstly, there was the transformation of the artist 
within the context of the revolution; but also what this transformation 
implied for the society at large, the overall trajectory of the revolution.
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The deconstruction of the specialised area 'art' meant to many of the 
artists the abolition of the system of wage-labour and its replacement 
by generalised creative activity. The Productivists saw themselves 
not only as becoming production workers, but also as contributing a 
vital element to the concept of socialism ie. the reconstruction 
of life and the building of a new world. Thus, what before the 
revolution had been looked on as a cardinal sin - utility, now 
became the basis of all their activity: "One thing is clear: the 
slippery, globular belly of the bourgeoisie was a bad site £or building" (30).
The Productivists gathered together in the Vhkutemas Institute in 
Hoscow £or a brief period where a number of attempts to move into 
'production' were tried.
Rodcheruco (abstract painter): architecture, clothing design, book 
lay-out.
Stepanova (painter/stage designer): worked in a factory designing 
textiles.
Sternberg Bros. (painters): agit-prop posters.
However, the theory of Productivism quickly encountered ^vo types of 
problems:
(i) the nature of their 'audience'
(ii) the one-sided resolution of their problem in favour of 
utility, at the expense of the other elements we examined 
earlier ie. festivity and pleasure.
The Audience
The chief difficulty for most of the Productivists was the extremely 
abstract nature of the transformations that they imagined they were 
pushing through, and the 'solutions' which they set themselves.
They rarely asked themselves about the nature of the new audience 
to which they were directing all their efforts. Nor did they ask 
themselves how it was possible £or them to relate to the Russian 
working-class as it was then constituted. In many instances the working­
class was nothing more than aa abstract ideological category, and whilst 
they were very clear and precise about the displaced position of the 
avant-garde artist, the vital point at which contact with the real 
world was to be made was seen only very vaguely. The difficulties 
created by their naive move into the factories without adequate 
preparation obviously came to them as something of a shock:
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"It is true that art-work, and factory or work-shop work, 
are still separate. The artist is still an alien in the 
factory. People react suspiciously to him, they do not 
let him get close. They do not trust him. They cannot 
understand why he must know the technical processes, why 
he should have information of a purely industrial nature. 
His business is to draw, to make drawings - and it is 
the business of the factory to choose suitable ones from 
among them and stick them on ready-made manufactures." (31)
The difficulty was that the revolution had created these potentialities, 
these 'bridges to the future', but the steps still had to be taken. The 
poet Arvatov, himself a member of Le£, criticised their impatience:
"The production-artists from 'Le£' believe that art must 
fuse with socio-material-life-construction, and demand 
this fusion immediately. Since an effective and full 
penetration of art into everyday life is possible only 
in a constituted Communist society, the production-artists 
are no more than Utopianists.
The Utopianism of the production-artists is evident 
also in their rejection of depictive and decorative art, 
and in their dogmatic approach to constructional art ••••••" (32).
The persistence of these utopian elements, and the impatient desire to 
force them into realisation, attracts only a half-criticism by Arvatov.
What he is getting at is that the final residue of aesthetic utopianism 
will not be dissolved until a truly communistic society has been 
realised, a realisation which could not be achieved simply by the 
voluntarism of the artists. In the face of an unyielding and 
embarassingly real backwardness, there was a tendency for them to 
revert to a kind of holier-than-thou attitude:
"The basic idea of Production art - that the external 
appearance of a thing is determined by its economic purpose 
and not by abstract, aesthetic considerations - is still 
insufficiently apprehended by our industrialists, and it 
seems to them that the artist, in seeking to delve into 
the 'economic secret' of the object, is poking his nose 
into other people's business." (33).
Utility versus Festivity,
The tension between 'obeying the social demand' and the earlier desire 
'to abolish art', was never successfully resolved, and it is difficult 
to see how it ever could have been in the context of Russia at that 
time. Host of the artists were loathe to criticise the content of the 
•social demand’, with the result that it remained a nebulous, abstract
They 
found it difficult to discard those elements which were not necessarily 
part of a socialist programme, such as machine worship and Taylorism.
The result was that t11ey clung to a clearly defined 'style' ,which they 
imagined was a 'pure' distillation of socialism, but which was, in fact, 
merely an expression of these other, non-socialist, elements. The 
abolition of art often got expressed simply as the erection of 
buildings in the International Style current throughout Europe at 
the time. There was an alternative route which we glimpsed earlier 
in the mass fetes, a route which was tentatively explored by the poet 
Haya.'lcovsl<y during his productivist phase. Whilst he embraced completely 
productivist ideas about the reorganisation of art to the 'social demand', 
he clung onto the elements of pleasure and festivity. While working for 
ROSTA he produced a series of agit-prop posters which are exemplary in 
terms of productivist theory, but at the same time he attempted to 
subvert those elements which reified machinery and economic efficiency. 
In the early twenties Maya.1<0vsxy and Gastev moved into the factories 
and workshops, not as Taylorites, but as organisers of festivals in 
which machinery and the workplace were directed towards playful ends:
"The first public divine service • • •• began with a noise 
orchestra composed of crowds of motors, turbines, sirens, 
hooters . ••.• The choir master stood on a balustrade and
'conducted' the din with the aid of complicated signalling 
apparatus. After the noise orchestra had raged .••. the 
real passion play began ••.• reckless gymnastics were 
zealously performed •.•. under, in, on, between, before, 
and beside the various machine structures." (34)
These factory symphonies were perforated in many towns during the early 
twenties and reached a climax, in November 1922, when the entire 
Caspian fleet and the factory sirens of the town o£ Baku were orche strated 





I thin!: it would be useful at this point to try to relate the argument 
developed so far to the n.ain body of the thesis. The central premise 
of the thesis is that, in terms of art, both post-revolutionary Russia 
and !Jazi Germany represent a kind of developmental fork, along which 
progressed two different but related responses to our central probler.iatic 
ie. the changes induced in the practise of the arts under the impact of 
nass revolutionary politics. First I wish to look at how they differ, 
and then to examine the connections.
Two features seem to differentiate the Russian path from that ta.1<en 
in Gernany: the Socialist fror.1 the national Socialist. Firstly, there 
is the centrality of the concept 'realism' to the Russian experience, 
which acted as a guiding lin..1< between the artist and his audience. 
Although this concept appeared under a variety of disguises, alternately 
referred to as 'objective', 'rational', or 'obeying the social demand', 
it always implied a qualitative break with past aesthetic theory and 
practice, and a rejection of art 'as the expression of the spirit', 
the individual psyche, or with art seen as escapism or fantasy. (This 
was to hold true even during the degeneracy of the socialist tradition 
during the era of dogr.1atic Stalinism and its theory of Socialist Realism.) 
Unlike the Nazis, the term realism was used to denote a set of aesthetic 
activities that were regarded as practical, as well as being meshed 
into a broad spectrum of collective productive activity, Art was no 
longer seen as, nor intended to be, something inhabiting the realm of 
the absolute or the ideal, and being 'realistic' meant that it could 
no longer claim a transcendent position vis a vis the rest of society. 
The Nazi idea was, however, the complete reverse of this and der.tanded 
a 'revolutionised' art that would stress its transcendent position: 
more spirit, more illusion, more of the absolute was their aim.
-53-
The second big differentiating feature was in their views 0£ history. 
The Russian avant-garde realised that this decisive brea.'lc with the past 
was a possibility only because of the entry of the working-class onto 
the stage of history. The impact of this class upon the traditions 
0£ high art would be both searching and radical, involving not siJ:1!)ly 
a shift in the content of art, but a deep transforn.ation of every 
aspect of its practise. The problem £or the Nazis was that they 
had no equivalent class on which to base their revolution. Their 
social category, the nationalistic Volk, could only generate a response 
which would strengthen traditional artistic forms, leading to the 
awkward position in which degenerate, archaic styles of painting were 
embraced as revolutionary.
Having said this, there were a number of inner connections operating 
in the dialectic between Nazi society and the central problematic of this 
thesis, connections which were operating in the dimension beyond the 
overt intentions of the Nazis. This was to produce some bizarre 
complementarities bet\veen post-revolutionary Russia and Nazi Germany. 
To lay bare the factors responsible for producing these complementarities, 
two seminal essays by Walter Benjamin have to be examined more closely:
"The Work.· of ,Art in the Age o£ Mechanical Reproduction", and "The Author , 
as Producer"· In these two essays Benjamin is trying to trace certain 
deep links in the area of aesthetics which connect Fascism and post­
revolutionary Russia with the type of society out of which they emerged. 
In the first essay there is an analysis of the changes which had been 
occuring in the social conditions determining the situation in which 
art is produced. It is significant that Benjamin places all the 
emphasis upon h.2.::!, art is produced, and on the underlying changes in 
sense perception which support these new conditions. Such consideration 
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takes precedence over simplistic exar.1ination of content change. The 
analysis isolates two sets of determinants which, in the context of 
late 1 9th and early 20th century European capi talis!':l, have deeply 
affected 'the craft of the beautiful'. First, there were the advances 
made within technology which nade possible the elaboration of mechanical 
forms of reproduction - by this he means such techniques as film, 
radio, and printing on a mass scale. Parallel to these technological 
innovations there are the effects produced by the emergence of mass 
society (again, by this he means the arrival, in the political and 
social sense, of the working-class). In combination, these two sets 
of factors have shattered the traditional basis and form of the arts, 
liberating them completely from their original religio-mystical setting 
and stripping the art-object of the remnants of its cultic source (what 
Benjamin calls its 'aura^). What is important in this context is the 
way in which Benjamin attempts to analyse these changes in terms of 
the two types of society claiming to go beyond capitalism ie. socialism 
and fascism. The sum total 0£ these transformative operations, performed 
under capitalism, is to create a situation where, within the domain of 
art, there exist two sets of contradictory potentialities which can 
develop in either a progressive or a reactionary manner, according to 
the type of society which eventually emerges out of capitalism in a state 
of crisis. The impact of technology and 'mass-politics' has had the 
effect of 'liberating the forms of creation from art', but it is an 
ambiguous liberation, allowing either (i) a true socialising of the 
form and function of art to occur; or (ii) a situation, the opposite 
of this, where the new modes of artistic creation become powerful 
weapons in a renewed enslavement and repression of the masses.
In the essay 'The Author as Producer', written during the ascendancy 
0£ Fascism, Benjamin attempts to explain the nature of the progressive 
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experiments which had taken place in post-revolutiona?"Ij Russia. These 
new modes of artistic practise - (he has in mind the ideas of the 
Productivists) - are progressive not simply because of their 
exemplary content, but because of their £orrr.al rigour. As he says
a propos the '1 iving newspaper' experiments and Brecht:
"Cor.unitment alone will not do •• , The crucial point, 
therefore, is that a writer's production must have 
the character of a model: it must be able to instruct 
other ,,.Titers in their production and, secondly, it must 
be able to place an improved apparatus at their disposal, 
This apparatus will be the better the more consumers it 
brings into contact with the production process - in 
short, the more readers and spectators it turns into 
collaborators!" (35),
In 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction' essay, 
he points out, towards the end of the work, that under Fascism these 
new techniques, and the new perceptions of reality that accompany 
them, are in £act fulfilling repressive ends by being encased in 
a set of social relationships which have not been truly revolutionised. 
But in both essays he makes it clear that the major spade-work in the 
articulation of these new techniques was accomplished by £our key 
movements of the inter-war avant-garde, namely Futurism, Dada, 
Surrealism and 'Constructivism'. Together these £our movements 
represent four different, but related, moments in an extended project 
to transform the arts. The crucial point is that Nazi Germany was able 
to latch onto the 'liberation of the forms of creation from art' and to 
turn then into weapons of both mass expression and mass-repression:
"Fascism attempts to organise the newly created masses without 
affecting the property structure which the masses strive to 
eliminate. Fascism sees its salvation in giving the masses 
not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves." (36) 
Thus Nazi art ends up as a peculiar mixture of elements of mass expressivity, 
which combine with an awkward attempt to resuscitate as 'National art forms' 
styles which a pre-fascist capitalism had already abandoned.
* * * . * *
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CHAPTER II
Nazi Art and Aesthetics
This is the major section of the thesis and consists 0£ seven related 
sections:
(i) a general historical outline aimed at showing which social 
groups were attracted to the Hazi ideology, and why.
(ii) a closer discussion 0£ some core concepts 0£ this ideology, 
especially the way in which they bear on problems o£ aesthetics.
(iii) an outline 0£ three 'major' Nazi thin.1<ers on art ie, Hitler, 
Rosenberg, and Goebbels.
(iv) a discussion 0£ certain key moments in Nazi artistic practice 
,. .rhich illustrate our central problematic.
(v) the analysis of certain exar:-.ples 0£ architecture.
(vi) an analysis 0£ a number of paintings.
(vii) the exa.':'.ination 0£ certain types 0£ mass expressivity within 
::azi culture, and a tentative ex-planation 0£ their form and 
£unction.
Historical Periodization and its Relationship to Ideology
Any periodization of German history between the wars is still very much 
a matter of controversy, since discussion 0£ the ,;-:eimar period tends to 
be overshadowed by, and inevitably read in terms 0£, the rise to power 
of the Nazis. Because 0£ this the entire period has a tendency to be 
regarded as synonomous with the Hazi rise to power, with a decisive 
full-stop being inserted on the ^th January 1933 when Hindenburg made 
Hitler chancellor. Bearing this in mind, I £eel that it is still 
important to attempt some kind 0£ periodization since any examination 
0£ National Socialist ideology must take account 0£ the £act that Uazi 
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tactics and ideas were deeply influenced by the wider economic and 
political context o.f Germany during the inter-war years. The schema 
which I wish to adopt anchors itself in the major points 0£ econor:1ic 
development, •.•rith 1924 forming ai, axis poi:'lt. The period 1918-1924 
can be seen, economically and politically, as a hangover from the 
1st World War. The dominating economic forces were generated by 
the war and by its subsequent effects upon a defeated Germany.
For instance, the repatriations demanded by the Allies in the Treaty 
of Versailles, followed by the collapse 0£ German heavy industry, 
culminated in the hyper-inflation of the winter 0£ 1922-23. This 
period of economic instability was matched by a chronic political 
instability , with the years 1918-24 being designated 'the era 0£ 
putsches'. There were attempts, by both the right and the left, 
to dislodge the Republic of 1918, a.'1.d the violent seizure of power 
became the model for those on the left attempting to complete the 
1918 revolution, and also for those on the right trying to reverse 
the constitution of 'the November criminals'. The clima"< of this period 
was the attempt, and failure, of the Nazis to overthrow the Republic in 
the Munich putsch of 1923. This failure led to their adoption of the 
parliamentary road, a strategy adopted not only by the Nazis but by 
the entire German right. The reorganisation of the party during and 
after Hitler's imprisonment was a summary of the immediate post-war 
eA-perience of the N.S.D.A.P. and, at the sar.1.e tir:le, an atter.tpt to 
co;ne to terms with the changed conditions of post-:-1924 ';leimar.
The Dawes plan of 1924 had succeeded in stabilising the German
economy in the short-term, and 'the good years' of 1924-1928 were the
only ones that Wefotar experienced that knew anything approaching political 
stability. Significantly, this was also the period 0£ internal 
reorganisation, and poor election results £or the Hazis. The 
financial crash of 1928-29 really marks the end of the r.,reimar 
Republic: the political crisis ushered in by the failure 0£ the 
German economy was a period 0£ rule by decree and cabinets, certainly 
not in the I spirit 1 0£ the founders of Weimar. From 1929-33 unemployrnent 
rose from 1.3 million (in 1929) to 6.0 million (in 1933). This was the 
period 0£ break-through £or the National Socialists, moving from being 
just another right-wing sect with a menbership of around 80,000 in 1927, 
to a party of 400,000 in 1930. This growth in membership was accompanied 
by a corresponding success in local governnent and Reichstag elections. 
Thus we can see the development of Nazi power as having three stages:
(i) 1919-1923, the period when they were a small militaristic 
sect (only marginally separated from the Freikorps bands) 
dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Republic;
(ii) 1924-1933. This period was marked by the adoption of 't.'1-le 
long road', with the aim of seizing the state and the wielding 
of power by parliamentary means. This period is also characterised 
by the subordination of all political activity to the building of 
a grass-roots party that would make this possible;
(iii) 1933-1939, the seizure 0£ the state and the attempt to realise 
the ideology.
The adoption 0£ this periodization means that I have set myself 
certain limits to the discussion of Nazi ideology. The aim is to 
give an outline o£ its major components immediately prior to their 
insertion into German society in 1933, and to explore their influence 
in the practice of the arts after the seizure of power in 1933. This 
has inevitably led to a certain 'take' on the problem of describing 
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this ideology. In no way is this a history of Uazi ideology: it is 
rather a description of it at a certain moment in history. Very little 
material, therefore, is included from the period before 1924. The bulk 
of the material I have used comes from the era of 1 parliamentarianism·, 
ie. 1924-1933. The examination of their practice ceases, £or the most 
part, with the outbreak of war in 1939. This is because, in terms of 
the central problematic of the thesis, the type of situation that I 
wish to examine is one in which the realisation of a •revolutionary' 
ideology is not distorted by the domination of purely military ends. 
In terms of Nazi Germany, the attempt to realise the image of a 
regenerated society (Volk) became suspended in the minds of the 
members of that society.
The Approach to Nazi Ideology
In this section I wish to outline the approach I am adopting to the analysis 
of Nazi ideology, both in terms of what I want to do and, J:1.0re ir.iportantly, 
what I don't want to do. Since the overall aim is to examine this 
ideology in relation to a set of cultural and artistic practises set 
in motion after 1933, there will be no attempt to present a total 
picture of the ideology of the n.S.D.A.P., nor will their be an 
attempt to give a 'total' picture 0£ its foundation and insertion 
among the various class factions of German society. I do not intend 
to give an exhaustive analysis aimed at answering the question q\l'hy did 
the Nazis come to power?', nor a complete history of the Nazi movement.
I have, therefore, opted £or a schema which gives only a sketchy picture 
of the relationship between Nazi ideology and German social structure, 
but which deliberately highlights those sectors of Nazi thought which I 
consider most strategic to an understanding of Nazi ideas and practise 
in the arts. This has meant that there is little examination of, for 
instance, foreign_ policy, or 0£ the relationship between the party and 
the economy.
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Another problem is thro;.;n up by the very nature of the ideology 
itself. After 1924 the Nazis, under the influence of Hitler, ceased to 
regard their social and political ideas simply as objects to be polished 
and refined in splendid isolation: ideology was to become a crucial 
political weapon rather than an academic thesis. As such its role was 
increasingly to become one of attracting support and mobilising individuals 
£or the cause. The distinctive feature of the post-1924 period was the 
importance placed upon the role of propaganda, and the task which Hitler 
set the reorganised party was to transform the incoherent and 
contradictory ideas of the pre-1924 period into a collection of effective 
slogans and catch-phrases. To understand the policies adopted after 
1933, one has to extract and impose upon the material a degree of 
coherence which never existed in 'reality'. Only in this way can one 
get at the interplay between ideas and the policies which were carried 
through. It would, however, be a mistake to imagine that one was thus 
constructing a 'pure' or 'ideal' picture of the Nazi universe: such an 
'ideal' version never existed, ,-lhat did exist, however, amongst the 
frantic politicking of the pre-takeover period, were a number of crucial 
categories which informed the way the party and its followers imaained 
they were moving.
As stated above, I have set a chronological horizon on 1924 £or my 
discussion of Nazi ideology, but 0£ course there was always an historical 
dimension to their ideas. The Nazi idealogu.es, consciously or unconsciously, 
imbibed deeply from the conservative thought 0£ 19th century Germany. They 
shared many of the assumptions of the Volkisch and racial thinkers who are 
scattered throughout the intellectual history 0£ the 19th century. Whilst 
being aware 0£ this dimension, I wish to concentrate upon the specific 
N'azi moment. The transition from thought to the practical politics 0£ 
a mass-based movement was the crucial task performed by the National 
Socialists. The historical dimension 0£ their ideology will always
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be refracted through the unique position of power that they alone were 
able to achieve among all the groupings of the German right,
A: General Outline of Nazi Ideology and some of its Determinants 
"Those who want everything to remain as it is, vote for 
Hindenburg. Those who want everything to change, vote 
for Hitler."
Slogan for the Presidential Campaign, April 1 932. (l)
The meaning of any ideology which is able to gain a dominant position 
within any society lies not only in what is said, but also in who it 
is said to. •Jho are the people who listen to the words, the phrases, 
the sloga."1.s, and then take them up as their o"Wn? In terms of t.'11e 
rise to power of the U.S.D.A.P. there are two dimensions in which the 
ideology operated. Firstly, there were the party members who entered 
the organisation during the early and middle twenties, and who went 
through the long haul back from failure and imprisonment to the triumph 
of 1933, Secondly, there were those who voted for the National Socialists 
in the numerous local and national elections which were such a feature of 
the latter part of the Weimar Republic. This difference is a crucial one, 
for the party's concept of the role it would play after taking power was 
to be rudely shattered when Hitler made a series of 'accomodations' with 
the army and big business after 1933. In this section I want to concentrate 
on looking at those parts of German society which s,-rung massively to the 
Nazis in their electoral breakthroughs in 1929, and at what it was 
within Nazi ideology that attracted them. Only in this way can we move 
onto those key categories which permeated Nazi thinking on the arts, 
since it is highly unlikely that a political party will gain control 
and popular support simply on the strength of its policies in the realm 
of culture.
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When Hindenburg declared Hitler chancellor in January 1933 , it 
was on the strength of his having gained :\':)^of the vote in the elections 
for the Reichstag in Hovember of the previous year. The achievement of 
Hitler and the National Socialists in the period 1929-1933 was to unite 
behind thenselves a highly variegated set of class factions which, 
together, were referred to as the 'Hittelstand'. This group was 
made up of those people existing in the gap between the organised 
working-class and the group consisting of big business, finance 
capitalists, and large landovmers. It was a group which, until the 
success of the Nazis, consisted of a host of groupings,with a multitude 
of economic aspirations and anxieties and which had manifested itself in 
a m.unber of fragmented political affiliations. Thus, the Nittelstand 
could be broken do\>m into several major sub-groupings:
(i) shopkeepers, artisans, and small businessmen 
(ii) the peasantry and small £armers
(iii) the salaried employees of large industrial concerns, 
plus the lower grades of the professions ie. the 
Civil Service
(iv) workers not organised into trade unions. These were 
usually attached to small enterprises.
Each of these sub-groups v,^s inserted into the German economy and class 
structure in a specific way, and it followed that their economic interests 
were rarely homogen}us and, in fact, were often at variance with each 
other. For instance, the demands of the peasantry were usually centred 
around the maintenance of high food prices or rather, in the period 
we are dealing with, around the problems created by too low prices.
They sought tariffs to protect their produce from cheaper foreign imports. 
Against this, the more urban elements of the Mittelstand were all £or lower 
food prices. From 1927-1929 there had been a rise in the lobbying of 
-63-
pressure groups, and this had gradually become more militant (though 
anti-socialist). This was matched by an increasing unionisation 
within the professional groupings as well as among the white-collar 
workers (again, this was anti-socialist). Against this there was 
a rabid hatred of unions among the small craftsmen and traders I who 
bore the brunt of militant unionisation which had expressed itself 
in a steep rise in the cost of labour and materials.
These contradictory elements were, up until 1929, matched by a 
parallel lack of political cohesion. Not surprisingly, their political 
allegiance was distributed among a wide range of parties, with liberal, 
catholic and conservative organisations all gaining some of their 
support. What they did have in common, however, was a £ear of 
encroachment by the two major power blocs within post-war German 
society - organised labour and big capital. We have, therefore, 
a situation in which a rejection of the working-class and its institutions 
was wedded to an equally incoherent anti-capitalism. Thus they rejected 
the institutions of free trade and the open market as the weapons of 
big business, which was seen as bent on destroying the small trader 
and the artisan.
The Depression of 1929 turned the German Mittelstand into potential 
fodder £or Nazi ideology. The Depression did not of itself cause 
National Socialism, but rather created the circumstances for a 
'fruitful' encounter between the groups mentioned above and the 
ideas being generated by the N.S.D.A.P. at that time. Unlike the 
1924 crisis, that of 1929 was on an international scale. The major 
western capitalist countries were themselves in a bad way, and were 
both unwilling and unable to bail out the German economy with a second
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Dawes Plan. In tems of the Hittelstand groupings, the economic 
crunch was to come with the failure of the banks and the subsequent 
drying up of capital. One must remenber that the resources of these 
groups had been badly hit by the 1924 inflation which had largely 
wiped out their savings. Again, it was not the 1924 inflation that 
caused Nazism, as is so often claimed: it just made the 1929 Depression, 
when it arrived, worse for this group. The subsequent credit squeeze 
meant that the banks were unwilling to lend money to small enterprises, 
which, throughout the post-1924 period, had also been under increasing 
pressure from the unabated cartelisation of German big business, or, 
if they were willing to lend, would only do so at very high rates of 
interest. This lack of money after 1929 led to the emergence of an 
anti-capitalist outlook within these groups.
There were four major aspects of German capitalism that came under 
attack from the Mittelstand groups:
(i) the prevailing credit and banking system which enabled 
banks and wholesalers to speculate in farm products;
(ii) the methods and organisations which were associated 
with monopolistic types of buying, plus the pricing 
of commodities and materials;
(iii) capitalist markets, open and free, which created large 
fluctuations in the prices of the products of the small 
urban and rural businesses, who themselves wanted a form 
of controlled market;
(iv) large-scale methods of production and distribution by 
large modern combines which were inevitably able to 
-65-
undercut the little man.
Into this situation stepped the Hazis. They were able to offer an 
ideology that was both anti-capitalist and anti-working class. But, 
above all, they were able to offer an image of a regenerated Germany 
in which the conflicts and anxieties of the period would be abolished 
and in which these two powerful blocs would be brought under control. 
The image they offered was the dictatorship of the Hittelstand.
The first task which the National Socialists proclaimed in their 
programme was to clear up the legacy of the First 'Jorld War. The 
humiliations imposed upon a defeated Germany by the Allies in the 
Treaty of Versailles had to be swept away. The whole battery of the 
Allies' vengeance, in the form of the war reparations, the limits set 
on the armed forces, and the loss of the German Empire, were not 
only stressed as morally degrading for the German nation, but were 
turned into powerful explanations for the present collapse of the 
economy: "if the foreign powers had not 'meddled' in the internal 
affairs of the country, then none of this would have happened". 
The answer which the Nazis prescribed for Germany was to cut the 
country free from the whole spectrum of foreign 'influences'. The 
Germans would create an autarchic economic system which would be free 
from the long hand of 'international finance capital'. This dream of 
an economy that was totally self-sufficient could only be sustained 
among groups which were on the periphery of the central productive 
processes. It was this desire to rid Germany of the consequences 
of its defeat and its economic collapse which was to provide the 
basis for the idea of a distinctively 'German' solution to the 
country's troubles.
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In addition, the Nazis were able to weld onto this strident 
emphasis on 'the German ifay' , an anti-democratic rhetoric which 
was derived from a few simplistic observations: Germany had been 
defeated by the western democracies; the politicians of democratic 
Weimar were the tools of these despised western powers; democracy, 
in the fom of the 1918 Republic, had ridden to power on the back of 
Germany's defeat. The institution of the Reichstag was denounced 
as merely an arena for the ccnfrontation of labour and capital. 
To the Hittelstand it had proved an increasingly ineffectual 
mediwn for the articulation of their interests and demands. 'Jhat 
the Nazis offered •.-1as a solution to this powerlessness, a solution 
that would cut through the polities of 'mere parties'. In the context 
of lfazi ideology, the democratic system had produced nothing but a 
babble of conflicting voices and programmes which were incapable of 
transcending the sectional interests of their constituencies and 
operating in the interests of Germany 'as a whole'. The Nazis 
offered the beleaguered groups within the Hittelstand a 'third way', 
which appeared to be radical but which avoided, on the one hand, the 
'cor.ununism' of the working-class and, on the other, an economy in 
which cartels and trusts were all-powerful. The Nazi party presented 
itself as a party of Germans and not of classes.
The economic proposals put forward by the N.S.D.A.P. were as 
confused and inchoate as the aspirations of the people who voted 
for them: "at the economic level there was something for everyone". (2) 
During the period 1929-1933 they became the masters of issue politics, 
literally leaving people to their own imaginations when it came to a 
detailed conception of what would constitute the proposed future 
society and its economy. For the peasantry they fought against the 
forced sale of land or fams by private bankers, promised security of 
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land, plus tariffs against foreign imports: yet, at the same time, 
they carefully deleted from their 'eternally valid' programme that 
section which demanded the expropriation of land without compensation. 
Coupled with this went promises of protection against the high interest 
rates charged by the ban..1<s.
interlarded •,Tith sizeable slabs of 'Blood and Soil I rhetoric, which 
flattered the peasant by placing him at the centre of life in the 
renewed Germany:
"One can say that the blood of a people digs its roots 
deep into the homeland earth through its peasant land­
holdings, from which it continually receives that life­
endowing strength which constitutes its special character," (3)
The artisan and small businessman were offered a series of anti­
capitalist measures aimed at controlling large capital and the finance 
houses, as well as organised labour, by preferring an image of a 
Germany based upon an artisan economy. The s:nall mmer was flattered 
by a cult of the trade: craftsmanship was glorified, and there •.:as 
to be the setting up of a type of' guild system in which 'courts of 
honour·· would be established with powers to enforce a special code of 
practice on all trade organisations. To ma.'11.y this appeared to be the 
beginning of a nell epoch in which industrialisation a."ld its attendant 
ruthless conpetition would be eliminated once and for all. It is 
certainly true to say that until 1933 the Nazi leadership allowed a 
thousand economic fantasies to flower,
Despite its apparent contradictions, not to say blatant opportunism, 
the Nazi programme was able to get across to its voters one central fact: 
support us, and things will change drastically, T'nis was the sense in 
which they were regarded as a radical party by those who supported 
them at the elections. However, the form this change would take 
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when and if they gained power was never clearly spelt out to the 
German electorate, but that the change, when it finally came, 
would sweep all before it was made very plain to the ran."'< and 
file of party workers. For ins'tance, the original electoral slogan, 
upon which the quote heading this section was based, ran: "Put an 
end to it now! Everyone vote £or Hitler!" . '..'hat exactly I it I was, 
and what would_ replace 'it 1 , depended upon the particular articulation 
which each class faction had with the main body of the ideology. Certain 
questions, crucial in any economic programme claiming for itself a radical 
status, were left in abeyance. The problem of profit and its social 
distribution among the classes was ignored until the final section 
of the Nazi programme, where it was dealt with in the following 
pregnant statement:
"How the question of profit will be solved in the future 
is not under discussion here." (4)
If the small-print of the future Nazi society was left rather 
vague, the analysis of the present ills of German society were made 
horribly clear, The Jew became a common factor in all their economic 
analysis. Anti-semitism was the ideological cement which bound the 
Mittelstand to the Nazi banner. A crude distinction was made in 
the body of Nazi anti-capitalist ideas between German capital and 
Jewish capital, with the Jew being nailed as the source of the 
country's economic disruption:
"The Jew ••• tended to represent the forces of the market 
in the flesh, and those who were rightly seen as the 
pioneers of modern ideas and forms of culture • •• were 
made scapegoats £or the dislike of modern developments 
in general • " (5)
For the urban petit -bourgeoise, and his rural counterpart, the Jew 
- whether as banker, middleman £or £arm prC:>duce, or department­
store owner - ca^e to epitomise the agent and the immediate source
-1o-
of his economic distress and political impotence. As Adorno 
succinctly puts it:
"The burden 0£ guilt is shifted £ram the sphere 0£ 
production to the agents 0£ circulation, or to 
those who provide services. 11 ( 6)
Thus were smm the seeds of a racial solution to what •,1ere economic 
problems. Purge the race,and the economic conflicts uhich were at 
the heart of Gernany's troubles would dissolve.
This then was the manure out of which the Nazi metaphysic grew. 
By offering the Geman Mittelstand a 'third way' to the solution of 
their problems, the :fazis allowed the fantastic dreams 0£ a regenerated 
Gemany to develop. From this soil sprouted "the sickly dreams of a 
return to artisanry and corporatism, the Ubuesque master race of 
blonde beasts". (7)
The Cultural Ideologv: Some Core Concepts.
In the preceding account, I have deliberately omitted one group who 
were won over to the National Socialists in large numbers even 
before 1933. These were the yoimg, or rather the middle-class 
young in higher education. Their organisations had been almost 
totally penetrated by the Nazis and Nazi ideology as early as 1930; 
(book burnings were taking place in the universities at least two 
years before the more notorious Hay 1 0th burnings 0£ 1933). \','hat 
we have examined in the previous section were the conditions which 
allowed the Nazis to impose a tentative political cohesion on various 
middle-class groups, enabling them to score some significant victories 
in national and local elections, £or instance their gaining control of 
the Landtag in Thuringia by 1929, These two £actors - growth in
support, plus an increasing involvement in local government meant
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that they began to encounter a wide sector of the German intelligentsia, 
not only the young, both inside and outside the university system. It 
was during the period 1929-1933 that the party began to be faced with 
the problem of extending its ideology into areas of debate that it 
had so far ignored, It had to keep pace with the flood of new 
recruits and, at the same time, talce part in the ever-widening 
'battle for ideas'. The first stages of this intellectual 
engagement were both confused and bewildering, with the party 
performing a series of embarassing about-turns as the more abstract 
dimensions of the ideology and their political implications were worked 
out. The 'Great Flat-Roof Debate· will suffice to show this process at 
work.
Prior to 1928 the national Socialists had rarely intervened in 
the intensive debate that had been in progress throughout the life 
of the Weimar Republic concerning the role art should have in 
'Hodern Society'. Right-wing attacks on what was termed 'cultural 
bolshevism' had been largely the work of conservative individuals, 
operating independently of pressure groups or political organisations. 
In 1928 a conservative architect and art theoretician, Schultze-Nau.mburg, 
launched an attack against the Bauhaus School of Art and Architecture, 
and specifically singled out for criticism the frequency with which 
the Bauhaus style utilised the flat-roof.
"Flat-roofs are inappropriate to the German climate and 
customs, and it is immediately recognisable as the child 
of other skies and other blood. 11 (8)
The sloping-roof and the gable were considered to be the only 'true' 
form for • the German roof'. The debate over which type of roof was 
suitable continued until 1928, with the rightist critics gaining 
support from the German Roofers Guild who thought that the spread 
of flat-roofs was depriving them of work, In 1928, the Nazis entered 
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the debate with a series of articles in the 'V6lkische Beobachter' 
which actually praised the Bauhaus style £or its 'crystal-clear 
functionalism'. At the same time, Rosenberg had been recruiting 
many 0£ the critics 0£ the Bauhaus style, including Schultze- 
Naumberg, into his Karnp£bund fur Deutsche Kultur, which then 
renewed its attacks upon the flat-roof, the Bauhaus, and 1 Neue 
Sachlichkeit' in the arts generally:
"Let us be rid 0£ skyscrapers and return to the 
green German soil." (9)
By 1930 the con.fusion had eased somewhat as the 'Volkische Beobachter' 
had by now come out against the Bauhaus style. The reasons £or this 
change are interesting since it is not an indication 0£ an increasing 
degree of coherence inside the ideology in respect of the arts, but is 
simply a piece 0£ classic opportunist politics:
"The Bauhaus style proletarianises 100,000's 0£ sel£- 
suf£icient building workers ... it liquidates the 
heart 0£ the petit-bourgeoisie." (1 O)
This initial confusion and hesitancy in matters cultural (and 
scie.'l'lti£ic) could be illustrated with hundreds 0£ examples. The 
point being made is that, having established themselves as a 
seemingly radical party among the German Hittelstand, this 'radicalism' 
had to be extended to the cultural and intellectual plane as soon as 
they began to penetrate and encounter the intelligentsia. I£ we are 
to understand the premises from which National Socialist 'radicalism' 
worked, then we must look at a number 0£ categories which operated on 
a higher level 0£ abstraction. The three categories that I have 
chosen as most vital £or any discussion of the practice and thought 
0£ the Nazis in the area 0£ culture are Volk, Race, and Soul.
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VOLK
The eategory of the Volk, in Nazi thought, functioned primarily as
a Utopian societal category, with its power lying in its ability
to provide an image of an ideal, comunity towards which the
coming National Sociali;t society could aspire. The mode in 
which such ideal societal images operate within the ideology 
of a particular group has been pin-pointed by \ialter Benjamin:
11To the form of the new means of production, which 
to begin with is still dominated by the old (Harx), 
there correspond images in the collective consciousness 
in which the new and the old are intermingled. These 
images are ideiis, and inthem the collective seeks 
not only to transfigure, but also to transcend the 
immaturity of the social product and the deficiencies 
of the social order of production. In these ideal 
images there also emerges a vigorous aspiration to 
break with v:hat is out-dated, which means, however, 
with the most recent past. These tendencies turn 
the fantasy, which gains its initial stimulus from 
the new, back upon the primal past. In the dream 
which every epoch sees in images of the epoch which 
is to succeed it, the latter appears coupled with 
elements of pre-history - · that is to say, of a 
classless society. 11 (11 )
If we substitute the word Hittelstand for the rather vague term 
'collective', then we can begin to see the power that the term 
'Volk' tapped with its ability to produce an image of a transcendent, 
classless society for a regenerated Germany. The category of the Volk 
had many general features in common with other conservative European 
critiques of industrial capitalism. It contained the standard 
appeals for the population to 'return' to a more organic form of 
social existence, where class warfare would be abolished and where 
the depredations of large-scale industry and free-market forces 
would be held in check. In addition, there were elements which 
favoured the setting up of a strong caste of enlightened guardians 
who would be able to replace the confusion created by political parties 
with mere sectional interests. Thus, liberal self-interest and 
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individualism would give way to a £orm 0£ cor.ununal vision and action. 
Every version of this critique drew its mythic poT.,rer from a £antasised 
fire-industrial 'Golden Age' ,in terms of which it launched its attacks 
on industrial capitalism. This 'Golden Age' was extremely selective 
from the totality 0£ each nation's historical experience, and the 
German version 0£ this critique, the Volkisch myth, drew upon only 
a few moments in the country's history. The central element was 
located in the peasantry and small towns of the mediaeval period, 
but there were also several accretions drawn from other periods 
which were then .fused with this central image. These additions 
were the myths of the 'Niebelungen' from the pre-Roman tribes (nordic), 
which happily combined with the inflated militarism stemming from 
Bismark's Reich.
This concept 0£ the Volk was constantly deployed as a critical 
tool against the contemporary political institutions of T:Teimar and, 
beyond this, to their intellectual sources, the liberal democracies 
of Western Europe. These political systems were denigrated as the 
products of 'merely' rational thought, and the types of social 
relationships which they fostered between men were denounced as 
'mechanical 1· In such societies, it was claimed, men lacked depth 
in their social life and found themselves enslaved by a system which 
was completely inadequate for expressing and confirming the deep 
emotions which were at the heart of any •tne^ society. The 
Volkisch way, on the other hand, was depicted as 'the German 
Way', a national alternative to the paths taken by the hated western 
democracies and, above all, to that taken by Ueimar. The Volk was 
to provide the frame for the emergence of a real conununity, divorced 
and separate from those ephemeral institutions produced by liberal 
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democracy, The essence of the Volk could never be grasped rationally, 
since it was nbt simply a product of the intellect but was a reality 
only capable of being experienced through the 'blood' and the 
sheer act of living in it. Two of the nost common adjectives 
used in talking about the Volk were 'elemental' and 'natu.ral', 
the implication being that it alone was capable of giving men 
a deep understanding of the universe and of the natural forces 
which constituted this universe. It alone was capable of healing 
the spiritual alienation of man, which again was seen as stemming 
from a form of society based upon liberal individualism. The sources 
of this outlook in German Romanticism were c.\"c.r-\i summarised by 
Thomas t-!ann:
"Poetry and art - at least, Romantic poetry and 
German art - these embody dreams, simplicity, 
feeling, or, better still, 1 gemutlich1 : they 
have nothing in common with 'intellect', which is 
very much like the Weimar Republic, to be considered 
a matter for Jew-boys, to be held in contempt by 
patriots." (12)
The logical result of liberalism would be a form of Harxism which 
would finally destroy the Volk and reduce men to one-dimensional 
economic animals. The entire identity of Man and his community 
•.,,ras summarised in the word I rootedness 1 : when Han achieved true 
rootedness, then real freedom could begin, since the individual 
would be subsumed under a wider emotional community:
"We do not conceive of the individual being as an 
isolated phenomenon, but •.• as the healthy essence 
of Volkstur.l." ( 13)
The dream of a pre-industrial community was to result in a 
sentimental worship of the peasant as the type closest to the
ideal of National Socialist man:
"First there was a German peasantry in Germany before 
what is served up as German history could develop 
from it and, unfortunately, on its back. Neither 
princes, nor the church, nor the cities have created 
German man as such. Rather, the German man emerged 
from the German peasantry." (14)
This idealised peasant was the heart and s::,ul of the Volk, displaying 
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sincerity, integrity, simplicity and the inevitable capacity for 
hard work. The term 'rootedness' reached past this picture of the 
hearty peasa..."l.t to encompass the natural setting in which this rural 
idyll was to be enacted. The Volk and the landscape it inhabited 
were bound together in a seamless whole, which both imprinted its 
essence on this landscape and was, at the sa';le time, formed by it:
"only those closest to the soil were the most genuine 
human beings, since they partook of nature and the 
historical landscape of the Volk; only they were 
attached to the life of the spirit." (15)
This hardly constituted an ideology for an urban working-class, 
and, as we have seen, the idea of the Volk contained many powerful 
anti-democratic and anti-socialist elements. Its ability to appeal 
to the German Hittelstand and to rr.obilise them on the side of the 
Hazis lay, not only in the fact that it was rooted in the contemporary 
material situation of these groups, but also that it was able to 
transcend this material reality and, however vaguely, offer them 
some hope for the resolution of their present fears and anxieties. 
Its power lay in its ideal content. The Volk image not only spoke 
to the alienation of the intelligentsia, it was also, after the 1929 
Depression, able to provide a focus £or the £ears of the Mittelstand 
by offering a societal image of an alternative way of life to the 
system which they identified as the source of their economic troubles. 
These fears, and the way in which they conceived of their being resolved, 
necessitated the transformation/obliteration of German big business and 
the alienated 'non-rooted' urban proletariat, symbolised in the way of 
life associated with a large modern city.
The Volk did not merely lie in the past, but was capable of 
projection into the future. The disruptive conflict of capital and 
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labour had destroyed the Volk of the past and had torn men from their 
organic cor:1munity, flinging then together in rootless opposition 
inside the 'asphalt jungles' of the modern cities. This harmonising 
of anti-modernist themes within the wider category of the Volk is an 
excellent example of the way in which ideas which had previously been 
the property of a small right-wing sect were capable of being turned 
into the basis of a mass movement by the Uazis. 'fhis is Paul La
Garde, ^‘s...°\"-\«l conservative critic of the 19th century, describing
the Germany of his day:
"The nation is bored. Therefore individuals, through 
smoking, reading, theatre-going, bar-loitering, home 
gardening and the addiction to humour magazines, try 
to dispel their awareness that ciphers like themselves 
cannot stand being alone for any length of time." (16)
La Garde 1 s contempt for the spiritual shallmmess of his times is 
focused on the role played by the city. This is Hitler, ,,rriting in
1 l!ein :Kampf' in 1924:
"In the 19th ce:::itury our cities bega.'11 more and more 
to lose the character of cultural sites and to descend 
to the level of mere human settlements. The small 
attachment of our present big-city proletariat for 
the town they live in is the consequence of the fact 
that it is only the individual's accidental stopping­
place, and nothing more. This is partly connected 
with the frequent change of residence caused by social 
conditions, which do not give a man time to form a 
closer bond with the city, and another cause is to 
be foi.md in the general cultural insignificance and 
poverty of our present day cities per se." (17)
Thus the Nazis made the modern city a major £actor in the social
and cultural decline of Germany, since it was precisely in this
arena that the two forces which symbolised the absence of the Volk, 
big business and the working-class, faced each other in the class
war. It was self-evident in the idea of the Volk that a true 
community was impossible when the soil of the fatherland was cut 
off from a people by a layer of asphalt:
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"The !fordic :,ran never £eels comfortable in apartment 
houses where the tenants live piled in layers upon 
one another, and where the most intimate sounds 
penetrate everywhere." (18)
For the intelligentsia the image of a Volkisch community was seen as 
a way of banishing the emptiness of modern urban existence and the 
peripheral nature of their O'.m lives and ideas, whilst to the 
Hittelstand it rneant the end of the organised labour movement and 
the reining in of big capital. The force of the Volk image can be 
seen in Leni Reifenstahl's film I The Triumph of the Uill' in which, 
apart from the endless r:iotorcades, the only intrusion that the modern 
world ma1:es into this Nazi spectacle is a glimpse of sor:ie factory 
chimneys, half-hidden in the haze above the gabled roofs of mediaeval 
!:Urer:iberg.
RACE
I£ the concept of the Volk provided a Utopian image 0£ a regenerated 
Germany, then the racial doctrines of the Ifazis provided the bridge 
across which the population would have to cross before the promised 
land could be reached. The elaboration of this racial ideology, 
and the savagery with which it was implemented, became the 
distinctive German contribution to the fascist chamber of horrors. 
As such, they have come to occupy a central position in all the 
subsequent debates about the nature of National Socialism. Often 
this expresses itself in the forr.n.uation of a rather simplistic 
equation whereby the racial doctrines = anti-semitism. In the 
follo,..ring analysis I have tried to keep the two dimensions separate, 
since the ideological work that each dimension performed was slightly 
different.
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'.iithin the Hazi ideological pantheon the racial doctrines ca'1.e 
to occupy a sinilar position to that of class in the !Iarxist 
tradition. Race was raised by the !fazis to the status of I the 
motor of history', a key for the complete understanding of Han Is 
past and of his .f'ut'...tre. For the Hational Socialists the essence 
of human history was not to be found in the rise and £all of social 
classes as men elaborate and develop their modes of production, but 
rather in the rise and fall of 'racial cores', and, more specifically, 
in the fortunes of the Nordic/Aryan racial core in its journey 
through world history. If the concept of the Volk dealt with social 
structure, then the racial core was the agglomerate which was to be 
organised within this structure. The political importance of these 
racial doctines lay in their ability to provide a counterpoint to 
the mobilising power which the ideology of class-struggle had 
achieved among the German working-class. To achieve an ascendancy, 
these doctrines had to enter the market place of competing ideologies 
and engage those systems already in existence, of which the most 
important was Harxist socialism. It \las in this sense that they · 
provided the 1-!ittelstand with a set of ideas with which to combat 
the theoretical weapons of the working-class. This £'unction of 
German racialism has been admirably sum::iarised by Sedgewick:
"What has to be determined is the £'unction of anti­
semitism (and anti-Slavism) in the belief system 
of the National Socialist movement as a whole. For, 
despite the programmatic timidity and opportunism of 
all wings of Nazism, from Hitler to the so-called 
'Left Nazis' like the Strassers, the 'Socialism' of 
'National Socialism' has to be taken very seriously. 
All the militancy and sacrifice, all the hatred of 
privilege and corruption, all the determination to 
make a better and cleaner world, which among 
revolutionary socialists is attached to class 
perspective on society, was present among the Nazi 
pioneers, only linked to a racial 'vision'. Demagoguey 
and conscious deception were practised constantly, but 
within the limits of a terrible sincerity." (:t9)
One could also add that after 1933 this 'terrible sincerity' was 
not simply the property of a handful o£1Uazi pioneers I but of a 
mass-based political movement.
Race and Culture
The liazis, in common with all the groupings o.£ the German right, 
shared a r.mtu.al heritage, that of a continuous tradition of concern 
with racial polities. The t';10 primary sources £or these racial 
doctrines were the impact of 1 9th century philology, and the 
political anthropology which accompanied Germany's aquisition o£ 
an Empire. The philological element originated in the researches 
by Hax Muller into the origins 0£ the Indo-European £a'1lily of 
languages. '.lhile his specific findings on the nature 0£ these 
languages were a considerable step forward £or the time, he also 
absorbed the general sociological thought of the period, positing 
a concrete historico-racial grouping which was responsible £or the 
passage of these related languages from Asia to Europe. This was 
the source 0£ the Aryan myth whereby the wanderings of this 
imaginary group of people were traced through the cultural and 
social history of Europe. Alfred Rosenberg, who was completely 
irmnersed in this tradition, set out to trace and identify the 
various manifestations 0£ this racially homogenous group in the 
civilisations of the Ancient World and in the societies of mediaeval 
Europe. What £or ?-f\il.ler had been nothing more than a vague suggestion 
that such a racial group existed became, in the hands of Rosenberg, 
an empirical £act, a •resolute racial core' and, at the sa."lte time, a 
peg onto which he could hang a bewildering variety of ideological 
suppositions. Thus, a caption in a National Socialist newspaper read:
"The race now as a thousand years ago"
while below this was a picture of a Roman £ace placed against that of 
a modern German. (20)
The Nazi racial theory 0£ history took a great deal 0£ trouble 
to eliminate the earlier diffusionist eler:tents which had permeated 
the racial ideologues. Cultural traits could not be allowed to
dif£use through peoples and o.tl.tures, but had to be read as the 
indelible print of actual racial groupings intruding into the social 
and cultural bodies of similarly distinct racial cores. All the 
cultural manifestations of a people were seen as a £unction of 
their racial composition and were, therefore, indissolubly intertwined. 
The reality behind the cultural products of a society was always a 
biological, racial grouping:
"Long ago we had to abandon the notion of there being 
an homogenous origin £or the myths, art, and religious 
£orms of all peoples. On the contrary, well established 
evidence of saga diffusion £ro1;1 people to people, and the 
correlation of these sagas with different groups of peoples, 
reveals that the most basic myths have a definite point of 
origin." (21 )
Each ensemble of myths and cultural traits is specific to a continuous
and homoge¥us race, and will retain this distinctiveness almost
regardless of the economic and political circumstances in which 
the racial core £inds itself. Culture becomes the urgent expression 
of racial specificity. In his •masterpiece', 'Der Hythus des 20 
Jahrhunderts', Rosenberg set out to rewrite European history in 
terms 0£ the fortunes of the Aryan/Germanic peoples and their 
to^^us wanderings through the pages o£ a totally ficitious history. 
The almost lunatic lengths to which he was prepared to go in order 
to equate what he thought was 'good' in European history with the 
exploits of the Aryan peoples can be judged by his comments on French 
history:
11 French power polities remained constant only because 0£ 
the traditions of a thousand year history combined with
But this was manifested
in a fashion different from that which had appeared between
Those in France who still
thought nobly drew back from the dirty business of politics, 
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lived in provincial capitals in conservative isolation 
and sent their sons into the army to serve the father: 
land. This was particularly so in the case of the navy. 
At the end of the 19th century, onlooxers at naval balls 
made the astonishing discovery that all the officers 
were blonde!" (22)
:.longside this idea 0£ the racial specificity 0£ cultures, and 
particularly that of the Aryans, there was a second source of 
racial thinking, deriving from a type of 19th century 'Political 
Anthropology'. The impulse £or this lay, as we have said, in the 
study of the physical characteristics of those various peoples who 
had been incorporated into the German Empire, but what in the 19th 
century had been a perfectly respectable interest in the species 
variability of Han, was rapidly transformed into a purely racial 
ideology. The result was that, by the end of the 19th century, 
it was a commonplace among right-wing sects to subscribe to one 
variant or another 0£ a 'breeding' theory of history, which was 
almost invariably coupled with a moral hierarchy 0£ races with the 
Aryan, of course, firmly at the top. (It should be noted that 
Mendelian genetics made hardly any impact upon Nazi racial theory.) 
The nation-state was seen as a biological breeding group, and the 
'health' of the state and its culture depended upon the 'health' 
of the breeding stock. Cultures declined and nations £ell because 
0£ a serious weakening or undermining of the race. This was to 
produce a type 0£ 'Decline and Fall' thinking, set within a 
biological/racial framework. Prior to the domination of the
German right by the Nazis, this biological and political anthropology 
tended to be both pessimistic and elitist, and the groups holding these 
racial ideas were resigned to an unstoppable decline in civilisation 
and, more particularly, in German life. The only recourse that 
appeared open to them was to set in motion a programme 0£
i
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'regeneration', aimed at the breeding of a racially-pure elite who 
would take control of the state and guide the nation back onto its 
true course. The Nazis were to reject this pessimistic element, 
adopting instead an active philosophy in the face of this 'decline' 
of the German race. However, what they did inherit from this 
tradition were all the familiar catch-phrases of racial rhetoric: 
words such as 1 ffiongrelisation', 'bastardisation', 'race-dilution', 
became common images in the Nazi analysis of the condition of '>leimar 
Germany.
In contrast to the rather desperate gloom which settled over 
the German right, the Nazis were neither pessimistic nor elitist in 
their racial programmes. For them the 'third way', which they 
regarded as their special contribution to the tradition of racial 
thought, would require themass application of procedures to ensure 
'racial hygiene'. The full and correct application of these racial 
doctrines would open up the way £or the realisation of the transcendent 
Volk and its dream of a regenerated Germany. It is not unreasonable 
to say that £or the Nazis racial regeneration became synonomous with 
the 'revolution'. Although by the end of the war the 'positive' 
breeding policies had been only partially realised eg. through 
the selective matings of the S.S., the more negative aspects of 
the doctrine ie. the elimination of the racially impure and 
agents of contamination, were pursued with a vengeance.
"There is a £earful awareness that today we stand 
before a final decision: either we attain, through 
a re-experiencing and cultivation of primal blood 
combined with an elevated will to struggle, a new 
purifying level of achievement, or even the last 
Germanic-Western values of civilisation and state 
discipline will vanish amidst filthy metropolitan 
crowds, crippled upon the hot barren asphalt of a 
bestialised humanity, or trickling away, in the form 
of a self-bastardising emigration, as a sickness­
inducing germ, to South America, China, the Dutch 
Indies and Africa.'' (23)
Anti-Semitism
"The Jew has no culture'' (24)
The image of the Jew which developed within Nazi ideology provided 
a negative counterpoint to the 'positive' picture contained in the 
concepts of the Volk and the Race. This ideology had established, 
in however vague a manner, a kind of 'cultural nationalism', and 
had underpinned it with a racial/biological base. The German nation, 
the German peple, and German culture became woven together in a 
quasi-mystical unity unique to the Aryan race. The nature of these 
relationships, and the fact that only Aryans were capable of 
experiencing this 'elemental' collectivity, became the substance 
of the 'Germanicness' that the ideology was constantly trying to 
locate and define. This 'Germanicness' was being stifled and held 
back from realisation by the operation of non-Aryan forces within 
the society. International finance capital, Harxism, the alienation 
of modern urban life, all these had their origin in the Jew and his 
racially specific way of life. The problem was how to attribute such 
a w'ide variety of elements to the activities of one particular ethnic 
group. The solution, in terms of this particular ideological discourse, 
lay in the unique characteristics - racial and, therefore, also 
social and cultural - of the Jewish people themselves. The Jew 
had always been regarded by the German right as 'alien' to the 
mystical unity of the German race and its Volkisch community. It 
was considered impossible for the Jews ever to become 'truly' German, 
or truly anything for that matter, since they,of all men, alone 
lacked a homeland and therefore, in terms of the racial logic, a 
soul, 1 kultur', or anything else that was characteristic of 'rootedness'.
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"The Jew had no feeling for a homeland, could not 
get such a feeling anywhere, did not yearn to do 
so, and therefore appeared as an eternal wanderer 
wherever the middleman-business or usury could 
prosper." (25)
He was forever a parasite upon the lives of peoples who possessed 
these qualities: always in an active conspiratorial relationship 
with these cor.111tunities, attempting to subvert them and subject 
them to domination by the injection of alien ideas and institutions. 
In the Nazi cultural critique the Jew became the source of all 
those tendencies in modern life which had led to the 'decline' 
of Germany. This overall national 'decline' was responsible for 
the defeat of 1918, and the increasing decadence of life under 
the institutions of the weimar Republic. Since the Jew lacked 
a soul, or rather a German soul, he was forever incapable of 
experiencing that deep metaphysical communion v.'ith nature and 
man which was so characteristic of the Aryan way of life. This 
lack of spirituality was complemented by a tendency for the Jew 
to become the purveyor of a 'shallow materialism' which could assume 
a multitude of historical disguises. This 'Jewish materialism' could 
be identified in the rationalism of the Enlightenment, right through 
to its most modern embodiment in Socialistic Marxism. The Jew, or 
his agents, was always the middleman, never the producer; he was 
always the rationaliser, or the prophet of enlightened liberalism 
or humanism. The leading edge of the various modes taken by this 
International Jewish Plot was the gradual domination of the nation's 
economy by international (Jewish) finance capital. Marxism was 
regarded as a second-order phenomenon invented by finance capital 
to infect the nation and ferment class warfare, the more to open 
up the country to a sneak attack:
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"The struggle of social democracy against the 
economic life of the nation has been only to 
prepare the ground for the rule of the really 
international and stock exchange capital." (26)
In his more immediate behaviour, the Jew was always branded as 
•non-idealistic', devoted to 'mere sensuality', a decadent softie. 
He remained tied to the city, where he plotted the overthrow of the 
European nations through economic disruption and, just as importantly, 
through a type of cultural sabotage. It was their influence, manifesting 
itself through a wide range of cultural activities, that led 'good 
Aryans' to deny the inner promptings of their 'Nordic race-soul'. 
The supreme example of this was to take seriously, or worse still 
to practise, that most characteristic manifestation of the Jewish 
spirit, modern art:
"The metropolis began its race-annihilating work. The 
coffee-houses of the asphalt men became studios; 
theoretical, bastardised dialectics became laws £or 
ever-new directions. A race chaos of Germans, Jews, 
and anti-natural street races was abroad. The result 
was a mongrel art." (27)
"Democratic race-corrupting precepts and the Volk- 
annihilating metropolis, combined with the carefully 
planned, decomposing activities of the Jews. The 
result was not only the shattering of the Weltanschaung 
and state thought, but also the art of the Nordic 
west ••.• " (28)
The role played by the anti-semitic elements within the general racial 
doctrines of the Nazis cannot be stressed sufficiently. In the area 
of culture the constant depiction of the 'hell' of the Jew-induced 
present was used to give substance to the elusive reality of the .
posited Volkisch paradise of the future. To the question 'How can 
the cultural life of Germany be regenerated?', the Nazis replied, 
'By eliminating the Jew!'.
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THE SOUL
One o.f the .favourite ploys o.f the Nazis was to contrast the National 
Socialist 'revolution' with the type o.f revolution advocated by 
Marxists. The latter was invariably dismissed as a 'shallow' 
revolution, having only a purely materialistic content. I.f 
successful, the :Marxist revolution would reduce 
individuals to ciphers, 'economic men', embedding them in a network 
o.f 'external' and mechanical relationships. The Nazi revolution, on 
the other hand, was alleged to be .fundamentally concerned with the 
spirit, an area lying above that o.f economics. Hitler in his 
speeches constantly referred to his movement as 'a revolution 0£ 
the spirit'. The stated aim of the National Socialist revolution 
was 'the liberation o£ the soul o£ the German people'.
The power that this idealistic component had in lining up the 
German middle-class behind the Nazis has been consistently under­
estimated, especially by those Marxist commentators of the thirties 
who tackled the problem 0£ fascism (Guerin, Neumann, Brady). This 
was to result in an overly dismissive attitude towards the .force 
which such an ideology could exert in a given social structure. The 
Nazi ideologues were repeatedly characterised as 'skilful charlatans', 
cynically de.frauding and misleading the German people with irrational 
'pie-in-the-sky' promises and second-rate mysticism. The .final 
crushing judgement on the ideology is that it was precisely these 
idealistic elements that were thrown overboard on gaining power. 
There is, 0£ course, a core of truth in these judgements. For 
instance, as early as September 1934 Hitler could say: 
"The National Socialist revolution ••• as a 
revolutionary power process is closed." (29)
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But it was only closed at the expense of a massive internal repression 
within the party, coupled with the R'l3hm purges. Nevertheless, it is 
perhaps only in the area of culture that the drean of a revolution 
of the German spirit and soul could be sustained after 1934.
"The revolution would be an inner transformation •.• 
it would leave the external shell intact and would 
change only the inner nature." (30)
Narx:ist analysts were again right to castigate this as amounting to 
the perfect bourgeois revolution, subjectivising its content and 
leaving the 'external' property relationships intact. But this is 
to ignore the dimension referred to by Sedgewick as 'the terrible 
sincerity". Rosenberg derided the Harxism of his day as "lacking 
a myth" and went on to locate the success of the National Socialist 
movement precisely in its ability to address itself to the problem 
of spiritual alienation. The problem of what to do in order to - 
restore the German soul was one with which Hitler particularly 
concerned himself:
"The German collapsing into himself, divided in spirit, 
disunited in his purpose and thus powerless to act, 
becomes enfeebled in his own existence. He dreams 
dreams of justice in the heavens and loses ground 
on earth. But the more nation and reich were 
shattered and the safeguards of national life 
wea.<ened, the more he tried at all times to turn 
necessity into virtue •••• Ultimately, the only road 
remaining open to the German people was the inward 
road. As the nation of the bards, poets, thinkers, 
they drea."ned of a world in which the others lived. 
Only after being battered unmercifully by privation 
and misery did there grow up the longing, perhaps out 
of the arts, for a renewal, for a new Reich, and thus 
for a new life." (31)
\!hat a class imagines^ it is doing may be false, but this inage does 
not therefore become simply the product of a few cynically motivated 
leaders.
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'!hat were the specific qualities of the Germa11 soul that was 
about to be transformed? It is one of the ironies of history 
that the :Tazis would have liked to have been }:no',."n as the true 
inheritors of Gerr:1an Ror:ianticisn. They saw themselves as the only 
political group which had managed to combine a deep grasp of the 
realities of modern polities w'ith an ability to dream the drea--,s 
of the "fog-beridden" German soul. They alone had the insight 
and the vision, as well as the political skill and ability to ma}::e 
this vision a reality. The idea of 'the German soul' was to come 
to occupy a key position in their thin..<ing about art. The soul was 
seen as the location of the eternal, of 1he unchanging reality which 
lay behind the phenomenal appearance of human history. In the Soul 
were to be found those absolute, ideal values which were carried 
through history by the race, and which found concrete and social 
expression in the life of the Volk. The Soul was, therefore, not s’^ 
a ru-^""u\ 1 ^'uJwe entity, but an objective communal reality where 
the deepest and most basic essence of a people was to be found. 
Participation in the 'race-soul' did not rest upon a mode of 
existence that was either rational or materialistic in nature 
(for instance, it did not rest on the suJrunation of private economic 
endeavours), but was based on a profoundly mysterious and spiritual 
way of life. Nazi ideology set itself the task of unifying the 
political movement with what were seen as the urgent and irrational 
demands of the German Soul. Only in this way could Germany return 
to the source of those eternal truths which characterised the 'true' 
German. During the period 1933-1939 this was to take the form of 
nature worship and drew its inspiration from the myths of the 
Niebelungen. The reviving of these old rituals was seen as a way 
of putting the Soul back into communion with the cosmos and of 
—90—
undoing the materialism imposed by the Judaic-Christian tradition. 
As we noted earlier, the Soul was always the property of a unique 
racial grouping and was only able to be truly itself by relating 
to the history of that race, to 'the glorious deeds of its 
ancestors', to the landscape inhabited by the race, and to the 
whole nexus denoted by "blood and soil". The restoration of 'the 
whole man' was always present, however distorted, in the notion of 
'the revolution of the spirit·. The invocation of a myth-ridden 
past was the repository £or these images of the whole man: its 
realisation, however, was conditional on the most thorough cleansing 
of the society:
"The fantastic mingles with the horrible: up to the 
very end the crudely legendary, the grim deposit 0£ 
saga in the soul 0£ the nation, is invoked, with all 
the familiar echoes and reverberations." (32)
The Nazi Aesthetic
"For if the Age of Pericles seems embodied in the 
Parthenon, the Bolshevistic present is embodied 
in a cubist monstrosity."
Hitler (33)
When we come to examine the theory and practice o£ the Nazis in 
the realm 0£ the arts, one feature stands out above all others, 
namely the drawing together 0£ the political and cultural dimensions 
into a conscious synthesis. The overriding ambition was to weld 
culture into a total political w'eltanschaung:
11 after the capture of the state, the National Socialist 
idea would link up all the cultural life with conscious 
political-ideological propaganda." (34)
However, if the analysis were simply to remain content with this 
bald statement of intent, there would be little to distinguish the
Nazi cultural project from that of post-revolutionary Russia and 
the other socialist regimes which have followed it. Notions of 
a convergence within 'totalitarian' regimes always obscure real 
differences between these societies, especially the direction 
which they envisage art and culture taking in a post-revolutionary 
situation, The Nazi position on art was radically different from 
that which -was inspired by the Marxist tradition, What we are 
confronted with here is a radical right-wing movement whose 
cultural thought was 'idealist· as against the 'materialism' 
of the Marxist tradition. Despite numerous controversies and 
important differences of emphasis which have occurred within the 
Marxist tradition, it nevertheless contains a number of core concepts 
which it would be useful to highlight at this point in order to 
distinguish them from Nazi thought and practice.
The major part of Marxist thinking on art and culture stems
from the classic paragraph in the preface to 'A Contribution to
the Critique of Political Economy·:
"In the social production of existence, men inevitably 
enter into definite relations which are independent of 
their will, namely relations of production appropriate 
to a given stage in the development of their material 
forces of production. The totality of these relations 
of production constitutes the economic structure of 
society, the real foundation on which arises a legal 
and political superstructure and which corresponds to 
definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political, and intellectual life. 
It is not consciousness which determines their existence, 
but their social existence that determines their conscious­
ness •••• Changes in the economic foundation lead sooner 
or later to the transformation of the whole superstructure. 
In studying such transformations it is always necessary 
to distinguish between the terial transformation of 
the economic conditions of production, which can be 
determined with the precision of natural science, 
and the legal, political, religious, artistic or 
philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which 
men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out .•.. " (35)
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From this basic position there follow a number of assumptions 
which constitute the Marxist tradition:
(i) iArt is always a social activity (despite immediate 
appearances) and will therefore partake of the total 
social activity of men in the reproduction of their 
life. On an ideological level, art may be regarded 
as divorced and separate from the world it inhabits, 
but at a deeper level it is completely penetrated 
by the activities of men living in society.
(ii) Following from this, there is the notion that a 
culture's 'feet' are always located in the 'mud' 
of the economic process and are, therefore, 
necessarily part of the struggle between the 
classes £or the possession of the means 0£ 
production and 0£ the social, political and 
ideological power which accompanies such ownership.
(iii) It is the task of the Marxist critic to bring these 
relationships to a conscious level.
(iv) Although the implications £or artistic practice are 
not always so clear cut, the role of the artist , 
following the triumph of the doctrine of Socialist 
Realism, has been above all to participate on the 
side of the proletariat - and its institutions - 
in its struggles. This has usually taken the form 
of a demand that the artist practice a type of 
'imaginative pedagogy'.
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Nazi thought and practice in the arts was very different from 
this. Firstly, all •true' art and culture were seen as the 
repository o£ the eternal spiritual values of man. These values, 
and by implication the art which contained them, were transhistorical, 
the property of a transcendent Soul rather than the result o£ the 
dialectical movement o£ social classes through history:
"There is no such thing as a revolution in art; there 
is only eternal art - the Greek-Nordic art." (36)
But this transcendent nature of art did have a social aspect. The 
realm of the eternal values was not simply an atomistic collection 
of individual souls, but rather a spiritual couounal soul, which was 
the property of the race. The eternal realm of art was the spiritual 
parallel of the racial unit organised in its Volkisch community, and 
it was through this ideological gateway that the Nazis attempted to 
relate art and politics. It followed that, since true art always 
expressed something other than the individualistic transcendence 
which was the most characteristic feature of art in the 'Jewish- 
liberalistic' democracies, it would 'plug' into,and lay bare, the 
eternal values of the German people as a racial c^munity. Thus the 
expression of a racial view through the medium of art was opposed to 
the kind of art which expressed class or the private vision of an 
individual. Both these types of art were 'race-denying', while the 
aim of the Nazis was to create a situation where "blood and race will 
once again become the source of artistic intuition".
This is an inversion of the Marxist tradition, a reversal of 
the Marxist causal chain or, rather, of the hierarchy of human 
activity in which artistic production takes place. In the Nazi 
schema, the values of art descend eternal from the skies, eventually 
filtering downwards into the totality of men's social being. The 
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reconstituted society does not create new art and culture: it 
rediscovers, that which had been lost, but which had always existed 
as an eternally present potential. To this central notion of the 
transhistorical nature of 'true art' there was grafted a moral 
'take' on the cultural products of a race, which again had direct 
political implications. All cultural artefacts could be seen as 
symptomatic of the moral 'health' of a people, and could, therefore, 
be used to diagnose the condition of the patient's soul. In this 
context, words such as 'decline', 'decadence' and 'exhaustion' were 
favourite terms:
"In the collapse of Germany after the war, the economic 
decline had been generally felt, the political decline 
had been denied by many, the cultural decline had not 
even been observed by the majority of the people." (37)
Within the Nazi cultural critique there were many embryonic 
forms of a social-based analysis of art: links were certainly 
made between the more general social life of a group, and the 
type and standard of its cultural activities. Artistic and cultural 
'problems' were invariably read as transposed versions of problems 
posed by life and society. The difficulty was that the terms of the 
analytical equation were often highly distorted. For instance, given 
their idealistic premises, their analysis of the 'problem' of German 
art would go something like this: 'Art gets cut of£ from its eternal 
historically-transcendent source; this degeneration of art is matched 
by social disintegration and decline; the cause of both is the 
disintegration of the racial breeding unit; thus the problems 
of society and of art can be solved by correct breeding policies 
aimed at locating, and recreating, an idealistic transhistorical 
entity, namely the true and pure German race.' Caught in this logic, 
it is not surprising that all they were left with were the grisly
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realities 0£ the racial hygiene programme, whilst the Holy Grail of 
a renewed German art remained forever an unresolved problematic. 
Their distorted social and political analysis meant that they were 
unable to escape from that fundamental aesthetic dilemma to which we 
addressed ourselves in the introduction - how it is possible to 
unify art and politics and allow it to function within a radically 
new social order:
"During the long years in which I planned the formation 
of a new Reich, I gave much thought to the tasks which 
would await us in the cultural cleansing 0£ the people's 
life: there was to be a cultural renascence as well as 
a political and economic reform." (38)
Politics was to be allowed to enter the realm of culture, but only 
in order to root out, eliminate and destroy, and all in the name of 
a specious racial community. Culture was to be allowed into politics, 
but only to celebrate this specious community, a community which had 
never existed in £act and was unrealisable in principle.
Hitler, Goebbels and Rosenberg
"A romanticism of steel has taken the place 0£ 
a romanticism of dreams.'' (39)
"The most perfect shape, the most sublime image 
that has recently been created in Germany has 
not come @ut o.tJ any artist's studio. It is 
the steel helmet." (40)
Despite the seeming centrality of artistic matters in the broad 
sweep of Nazi concerns - (Hitler, £or instance, harangued the 
annual party rally at Nuremberg in 1935 £or three hours on the 
importance o£ art in the newly emerging National Socialist state) - 
they were relative late-comers to the debates on culture which had 
been such a notable characteristic of Weimar. At first, their 
policies were haphazard, and very much the product of immediate 
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opportunistic decisions. For instance, the works of 'degenerate 
artists' were not removed from the walls of German museums until 
1937, In this section I wish to outline the different dimensions 
of their aesthetic dealt with by the three most important 'thinkers' 
in this area, Hitler, Goebbels and Rosenberg. Each placed his 
emphasis upon different aesthetic problems. For Hitler the key 
concept was Race, and the most immediate task was the "purging 
of the temple of art" and the ushering in of a racially-pure, 
Nordic art. For Rosenberg the chief concern was the elaboration, 
one might almost say the discovery, of Volkisch art; while for 
Goebbels the only consideration was that art should serve the 
cause of iropaganda in the struggle for the supremacy of the 
National Socialist weltanschaung in the minds of the German masses.
HITLER
Painting and architecture were the only two cultural areas in which 
Hitler personally intervened to 'clarify' and direct the line which 
the party was to take after 1933, His thinking on art has to be 
culled largely from the many speeches he made on the topic and, 
when taken overall, displays a strange amalgam of populist rhetoric 
and simplified 19th century romanticism, welded together by means of 
an openly racist framework. His aesthetic revolved around the two 
concepts of 'the Soul of the people', and the 'racial community 
of the Nordic/^^an race'. This transhistorical Soul was seen as 
the source of all true art:
"art is the expression of the Soul and the ideals of 
the community. 11 ( 41)
This source renders art at one and the same time •eternal' and race 
specific, a seeming contradiction that can be easily resolved if we 
remember that the Soul of the German people was the only one capable 
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of truly comprehending the infinite, and that it alone could enter 
"the eternal starry heaven of the infinite". In its regenerated 
form, German art was to be the veritable inheritor of the 
classical Greek tradition, the only other example of 'real' art 
in the history of Man. (In Nazi hi<3furiography, the Greeks were 
judged to be Nordic.) The problem confronting Hitler's aesthetic, 
and Nazi practice in general, was to specify that which was eternal 
and yet both German and also a manifestation of Nazi ideology. This 
central problematic was to cause much confusion and polemics among 
the N.S.D.A.P. since the Fuhrer was notoriously vague when attempting 
to give some concrete content to the category of the eternal.
In trying to pin down more narrowly what was the German in German art, 
he supplied this slogan:
"To be German is to be clear!"
The content of this Nordic Soul was to become extremely elusive in 
the years to cane, but Hitler was in no doubt that an adequate 
artistic expression could be found for it somewhere. In the face 
of foreign criticism of the 'mediocrity' of 'German' art under the 
rule of the Nazis, he brushed aside any attempt to formulate an 
objective aesthetic based on reason:
"it is not decisive what attitude, if any, foreign peoples 
take towards our works of culture, for we have no doubt 
that cultural creative work is the most sensitive express­
ion of a talent conditioned by blood, and cannot be under­
stood, far less appreciated, by individuals or races 'Who 
are not of the same or related blood." (42)
As with many other areas of Nazi thought, the focus becomes 
distinctly sharper when discussing what is not German. It would 
be useful, at this point, to examine Hitler's attitude towards the 
avant-garde, since it is through his 'critique' of modern art that 
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the social dimension of his aesthetic can be most readily glimpsed. 
For Hitler, modern art could be easily dispensed with since it was 
an art hopelessly locked into a 'Jewish-liberalistic' outlook, and 
was by definition the expression of a decadent social structure. 
When he is not attacking the modern movement in Germany £or being 
the result of a conspiracy between the Jews and liberal snobs to 
sap the morale of the Aryan people, he sees it as, above all, an 
art born of social confusion and cultural decline. He repeatedly 
refers to the 'babble 0£ art-chatter' emanating from modern art 
practitioners, which renders their work inaccessible to the mass 
0£ the people. What seems to disturb him most is the undeniable 
distortion of the human form which was so characteristic of German 
Expressionism and such movements as Cubism. At this point Hitler 
appears to be genuinely puzzled by these modern works: £or him 
it must boil down to the £act that these artists have a malfunctioning 
on the level of perception, in which case they can be handed over to 
the doctors of the Reich £or treatment, or, on the other hand, the 
tendency towards distortion is a function of a social degeneracy 
(£or him, a 'racial condition^), in which case they can again be 
brushed aside in the thrust £or a German art, since they will be 
made irrelevant. The work of the avant-garde was seen as having 
gone astray because it does not aspire to 'the eternal, the 
beautiful and the healthy':
"it is not the £unction of art to remind men of 
the forms taken by degeneracy." (43)
Any distortion of the •real' world is symptomatic of a distorted soul, 
and therefore has no place in the Nordic universe. Behind this 
denigration of the form taken by modern art, there lies the belie£ 
that one o£ the major reasons such formalistic distortion has taken 
place is that art has become divorced from the lives of the mass 0£
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the people, a condition that will eventually be resolved by the
Nazi 'revolution·. It is in the focusing of his aesthetic critique
upon the alienation experienced by the European cultural avant­
garde that we arrive at the core of Hitler's concern, and also
the point at which he becomes most ambiguous:
"The people, when it passes through these galleries, 
will recognise U. ts own) spokesman and counsellor: 
it will draw a sigh of relief and express its glad 
agreement with this purification of art. And that 
is decisive: an art which cannot count on the 
readiest and most intimate of the great mass of the 
people, an art which must rely upon small cliques is 
intolerable ···· the artist cannot stand aloof from 
his people." (44)
To understand this 'art-and-the-people-reconciled' aspect of Hitler's 
thinking, we have to retrace the arguement momentarily. We have 
already seen that art and culture were regarded as absolutely 
central to ideological matters, since it was through art that 
the racial soul could both express and objectify itself; The 
essence of this racial soul and the .forms of its expression £used 
in a mystical collectivity:
"art is the incorporation of the deepest, the essential 
force of a people." (45)
In a speech delivered before the Reichstag soon after the seizure
of power (23rd March, 1933), Hitler actually attacks the 'materialists' 
of his own party who were demanding bread before art: this was 
intended as a veiled criticism of the lingering 'left' tendencies
of the Propaganda Minister:
"the less a people gives to art, the lower, in 
most cases, is its general standard of life." (46)
•Artistic activity c^mot simply be brushed aside in a theoretically 
constructed hierarchy of needs in which art is regarded as something 
which can be taken 'up at a later and happier time:
"art is not something which can be s^ummoned at need,
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and at need dismissed or pensioned off.” (47)
Hitler saw art as something vital at all times to the soul and 
spiritual life of the people. But if art was to be taken (note, 
not 'come') from its aesthetic and social closets and made the 
property of the masses, what was to be the 'revolutionary' new 
form this art would take? what were to be the cultural repercussions 
implied in the social aesthetic spelt out by Hitler? The first and 
primary need was the seizure of political power: only then would a 
regenerated German culture, in touch with the mass of the people, 
become a possibility. Here again we can glimpse in Hitler's 
thinking a half-formed, distorted notion of a cultural revolution: 
"And so today art will in the same way announce and 
herald that common mental attitude, that common 
view of life, which governs the present age.” (48)
The nation will be first united under the N.S.D.A.P.; then the 
masses will be brought to art - and art to the masses - and 
they will participate in their culture, a regenerated German culture: 
"The artist does not create for the artist: he 
creates for the people and he will see to it that 
henceforth the people will be called in to judge 
its art.” (49).
On the surface this would appear to be the beginnings of a radical 
programme for the reshaping of the arts: démocratisation of access; 
power to determine what is produced; and, if we stretch the analysis, 
at least the implication of the appearance of radical new cultural 
forms. But here we come up against the central ambiguity in Hitler's 
thought, in that he manages to channel this incipient radicalism into 
a profoundly conservative and backward-looking vision. The 
'démocratisation' of the arts is simply a staging-post, a condition 
to be fulfilled, before the production of that old faithful of 
Romanticism “ the 'Genius':
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"One anxious wish and one alone must therefore £ill 
the hearts of all o£ us - that Providence may 
grant to us the great masters, who shall echo in 
music the emotions of the soul, who shall immortalise 
them in stone." (50)
The cultural revolution he appeared to promise was simply a transitional 
phase which, when completed, would transport Germany once again into 
the realms depicted by 'geniuses', that most distinctive symbol of 
the long tradition of 'alienated' sensuality in European culture:
"Now is the opportunity £or youth to start its 
industrious apprenticeship and, when a sacred 
conscientiousness at last comes to its own, then 
I doubt not that the almighty, from the mass o£ 
these decent, creators o£ art, will once more raise 
up individuals to the eternal starry heaven o£ the 
imperishable God-favoured artists o£ the great periods." (51)
I£ the aim and end towards which Hitler's cultural thinking pointed 
was backward-looking and firmly rooted in the cliches of the 19th 
century, then the 'radically new' cultural forms envisaged by the
Nazis were literally archaic:
"The new age of today is at work on a new human type 
··· there is a new feeling of life, a new joy. Never 
was h-^^ity in its eternal appearance and its frame 
of mind nearer to the ancient world than it is today." (52)
A Germanic Athens, peopled by blonde geniuses, would be the embodiment
of Hitler's artistic vision. Compare this with Trotsky's vision of
the socialist cultural revolution:
"It is as difficult to foretell the degree of self­
control to which the man of the future will attain 
as it is to prophesy the ultimate results of his 
technical capacities. The construction of society 
and the physiological and psychological self­
education of man will be combined in one and the 
same process. All the arts, poetry, painUng, music 
and architecture, will celebrate this process in 
marvellous ways ·.. Man will be infinitely-stronger, 
wiser and more harmonious, his voice more tuneful, 
. and his movements will be regulated by a new rythm
··· the average man will rise to the level of an 
Aristotle, a Goethe, or a Marx, and, behind this 
ridge, new and loftier peaks will shine." (53)
GOEBBELS
Goebbels was very much the man of practical politics who often 
boasted of his sensitivity to what the masses were thinking and 
feeling:
"If you put propaganda on the table the masses can 
eat it."
His view of art and culture could be summed up in one simple question: 
'how does this work of art further the acceptance of the Nazi 
weltanschaung in the minds of the German people?' In his eyes 
culture was relevant only in terms of the ideological battle 
which had to accompany the successful political battle. (This 
does not mean that he had no personal preferences, but these were 
always sharply separated from general and national strategies.) For 
him abstract aesthetic problems did-not exist or, if they did, were 
not worth troubling about. His earlier 'radicalism' within the party, 
plus a youthful flirtation with the Russian revolution, had left him 
with an undying admiration £or Bolshevik propaganda techniques. 
Culture was vital in the propaganda war: everything beyond that 
was either a luxury or an irrelevance. Culture was politics or it 
was nothing.
In his speech to the Reich's Chamber of Culture in November 1937, 
Goebbels succinctly laid out the developmental aims of Nazi cultural 
policies. The first task, after taking power, was to 'cleanse' the 
German cultural scene of decadent influences. Jewish degenerate art 
had to be eliminated, not because he had a set of dogmatic ideas about 
an 'ideal' art which would take its place (he was notoriously liberal 
in his personal tastes, owning, £or instance, watercolours by Nolde) 
but because it was an art based upon a snobbish decadence. Like
Hitler, he considered that modern art had become detached from the 
hopes and ideals 0£ the German people, and no longer gave adequate 
expression to their feelings and desires:
"Our enemies cry that it is impossible to expel the 
Jew from German cultural life: that he cannot be 
replaced still rings in our ears. We have done 
precisely this and things are proceeding better 
than ever. The demand of the National Socialists 
has been thoroughly carried out in this field and 
the world has visible proof that the cultural life 
0£ a people can also - and indeed meaningfully and 
purposefully - be administered, led and represented 
by its own sons." (54)
Note how in Goebbels'thinking, the racist doctrines lead almost 
imperceptibly to a democratic cultural nationalism: a German art 
for the Germans.
Once this 'cleansing' phase is over, the Nazi 1G1eichscaltung' 
of culture can start having its effect and begin to enter the 
general consciousness 0£ the German people. However, Goebbels 
was never a utopian in his attitudes towards ideology: the N.S.D.A.P. 
Weltanschaung would bite only if it was transformed into a barrage 0£ 
slogans which utilised the most modern techniques of dispersal. 
Although personally attracted to much that was officially designated 
as degenerate in German painting, he realised that the press, the 
newsreels and the radio were to perform the majority of this 
ideological work. Painting and sculpture were definitely small-fry 
in the battery of cultural forms that were to get the Nazi message 
across. He was convinced that a period 0£ ideological construction 
would have to follow the period 0£ 1 cleansing', before a truly German 
culture could be established:
"a host 0£ old habits and prejudices to which many 
people had become fondly attached, had to be over­
come through the organisation of the German creative 
artists in the Reich Culture Chamber." (55)
1. I
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(it is ironical that at one time the X.P.D. imported one of 
Pavlov's assistants from Russia to run their 1932 propaganda 
campaign, so effectively had Goebbels learned the lessons of 
his Bolshevik mode\a • )
The third stage in the development of Nazi cultural policies 
would be to effect a general raising in the 'average' level of the 
cultural life of the people. Here Goebbels was extremely astute 
in his appraisal of the 'meaning' that much modem German art had 
£or the mass of the people. They were genuinely disturbed by the 
extreme distortion seen in so much of this painting, and found the 
atonalities of modem music incomprehensible. In this he was able 
to tap a deeply conservative root when he was to say about the 
artistic policies of the Nazis:
"Never had the general public participated in the 
question of the plastic arts in such a lively and 
intimate way. That the appearance of a new creative­
ness was combined with the end of a period which had 
lain on our souls like an oppressive nightmare, was 
actually treated as a redemption." (56)
His notion of the democratisation of culture, and the 'lively 
and intimate participation' this involved, implied that he wanted 
to open the forms of cultural expression to all, but that these 
forms would remain unchanged in the process. At this point he 
was not greatly concerned with the 'German' in the term 'German 
culture', since it simply meant that the traditional forms were 
to be practised by as many people as possible:
11 Everywhere people are painting, building, writing 
poetry, singing and acting." (57)
The 'cultural revolution' was to produce a nation of weekend painters, 
amateur dramatic societies and works' bands. If we remove the 
disgusting racist content of the Nazi ideology, we are left with 
a type of enlightened liberal-democratic cultural policy aimed at 
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the enrichment of the people's leisure through grass-roots 
participation. The problem of the class nature of specific 
cultural £orms has always proved to be the stumbling-block 
for such cultural policies and middle-class forms, parading 
as 'national' forms, were never dissolved in the paintings 
produced under the Nazis.
Goebbels, in what is obviously a bow to his Fuhrer, adds a 
final stage to this schema £or the arts. By upping the general 
level of the nation's cultural life, the scene will be set for 
the appearance of the artistic genius:
"In the new state, opportunities have been offered 
to talented people as never before. They need 
only reach out and make themselves masters of 
them." (58)
But he was to remain doubtful about the imminence of this abstract 
possibility, which was having some difficulty in manifesting itself: 
"there is the fact that the great philosophical ideas 
that have been set in motion by the National Socialist 
revolution operate, £or the moment, so spontaneously 
that they are not yet ripe enough for the elaboration 
into artistic form." (59)
Perhaps he realised that the days of the Romantic Genius were over, 
and that the canvas and the slim volume of poetry would never 
adequately embody the Soul of the regenerated Volk even if they 
did have a •mass participation^. The Volk went to the theatre to 
forget its troubles, and was not interested in encountering them 
again on the stage: they went
"to see the lofty and the beautiful • • • a world of 
gracious appearance ••• to imagine themselves in 
an enchanted world of the ideal." (60)
In the end, art was again condemned to play nursemaid and comforter 




"The past created church and court styles; it 
gave us an Hellenic and Roman unity, The task 
of the present is to prepare a Volkisch unity."
Alfred Rosenberg (61)
In my examination of Rosenberg's ideas about art, I want to set two 
distinct limits on the discussion. Firstly, to portray his ideas 
comprehensively would only be to repeat a great deal that has 
already been mapped out in the earlier sections. I have, therefore, 
restricted myself to drawing out the characteristics which are 
peculiar to him, and have left out the more general ideological 
framework he shared with the other Nazi theoreticians. Secondly, 
I have left until a later section on Nazi artistic practice much 
of the material he produced in the heated debates on the future 
role of art in Nazi society. In this section I want to approach 
his ideas from what I take to be his central problematic, namely 
to define what is meant by the phrase • a truly Nazi artistic style".
The most distinctive element in Rosenberg's aesthetic thinking 
is the continual search for, and complete failure to locate, the 
nature of the 'Volkisch racial unity' mentioned in the heading 
quotation. This difficulty also extended to the location of 
the cultural forms which would be its aesthetic expression. Like 
the other major Nazi ideologues, he held a number of common assumptions:
(i) art, at its highest points, was both spiritual and, 
at the same time, a manifestation of the life of 
the soul;
(ii) this soul was social and 'objective' in that it was 
the property of a specific racial community;
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(iii) art was symptomatic of the soul of the people 
and also, therefore, of the people's biological/ 
racial health.
"The naive, as well as the conscious, true artist, 
has always proceeded in a race constitutive manner, 
and he has embodied externally spiritual peculiarities 
through utilising those racial types that surround him, 
types which, in the first place, became the exceptional 
bearers of certain characteristics." (62)
In his search for a Volkisch aesthetic, Rosenberg adopted a species 
of aesthetic racism. Spiritual ideals found their highest expression 
objectively in the depiction of the human form, for it was precisely 
here that the physical ideal and the spiritual ideal £used. The 
construction of the image of the ideal human specimen in art is 
the initial step in its realisation in the racial community of the 
Volk. Only a people with its eyes firmly fixed on this supreme 
model of homo sapiens could hope to reach the final paradise:
"Collective Europe's hero-ideal is synonomous with 
a tall, lean figure with shining eyes, high fore­
head, muscular but not muscle-bound. A hero 
represented as squat, broad-shouldered, bow-legged, 
bull-necked, and with a flattened forehead is a 
contradiction in terms, and this type can be found 
only when people like Ebert have come to the surface." (63)
The true end of Rosenberg's aesthetic goes beyond the mere 
representation of this physical ideal, and on to its actual 
production. This logical progression moves from the muscular 
monumentalism of the sculpture of someone like Thorak to the 
eugenics laboratories of the concentration camps and the legalised 
brothels of the S.S.
Coupled with this racist grounding of all European art went
the familiar historical schema that we encountered in the earlier 
sections. He sentimentalises a golden Volkisch past in which the 
artist and his community were at one with each other. This past 
cultural unity is then used to criticise the present, a present 
which is seen primarily as a falling away from this cultural unity: 
under the impact of Jewish liberalism the world is shattered, with 
the result that we live in an age where there is a plurality of 
styles but no unifying style.
"If an age or a people no longer has a unified ideology, 
then it no longer has an art. Isolated artists could 
exist in such an age, but a style is something that 
results from a general direction of the soul. Therefore, 
we see today that we are also confronted with chaos in the 
field of art." (64)
The only way forward out of this chaos is the realisation of the 
Volkisch community, But what was the content of Rosenberg's 
vision? How would the new community be organised, and what 
would be its characteristic cultural expression? Again we move 
right into the heart of the problematic for Nazi ideology, not 
only in aesthetic matters but in a whole range of social and 
economic policies. Rosenberg is no clearer than his Fuhrer on 
the form that the new society should take. Vague, dynamic-sounding 
rhetoric is substituted £or concrete policies:
"However, after the destruction of the classical standard, 
the bastardisation of a Schoenberg, of a Xokoschlca, of a 
Becher, triumphed over our still aimless artists, who 
have thrown off the old but have yet to find the true, 
the new. A later age will prove whether the powers of 
the Volk and race were strong enough to create a synthesis 
out of chaos." (65)
Like Goebbels, Rosenberg voices some doubts about the present in that 
it does not seem to 'fit' with the future he had been dreaming of 
during the long years in the political outback:
"Today we have no great poets because •we' are noj: yet 
ourselves. The World War has not brought them forth 
because no one has yet attained the inner realisation 
that he £ought and died £or a new Mythus ... once 
this is realised, the poets of the World War will be 
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born. However, a new Xultur and a new art will 
one day also be able to develop from this new 
Mythus." ( 66)
The search for the ideal of the Volk was to continue with 
Rosenberg's remorseless attempts to pin down the social conditions 
which would allow a truly objective and public beauty to manifest 
itself. From 1934 onwards he was to be continually on the retreat, 
and was gradually ousted from any important position in aesthetic 
matters within the reich as the realisation of the new Xultur he 
had envisaged stubbornly refused to make its appearance. The 
resolution of art and society was to prove much more elusive than 




CH A P T E R III
The Period o£ Controversies and the Search for a Style
"Revolutionary upheaval in Germany swept into power a 
class of people which had previously never been noticed. 
People in trouble, failures and adventurers, and other 
young, inexperienced idealists joined together and followed 
the parade."
Emil Nolde (1)
"Expressionism can never serve Fascism, because Fascism 
seeks its ideological supports (as far as cultural 
heritage is concerned) in styles which antedate fully 
developed capitalism - in the columns of classicism 
(just as political reactionaries did 100 years ago),in 
in absolutistic and emotional Baroque styles, in the 
guild spirit of the old German masters."
Xlaus Berger (2)
When reviewing the rise to power of the N.S.D.A.P., Hitler designated 
the years from 1929 to 1934 as "the days of struggle". The "struggle" 
which he referred to here was not only the one between the Nazis and 
the representatives of the Weimar political order, but was also the 
struggle which took place between the various factions within , the 
party. The final form taken by Nazi society and the state was not 
something which had sprung, fully formed, into being on the 
morning 0£ the 2nd January 1933. The eighteen months after the 
assumption 0£ power was a period of ideological hiatus, with the 
various factions inside the party disputing, often in a violent 
manner, the precise meaning and scope of the Nazi revolution. While 
there had always been a measure of consensus about how the old order 
should be disposed of, the future was a much more problematic area, 
and perhaps in no other sphere was this more the case than that of 
art and aesthetics. It is for this reason that I want to use this
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section of the thesis to trace in some detail the controversies 
which took place during these eighteen months, as they go a long 
way to illuminate the inherent contradictions which ran through 
the seemingly monolithic structure of Nazi ideology. These 
contradictions within the sphere of art were generated by the 
basic radical conservatism of the Nazi world view, in which there 
is both an appeal to a return to the past and yet, at the same 
time, the promise of a cultural revolution. This led to the 
search for an artistic practice (and, implicitly, an artistic 
style) that would both fulfil the need to look back to the past, 
and yet be capable of generating a 'revolutionary· artistic form. 
The theme of this section is, therefore, the tension which was 
produced by the emphasising of one or other of these terms in the 
aesthetic equation.
The most important question to examine in respect of these 
aesthetic disputes is what lay behind them? What was the dynamo 
which fuelled the controversies and made them escalate out of all 
proportion to their importance for the policies to be implemented 
after the Nazi seizure of power? One thing is certain: we do not 
have here a series of simple base/superstructure relationships. The 
battles were fought out on the level of ideology, but what made them 
important was that for a short time they provided a focus around 
which the discontent felt by certain sections of the movement 
could rally. This general feeling of unease stemmed from the 
confused and ambiguous nature of Nazi thinking on social and 
economic matters. The Rohm purges which took place in June 1934, 
followed by the shifts in economic policy during 1936, certainly 
provided limits to the directions in which a cultural reorganisation
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could go. But what we are above all dealing with in the years 
1929-1934 are the con£licts set up by the multiple class elements 
which the Nazis had managed to unite £or a short while in their 
drive £or power. The divergent interests 0£ the German Mittelstand 
were never completely eradicated by the Nazis: they were simply 
mediated into the structure and ideology 0£ the party. On the 
level 0£ ideology, and especially around the concept 0£ a 'German 
revolution', these divisions were constantly coming to the sur£ace. 
They were to £ocus on a central problem, especially relevant to the 
question 0£ culture, namely what was to constitute the 'Germanicness' 
o£ the 'German revolution·. The divisions in the party are clearly 
visible in two closely related debates about art:
(i) what was to constitute 'German Art'?
(ii) what was to be the role of this 'German Art' 
in the new Nazi society?
Some initial retracing will be necessary i£ we are $""\ -t° 
unravel the confused disputes of t!his period. They begin with the 
gathering together, around the figure of Rosenberg, of certain 
representatives 0£ the conservative elements within the German 
intelligentsia. They quickly formed a cohesive bloc which was 
intended to combat in the field 0£ culture the spokesmen £or 
'cultural bolshevism· who dominated the artistic debates o£ the 
Weimar period. They came together in an organisation called the 
'Kamp£bund fur Deutsche Xultur' and were able to achieve a 
dominant position within the party, assuming the role of official 
spokesmen £or the N.S.D.A.P. on artistic matters. Ever since 1925 
certain 0£ these Xamp£bund conservatives had been involved,in a
debate 0£ increasing tempo, with the architects of the 'Neue 
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Sachlichkeit/aauhaus' school. Architecture, in the Weimar 
Republic, had become one of the most politically charged 
of the Fine Arts, continuing in a muted form the revolutionary 
upsurge which had characterised most 0£ the arts in the immediate 
post-war period, Because it had been extensively commissioned by 
certain local governments, the Bauhaus style in architecture had 
come to represent the aesthetic £ace 0£ the Weimar Republic, As 
a style it still retained many elements of its early period 0£ 
radicalism, especially the notion of a unitary style of architecture 
capable of producing the 'new German man'. Above all else, it had 
become identified with the political creed 0£ the S.P,D., which 
was reflected in the great emphasis laid on the development of 
low-cost housing through the standardisation of materials and 
building techniques. The conservatives challenged this style 
on two points:
(i) they disputed that 'Neue Sachlichkeit' had any 
claim to call itself a 'German' style. On this 
point there was a kernel of truth to the 
accusation. In retrospect, 'Neue Sachlichkeit' 
architecture has come to be seen as simply the 
most developed form of the 'International Style', 
which had emerged from the crucible of international 
connections which had encompassed 'De Stijl' in 
Holland and the Constructivist architects in Russia.
(ii) The second bone of contention was the claim made by 
the progressive architects that their style of
building implied a 'revolution in living^. Although 
this element in their creed was to become increasingly 
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diluted as the twenties progressed, the social 
ethic always remained an important part or their 
building philosophy. The conservatives were to 
take issue on these points, claiming firstly that 
no such 'revolution in living' had occurred, and 
following this up with a counter-philosophy 0£ the 
social role of architecture.
In the ensuing debate the conservatives beg.n to elaborate their 
counter-ideology of what was to constitute the truly 'German' 
architecture and, beyond this, what was to be the role of this 
German architecture when the nation eventually 'found itself'. 
Thus the conservatives had, from the outset, inherited a debate 
whose central component was the social £unction of architecture 
(and, by implication, of art as a whole). I have already referred 
to 'the great flat-roof controversy' which took place in 1926. The 
most important feature of this debate was that conservatives, such 
as Schultze-Namburg and Emil Hogg, expressly structured their 
arguements to incorporate sociological,and cultural criticisms 
of what they referred to as 'industrial buildings'. These 
criticisms were then mediated through a nationalist and racist 
theory 0£ architecture. At this point, although they were not 
members 0£ the N.S.D.A.P., they were hammering out an aesthetic 
which, in order to combat the class-based nature of the Bauhaus, 
made race the major £actor in the development of a national artistic 
style. In this they did no different to a large section 0£ the 
right-wing of the German intelligentsia, and were unable to resist 
the embrace of Nazism as the decade drew to a close.
' '·
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From 1926-1928 these artistic conservatives participated in 
the debate simply as individuals and, at this stage, it was still 
conducted in a relatively gentlemanly manner compared with what 
was to come later. But the increasing isolation of the right­
wingers from the rich commissions being handed out during the 
Weimar period began to add a touch of sourness to the debate. 
In 1928, Schultze-Naumburg published two books which were to 
transform the arguement from a purely architectural issue into 
one covering a wide range of artistic activities, The books in 
question were 'Art and Race' and 'The Face of the German Housed 
In the first of these volumes he attempted to explain artistic 
'decline' and 'decadence' in terms of a biological deterioration 
of the race. In a notorious passage he juxtaposed photographs of 
individuals suffering from an appalling range of genetic defects 
: w Va\i. ; reproductions of the works of mainly Expressionist painters.
The implication, which was heavily drawn out, 
was that, so close was the resemblance between the diseased individuals 
and these artistic images, that the painters who produced such 
distorted figures must themselves be hopelessly degenerate. Both 
series of illustrations were indicative of a genetic disaster zone. 
His judgement on the artists who were capable of.producing such 
deformations in paint was:
"the uncreative men, formless and colourless, the 
half and quarter men, unbeautiful men who desire 
no beauty, who set their stamp upon our time." (3)
At this stage little differentiation was made by these 
conservative critics between the various tendencies which made 
up the German avant-garde. This 'blindness' to the political 
potential inherent in Expressionism meant that it took them by
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surprise a few years later. But in 1928 there was no other 
opposition being voiced from the right to counter Schultze- 
Naumburg's aesthetic synthesis of the standard volkisch 
themes. The book ends with the familiar plea for the artist 
to help overcome this biological deterioration:
"the artist should make visible a wish picture 
so that the entire Volk can strive towards 
beauty and attempt to resemble it". (4)
In the second volume, 'The Face of the German House·, 
Schultze-Naumburg mobilised a number of anti-materialist, 
anti-urban arguements in his continuing critique of the Bauhaus 
style. The truly German house would always be inimicable to the 
life and styles of the big city: the German house, and the way 
of life it symbolised, could only be found in the small to"Wns and 
villages of the German countryside. The Bauhaus style, on the 
other hand, was a product of the communist •nomads of the 
metropolis'. This debate was of a high level compared to that 
which was taking place in many other European countries at the 
time. The dispute over purely aesthetic matters moved effortlessly 
into a discussion of the modes of life, economic and social, 
encapsulated in the contending architectural styles. The debate 
was always a dispute over the mode of life that should be instituted 
in Germany. Politics lay at the heart of the controversy, and little 
was heard of the •autonomy of art·.
During 1928 the conservative crities began to group together 
into loose professional pressure groups. For instance, 'Der Block' 
was formed - a group of architects who had banded together to 
provide a counterweight to the Bauhaus modernists of 'Der Ring·.
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Magazines, letters to the press, in fact all the more visible 
aspects of the debate, were symptomatic of its increasing 
importance in the cultural life of Germany. It was also 
during 1928 that iosenberg began to establish contacts 
with these conservative architects, and it was his personal 
intervention which signalled the movement's shift to a more 
aggressive form of strategy. In 1929 Rosenberg managed to create 
a waited front out of these organisations, combining them under 
the banner of the 'Xampfbund fur Deutsche MWur whose leading 
lights, apart from Rosenberg himself, were Walther Darre, an 
authority on agriculture and the peasantry; H.F.X. Gunther, 
a racist anthropologist; Professor Zeigler, a painter who was 
to become Hitler's favourite artist; and A. Bartels, a right­
wing literary historian. Almost immediately Rosenberg was able 
to intergrate the Xampfbund en bloc into the structure of the 
N.S.D.A.P., managing to secure for it an authoritative position 
as part of the Nazi's increasing involvement in cultural matters. 
The brief for the K.D.I. was summed up in its founding decree:
"The I.D.X. undertakes to gather together the 
treasures of volkisch culture and its bearers. 
From this reservoir the N.S.D.A.P. section of 
the Popular Education communicates the best to 
the people in the form of education." (5)
With the official recognition of the role of the Xampfbund, 
the party was, at least on paper, committed to the implementation 
of a set of policies which took in a whole range of volkisch 
concerns. The period from 1929-1933 was one of increasing activity 
£or the I.D.K. From its initial start in Munich, it gradually 
established itself as the only visible voice on cultural matters 
from the right. By 1933 it regularly published a magazine, the
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'Deutsche XulturW:>-.c-\-\ ', and had set up an extensive regional 
network of 33 sub-chapters which were visited by a wide range 
of speakers. In 1930 a chance came to implement their cultural 
policies when Frick took control of the regional goverrnment 
of Thuringia. One of the ministries which was placed under 
Nazi control was that of Education, and the Kampfbund moved 
in to test out their theories of culture. The regime was to 
last £or one year only, and what little the Xampfbund was able 
to achieve in this short time struck an ominous note £or the 
future. Throughout the year there was little evidence of the 
'positive' side of the volkisch programme, but plenty emerged 
from the 'negative^. The entire area was subjected to a blitz 
of speakers, all drawn from the K.D.I.'s lecture circuit. These 
speakers constantly plugged the anti-modernist line, using the 
twin issues of 'Jewish Culture' and 'Nigger Culture' - (jazz 
was considered to be an important weapon in the International 
Jewish Plot) - on which to hang their message. The first 
decree issued by the Ministry of Education was 'Against Negro 
Culture, for German Volkstum' (April 15th 1930). This was 
quickly followed by an extensive censorship of books and films. 
Museums were purged of their 'degenerate' paintings, and 
undesirable artists were dismissed from their teaching posts. 
Thus, by 1933, the volkisch tendency had not only succeeded in 
forming a cohesive bloc within the party, but had also gained 
valuable practical experience in Thuringia. They seemed poised 
for a total victory when Hitler took power in 1933, since only 
the volkisch aesthetic appeared to have a clearly formulated set 
of policies which could immediately be implemented. Their aesthetic 
had a number of familiar features. Firstly, the 'new German 
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culture' they desired would be based upon the peasant and artisan 
strata of society. Secondly, it would oppose, and go beyond, the 
over intellectualised/individualistic modes of expression 
characteristic of the 'townie' modernists, Thirdly, it would 
be an art that was grounded upon the intuitive comprehension of 
nature and the German soil, exalting the mystique of 'handwork' 
over the rationalising materialism of machine technology. Above 
all, it was to be a vital component of the more general Nazi 
revolution:
"Around us a new Germany must rise, which can find 
a home in dwellings embedded in foliage , whose 
government buildings so longer look like factories, 
nor its churches like movie-houses, but instead 
bear the signature of the majority and the power 
of the people ••• this evil tormenting dream must 
cease. And when dawn comes, then will resound the 
cry: 'Deutschland Erwache!" (6)
The Opposition
The first blow to the :ramp£bund I s dream of cultural hegemony 
came very shortly after the seizure of power. In March of 
that year Goebbels was made Minister of Propaganda and the 
extent of his empire, especially its incursions into territory 
which the X.D.:r. had come to regard as its own, came as a complete 
surprise to them. From the very start it was clear that there 
were to be .!!:.2 bureaucratic power-bases £or the control of culture. 
The burning problem £or the Iampfbund was which one of the two 
would succeed in stamping its views on Nazi society. Undeterred, 
the Iampfbund began a purge of museums and art galleries, confident 
that its claim to be ushering in the new aesthetic age would be 
confirmed • any day' by the personal intervention of the Fuhrer. 
Rosenberg had seriously overreached himself at this stage, and 
was to pay £or it in the following year. There was an unexpected 
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response from a source which the K.D.K. had completely overlooked, 
and that was the party itself. By February-March 0£ 1933 
objections were being raised by sections 0£ the National 
Socialist Students Association to the raids taking place on 
museums. In Berlin, articles began to appear in the press 
cautioning against 'premature' action and condemning the 
Kampfbund for its 'reactionary' and 'historicist' policies. 
As pointed out in an earlier section, the Nazis had met little 
opposition when they took over the German Students Association 
in 1930, The appeal 0£ the Nazis had been strong among the 
"young, inexperienced idealists" 0£ the middle-class, and it 
must be r^cmbcrcd that these student associations were just 
as racist in their outlook as the other party organisations. 
They were, however, very susceptible to the more revolutionary 
elements in the Nazi programme, especially those tendencies which 
stressed anti-capitalist strategics. The election 0£ Goebbels in 
March had encouraged a group of art students in Berlin, under the 
leadership of Otto Andreas Schreiber, to come out into the open 
and overtly combat the bucolic fantasies 0£ the Rosenberg group. 
In mobilising their arguements, a dispute arose between two 
differing aesthetics, both claiming to be 'revolutionary' and 
'German 1 • Each put tlemselves forward as being the true 
representatives of the German people, and from an initial 
starting point on art, both of these groups were to finally 
find themselves fighting out 'the true meaning of the Nazi 
revolution'.
In imagining that Gocbbcls would be sympathetic to their 
cause against the Xampfbund, the radical students were not merely 
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indulging in wishful thinking, He was notoriously liberal in 
his personal artistic tastes - (paintings by Nolde and 
Schmidtt-Rotluff hung on the walls of his home) - and in 
his youth he had been closely associated with the left-faction 
of the Strassers. It was in the light of this history that the 
students were encouraged to push for a revolution in the arts 
which would complement the revolution that had taken place in the 
political sphere. Hitler's grasp on the political situation during 
the first months of 1933 was far from complete, and there is 
much evidence that these Berlin art students were mixed up in 
some extra-aesthetic activity. Almost as soon as Hitler had 
taken power, certain voices in the S.A. had begun to talk of 
a 'second revolution' in order to complete the anti-capitalist 
programme which was clearly spelt out in the 25-point party 
manifesto. Towards the end of February/early March, the students 
at the Hochschule fur Kunsterziehung in Berlin staged a sit-in. At 
about the same time there was an attack on the Berlin Stock 
Exchange, followed in June of that year by a series of violent 
student/young workers demonstrations, all o£ which were stressing 
the need to complete the revolution. The anti-capitalist chickens 
were coming home to roost, and it was almost a year before this 
episode was finally mded by a personal intervention on the part 
0£ Hitler. It is against this background of political discontent 
and ideological flexibility that the debate over art must be placed.
Schreiber was at the centre 0£ a group 0£ young painters who 
saw themselves as the inheritors 0£ the tradition of German 
Expressionism. Though full-blooded Nazis, they were also hopeful 
of getting Expressionism installed after the takeover as 'the truly 
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German art'. This was not the first time that Expressionism 
and the German right had made contact with one another.
During the 1920s the more revolutionary elements within the 
Youth Movement had tried to get Expressionism recognised as 
the 'official' art of the movement (7). The chaotic mysticism 
of the early Expressionists, their 'soulful agony' and their 
search for a transcendental reality, had strongly appealed to 
the volkisch mysticism which was so much a part of the Wandervogel. 
These latter-day Expressionists based their claim to represent 
German art on the contention that the vision which had been 
articulated by such painters as Kirchner, Schmidtt-Rotluff, 
Barlach and Nolde was the only truly national expression to 
come out of the arts in Germany in modern times. Here, they 
claimed, was a truly nationalistic style which was at the same 
time soaked in the premises of modernism. This is why so much 
of the debate which was to follow hinged upon the status of 
these Expressionist painters: were they to be seen as a 
genuine manifestation of the German soul, or were they simply 
'decadent primitivists1 ?
The attack was opened by Schreiber in a series of lectures 
which he delivered to student meetings in the first few months 
of 1933. He referred to the painters supported by the I.D.I. 
as an "organisation of cantankerous daubers" whose archaic style 
was backed-up by a set of botched populist assumptions. The major 
thread 0£ his arguement was that the painters regarded as exemplary 
by the Iampfbund were indulging in a backward-looking worship 0£ 
outworn 19th century styles which could never be adequate to the 
expression of contemporary National Socialist reality. In a talk
.
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given on June 29th 1933, Schreiber came out openly with his 
demand that the Expressionists be installed as the true 
representatives of National Socialist art. He ended his 
speech by formally dissolving Rosenberg's Kampfbund. Letters 
of support flooded in from all parts of Germany when his speech 
was made public:
"The S.A. man's battle in the street must not be 
betrayed in the field of culture. Long live the 
complete National Socialist revolution!" (8)
Rosenberg defended the volkisch aesthetic against these 
onslaughts by publishing two articles in the 'Volkische 
Beobachter' in July (9). In the first of these reformulations 
of the volkisch outlook, he began from a point of agreement with 
the Schreiber faction, namely the primacy of the Nazi political 
revolution in the debate:
"First of all, the political revolution of National 
Socialism is the most important step of the 
movement." (10)
He then pushed forward into an analysis of the artistic styles 
which he considered could both mirror, and be adequate to, this 
political revolution, attempting at the same time to counter 
the 'historicist' label pinned on him by the radicals:
"We can all agree that the mendacious pseudo­
Baroque of the 19th century was just as 
unbearable as the 'Engineer art' of today." (11)
This was a dangerous line for the leader of the Iampfbund to take 
since many of his volkisch colleagues had initially achieved 
prominence in the early part of the century with buildings which 
were excellent examples of this "pseudo-Baroque". The •traditions 
of 1900' were a major component in the lucky-dip of styles that 
the I.D.I. had toyed with in its efforts to locate the true style
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£or the revolution. By mentioning 'Engineer Art', Rosenberg 
was attempting to drive a wedge into the modernist camp: he 
had progressed a considerable way in being able to recognise 
the contrast between the spiritual inclinations of Expressionism 
and the materialistic aesthetic embodied in the Bauhaus movement. 
But his attack on the paintings 0£ the senior Expressionists 
showed up the deep gulf which existed between the Schreiber 
group and the Kampfbund. Rosenberg reverted to his •well- 
defined beauty ideal' in order to prove that these Expressionists 
were not in touch with the Nordic spirit nor, by implication, 
with the German people:
"These are not 'Mecklenburg Farmers^. Oh,no. 
The latter stride over the field in a completely 
different way to these figures of Barlach's 
humanity. " (12 )
For Rosenberg the distortion 0£ reality was an indication 0£ a 
deeper malaise. The work of Barlach, Nolde, etc., desplayed 
a false subjectivity: they were not 'inwardly authentic' and 
must, therefore, forfeit their claim to represent the German 
people. He then went on to lay dow the basic requirements for 
a valid, revolutionary, German art:
"How the German landscape is to be felt; how the 
heroic figure of the German warrior appears to 
be forged - these are the areas in which 
instinct and judgement of taste should test 
themselves. Then the outcome 0£ this struggle 
will determine the form and content-world of our 
future." (13)
The article ended with a veiled threat to the radicals to disperse. 
The entire opposition to the Iampfbund was nothing more than a 
bunch of 'cultural Otto Strassers^:
"In the political field we have already had an Otto 
Strasser tendency and combatted it, as we believe, 
to the benefit of the movement." (14)
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This was the climax 0£ the first round 0£ the controversy 
and, so £ar, the honours were even. The key figure in this 
debate was Goebbels, and he steadfastly refused to declare 
his hand. To the Iamp£bund his propaganda empire continued 
to pose a threat. For the radicals his strategic position 
within the party, coupled with his apparent artistic liberalism, 
still gave them cause to hope. Probably the rnqst illuminating 
aspect 0£ the whole affair were the contradictions and short­
comings displayed by both sides in the dispute. As far as the 
radical tendency was concerned, the popular base they imagined 
they had in the country remained largely imaginary: rather 
they fomed a convenient focal point £or non-aesthetic 
pressure groups operating within the party. They were a 
group to be supported largely because 0£ the political implications 
which would result from their defeat, It was totally romantic of 
them to suppose that, what was after all an art £orm based upon 
the most extreme form of bourgeois individualism, could 
immediately provide the style and form 0£ a mass-based popular 
art, which seemed to be the aim envisaged £or it in the statements 
of Schreiber. The radicals were never prepared to accept the 
fundamental nature of the changes implied in a true politicisation 
0£ art. Thus the content of the debate remained on an extremely 
crude level when assessed by the comparable debate which had. 
talcen place in Russia. What Schreiber said 0£ the I.D.I. painters 
was equally applicable to his own position:
"The Gartenlaube artist froughly translated as 'the 
chocolate-box school j and the 'literal painter' 
are having their great day: the former imitates 
nature and clail'llS that the people understand him, 
and the latter paints Germanic subjects and claims 
that his art is vollcisch," (15)
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It must, however, have been quite evident that the constituency 
of the 'volk' was even more alienated from the distortions of 
the human form so characteristic 0£ the Expressionists. The 
•man-in-the-street', if he ever even went to an art gallery, 
would be much more likely to £eel at home with the transparent 
realism of the Zeiglers, the Wendels and the Peiners. The 
search £or a truly radical art, that was both popular and public, 
implied a much more total destruction and re-thinking 0£ the 
forms of high art than either camp ever envisaged. It also 
required a revolution, in the sense 0£ the transfer of power 
from one class to another. Unless this happened, neither side 
would ever be able to see the true mechanics involved in a cultural 
revolution. One party to the dispute was dreaming of a return to 
a pre-industrial age; while the other based their hopes on a 
sudden rapport between 'the people' and modern art, precisely 
that which had been conspicuously absent throughout the long 
nightmare 0£ the 19th century.
The next round 0£ the controversy was initiated, perhaps 
unwittingly, by a speech made by Goebbels at the opening 0£ the 
Reich's Iulturk.mmer on November 16th, 1933. Once again it 
seemed to the radicals that they had the sympathy of certain 
highly-placed individuals, In this speech Goebbels emphasised 
the dominant role which 'youth' had to play in the Nazi revolution:
’’German art needs fresh blood. We live in a 
young era. Its supporters are young and their 
ideas are young. They have nothing more in 
common with the past which we have left behind 
us. The artist who seeks to give expression to 
this age must also be young. He must create 
new forms." (16)
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The radicals had ignored Rosenberg's earlier threats and 
had stepped up their anti-Kampfbund activities. They formed 
a painting group, 'Der Norden', and organised exhibitions of 
their own work and of their Expressionist heroes. They began 
to publish a magazine, 'Iunst der Nation', which gained a 
circulation of around 3,500, mainly in the Berlin area. The 
combined effect of all this was to transform a somewhat academic 
debate about the status of certain Expressionist painters into 
front-page news. Rosenberg's unquestioned domination in the 
field of art was finally broken, and a much wider public became 
aware of the fact that there were two contenders for the title 
of 'German art'. But much more important than this was the 
£act that the controversy had begun to divide the complicated 
bureaucratic hierarchy created by the Nazis, even before it 
had had time to settle down. Everyone with a finger in the 
cultural pie began to take sides in the debate. Goebbels 
coopted one of the radicals, Weidemann, to help him organise 
the Chamber of Culture. Ley's 'Strength through Joy' organisation 
recruited many of the radical painters, including Schreiber, to 
direct one of its more fanciful •workers^ art' exhibitions. 
Rosenberg and the Xampfbund had to rely on the support of 
the 'Volkische Beobachter' which, in an editorial, accused 
the radicals of being:
"A bitter and systematic resistance ••• organised 
against the new National Socialist ideal of a 
spiritually healthy art anchored in the race." (17)
By February 1934, the debate seemed to be getting out of 
hand and became just one more of the many symptoms of disaffection 
which were being voiced by the party militants, especially those 
within the S.A. The immediate reason £or this agitation was the 
failure of Hitler to confirm the S.A. as the supreme military 
authority within the Reich. The army had become increasingly 
restless with the aggressive front '^turned on them by the S.A. 
whose final aim was to completely absorb the Reichswehr into 
its o"1Il structure and thereby create a massive People's Militia. 
It was £or this reason that the aesthetic controversy became 
slotted into a much wider arguement that was gradually involving 
the whole of the movement ie. would the.party or the State (plus 
the Reichswehr) hold supreme power?
In March of that year (1934) another completely unexpected 
development took place. An exhibition of Futurist paintings was 
sent to Berlin by Mussolini, complete with fraternal greetings 
to his fellow fascists. An event more likely to raise the 
temperature of the arguement could hardly be imagined. Here 
was an example of an overtly fascist regime not only tolerating 
a modern artistic movement, but actually installing it as the 
'official' art of that regime. Undoubtedly the works of art 
which were exhibited as 'Futuristic' were only a pallid echo of 
the first phase of the movement: such artists as Prampolini, 
Ambrosi, Gitio, were scarcely recognisable as the heirs of 
Boccioni, Carra and St. Elia. Nevertheless, they still bore 
the unmistakable signs of being thoroughly 'modern'. The debate 
on the relative merits of these Futuristic works was to be the 
last chapter in the internal artistic discourse of the Third Reich.
The exhibition opened on March 28th, 1934, in Berlin, and its 
Italian sponsors were given the red-carpet treatment by certain
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elements in the Nazi party. The German reception committee 
consisted of Goebbels, Goering and Rust, while the Italians 
had sent their top artistic representatives, Marinetti and 
Pro£. Ruggio Vasari. The edition of the 'Vo1kische Beobachter' 
which came out on the morning of the opening attacked the 
exhibition, describing the objects on display as '' an attempt 
to throw contempt on the main body of German art" ( 18). The 
paper's correspondent went on to doubt whether Futurism could 
in any way be considered the aesthetic £ace of Italian fascism. 
How could this be the case when fascist solidarity demanded that 
young German artists and their Italian counterparts be united in 
thought and deed? The 'entente' had to be preserved despite 
appearances. Unfortunately, at the same time that this editorial 
was being published, the members of the Italian delegation were 
giving interviews to the press, and going to great lengths to 
explain how the spirit of Futurism and the aims of Fascism were 
identical. Prof. Vasari in one interview claimed that only 
Futurism could do justice to Mussolini's slogan:
"A new state, a new nation, can thrive only if the 
whole 0£ art is revolutionised." (19)
The radicals were, 0£ course, delighted with the exhibition, 
though mainly, one £eels, because it gave them some support 
in pushing their own local 'revolutionary' ideas, rather than 
£rem any genuine appreciation of Futurism. Schreiber, while 
sympathetic to the aims 0£ Futurism and its claim to be the 
true expression of the Italian soul, argued that only Expressionism 
could perform a similar role £or the spirit 0£ Germany. The 
authorities allowed the exhibition to remain open £or £ear of 
offending their Italian allies. Throughout the period of its 
being open, enthusiastic articles appeared in 'Kunst der Nation':
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"Without him Italy would be a dusty picture 
postcard. Marinetti and his disciples of 
the Manifesto are the artistic incarnations 
of an idea born about 1900 from the Vesuvius 
0£ Marinetti's mind and the inferno 0£ his heart. 
This idea was to capture time, time as such, to 
seize it by the hair as it spreads over Europe's 
asphalt roads, polished smooth by balloon tyres 
••. the new continent is inhabited by airplanes, 
automobiles and Marinetti. 11 (20)
In this article we are a long way £rem the fantasies of 'dwellings 
embedded in foliage' held by the volkisch members of the Iampfbund. 
They were outraged by the exhibition and immediately began to 
organise a series of nationwide counter-exhibitions to combat 
all such manifestations of 'cultural bolshevism'. In these 
exhibitions they made it quite clear that they regarded Italian 
Futurism as a blatant example of this cultural decadence. Given 
the rising cacophony 0£ the debate, Hitler decided that he would 
have to intervene personally and bring the controversy to an end. 
Quite rightly he saw the debate over aesthetics as simply part 
of a wider controversy about the nature of the Nazi revolution, 
and i£ the political debate were settled, then the aesthetic one 
would pale into insignificance and die. On the night 0£ June 30th 
he disposed of his political opponents in the S.A. In September 
he finally turned his attention towards artistic matters. His 
definitive statement on German art was delivered in his address 
to the annual party rally held on September 5th, 1934. In a 
long speech, Hitler referred directly to both sides in the 
dispute which had now been in session £or eighteen months.
First he disposed of the radicals and what he termed the 'art- 
chatterers^:
"The charlatans are mistaken if they think the 
creators of the Third Reich are foolish or 
■ cowardly enough to let themselves be befuddled 
or intimidated by their chatter. They will see 
perhaps the greatest cultural and artistic mission
-.L.l.L-
of all times go about its business, ignoring 
them as though they had never existed." (21)
Hitler's longstanding personal dislike of •modernism' had
triumphed over all other considerations. In this speech
he made it clear that the radicals not only were to have no 
part in the future development of National Socialist culture, 
but were to be seen as a positive threat to it. However, there 
were some shocks in store for the Iampfbund as well:
"Second, the National Socialist State must defend 
itself against the sudden emergence of those 
backward-lookers, who imagine that they can 
impose on the National Socialist revolution, as 
a binding heritage for the future, a 'Teutonic' 
art sprung from the fuzzy world of their own 
romantic conceptions." (22)
The mythology of the volkisch tradition was to be disposed of 
overnight. The mockery and scorn which Hitler poured on the 
volkisch thinkers drew, ironically, upon many of the arguements 
which the radicals had themselves used in the fight with the 
I.D.I. Hitler made it obvious that they too were to play no 
major part in the shaping of any future cultural policies.
The final insult was added when he doubted that they had ever
been 'true National Socialists':
"Either they dwelt in the hermitages of a German 
dream world which even Jews found ridiculous, 
or they trotted along, pious and harmless, amid 
the angelic hosts of a bourgeois renaissance ••• 
When ••• after our victory ••• they hurried down 
from the loft of their bourgeois party stable to 
offer their services as political minds and 
strategists to the National Socialist Movement 
••• they had no understanding of the magnitude 
of the upheaval that had meanwhile taken place 
in the German people. So today they offer us rail­
road stations in original German Renaissance style, 
street signs and typewriter keyboards with genuine 
Gothic letters, song texts freely imitated from 
Walther von der Vogelweide, fashions borrowed 
from 'Gretchen and Faust, pictures of the 'Trompeter 
von Sackingen' type. Perhaps they would like us to 
defend ourselves with shields and crossbows." (23)
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What was to take the place of the Fascist Expressionism or 
völkisch fantasy can only be seen from the works of the 
artists who rose to prominence after 1935. Hitler's later 
statements about art are both vague and general. However, 
it would be wrong to assume, as many commentators have, 
that Nazi artistic policy becomes completely 'arbitrary' (24) 
or 'lacking in ideology' after this date. Choices were made 
about those styles which were to be favoured, as well as about 
those which were to be rejected. The volkisch wing may have 
been officially defeated but there continued to be a hangover 
of their ideas in the later paintings, especially of their 
concern to locate an artistic style that was truly German, 
popular and, at the same time, 'revolutionary'. The failure 
of such a style to manifest itself provides the major theme 
in the history of German painting in the years leading up to 
the outbreak of the war.
* * * * *
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CHAPTER IV
The Institutional Framework of National Socialist Culture 
In this section I wish to cuH:"« br;c^i the structure and mode 
of operation of the multiple bureaucratic organisations which 
were established after the 1933 takeover to shape and direct 
the.cultural life of Nazi society. While the bewildering 
succession of bureaucracies, each with differing spheres of 
influence, are not directly relevant to the aentral problematic 
of the thesis, the philosophy which underlay the thrust for a 
total ^leichschaltung' of the cultural life of Germany is 
crucial to any analysis of the artistic output after 1933. 
It was the complicated bureaucratic machinery that was to be 
the carrier of much of the thinking on art which we examined 
in the earlier section, and it is in the concentrated 
bureaucratic embrace of the arts that the Nazi approach to 
culture differs most obviously from the philosophy adopted by 
the liberal democracies. The arbitrary dismissal of Nazi culture 
as 'pure propaganda' derives largely from the failure to under­
stand this difference of outlook. In his book, 'The Spirit and 
Structure of German Fascism· (l), Brady characterised the 
classical notion of the state in liberal democracies as one 
which espoused an ideology of separation. Such various areas 
of social activity as industry, science, art and religion are 
seen as separate and distinct from one another and also from the 
area occupied by the State. In line with this outlook, the state 
should in theory adopt a neutral stance towards these various 
fields of activity, eschewing any role which entails control or 
'· ~
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interference beyond that 0£ a policing £unction. The brief of 
the state is to 'hold the ring' and ensure '£air play' across 
these multiple competing interests. This neutral stance is 
reflected in each area 0£ a::tivity by an ideology which repels 
the advances made by the state. In the case of industry, there 
is the notion of the free-market economy; in science there is 
the notion 0£ 'pure research'; in religion there is the 
fundamental right to freedom 0£ worship; while the arts are 
dominated by the claim to the right of freedom of expression. 
State interference in the arts - (apart from subsidies, 
which are seen as upholding individual freedom) - is 
condemned as 'barbaric' and 'authoritarian' and as ultimately 
leading to the production of souless propaganda. Brady1 s model 
of the liberal state is, of course, an ideal, which has undergone 
considerable alteration in the era 0£ managed capitalism: nevertheless, 
this type of ideology is still tenaciously clung to in the field of 
the arts. On the other side of the equation, the state also has a 
picture 0£ itself as being neutral in respect 0£ the arts, -(eg. in 
the case of England, a Labour government would not demand, as a 
condition of its support, allegiance to the party or the 
production of art with a socialist slant) - and any attempt 
to inject an overt political ideology becomes 'unthinkable'. Thus, 
within liberal democracies art is seen as being:
(i) a field of individualistic expression 
(ii) a non-political activity.
The Nazi concept of the state was an almost complete inversion 
of this model. As we discussed earlier, the Nazis conceived of 
all forms 0£ social activity as containing a political core. The 
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areas of human activity were not separate but were united into 
an organic whole through the mediation of a dominant weltanschaung. 
Again, this 'weltanschaung was primarily a political phenomenon, Art, 
religion, science, in fact Xultur generally were expressions of a 
unified, internal, national spirit. In this schema, the state 
became the highest expression of this national spirit and was, 
therefore, morally obliged to guide and supervise the direction 
which this spiritual entity was to take. Thus, according to the 
political philosophy of National Socialism, the state was in an 
active relationship with the arts, duty bound to take upon itself 
the function of spiritual leader:
"The writer stands shoulder to shoulder with the 
soldier, the labourer and the entrepreneur. He 
is of the people and fights within the restricted 
environment of his people for its existence and 
future. The writer is thus irrevocably committed 
to politics .•• He is no longer the centre of a 
circle of faithf'ul readers who enjoy each year 
his latest production at the comfort of their 
firesides: his place is in the arena where the 
whole great struggle of his people is taking place." (2)
The State became the channel for the redirection of artistic 
effort and, at the same time, was to act as an •example' in the 
reshaping of the national soul. In order £or this mediation to 
work, the state had to see itself as the direct expression of 
a united national will. No longer was it simply to be a 
committee discreetly operating in the baclcground, but rather 
was it to become the highest expression of a united nation which 
had transcended the rifts created by a class-ridden social order. 
It is in this context that the concept of Nazi art as propaganda 
has to be placed, and once again we have to take note of the 
sincerity of the actors in order that the drama be f'ully comprehended.
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The network of bureaucracies which surrounded the arts was 
constituted as follows: -
(i) Goebbels> ^^ire, made up of
(a) the Reich Ministry of Peeples Enlightenment 
and Propaganda
(b) the Central Propaganda Office
(c) the Reich Chamber of Culture
(ii) Rosenberg's Institutions, which was to consist 
solely of the National Socialist Co^^anity of 
Culture. This was largely a compensatory sop 
which was given to Rosenberg after the controversies 
of 1933-1934 had settled down.
(iii) The 'Strength through Joy' section of the D.A.F., 
under the control of Robert Ley.
In terns of the areas of National Socialist art which I intend to 
examine in the following sections, only the first two have any 
direct relevance.
ORGANISATIONS UNDER THE (X)NTROL OF GOEBBELS
We have already seen that Goebbels had firmly placed all cultural 
activity within the realm of propaganda. Its task was to illuminate 
the National Socialist weltanschaung in the minds of the German 
masses. Propaganda in all its forms would not only keep in touch 
with what the public was thinking; it would also play an active 
role in that it would •create· and 'mould' the consciousness 
of these masses by a blanket saturation of all forms of
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communication. In order to achieve this:
"the professions and institutions of literature and 
art had to be changed from instruments of liberal 
individualism to fulfilling the public functions 
of indoctrination and leadership." (3)
(a) THE REICH MINISTRY FOR PROPAGANDA: this organisation was set 
up on March 11th 1933, and was intended to be the official state 
organisation for the control of culture. Within the ministry a 
number of separate departments were established covering Film, 
Literature, Theatre, Music, and the Fine Arts.
(i) The Department of Fine Arts. This was to become 
the chief source of what the state considered to be 
desirable art, setting dew stylistic guidelines 
which every painter and sculptor was bound to follow.
It also led the fight, after 1934, against all manifest­
ations 0£ modernism in German painting, which was to 
culminate in its decision to burn thousands of canvases 
by contemporary German painters. In addition to this, it 
organised exhibitions throughout Germany of the work of 
favoured artists. The department was the chief arbiter 
in the search to give the category 'National Socialist 
painting' some kind 0£ stylistic content.
(ii) The Department of Music. There were two prrlncipaJ. 
guidelines in the brief given to this department. The 
first was to further the development ofNordic' music, 
and this was to prove a singular failure, degenerating 
finally into Wagner worship and a manufactured
The range this
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Nordic music was to cover was rather severely restricted 
to a rehashing 0£ late-19th century Romanticism. The 
second aim was to enforce a total ban on the work of 
Jewish composers and 0£ any who happened to display 
'Jewish' characteristics eg. atonality.
(iii) The Dm,artrnent of Literature. The main concern 
of this department was the enforcing 0£ censorship rules 
which covered a wide range of published material. They 
had absolute power to ban and destroy anything which 
was thought to be 'suspect' - (by this was meant that 
the work did not adequately embody the National Socialist 
Veltanschaung). Their more general brie£ lay in two 
vaguely worded decrees: (a) to provide political 
leadership in literature; and (b) to ensure that the 
broad strata of the German people were brought into 
contact with the achievements of German poets and 
writers
(iv) The Department of Theatre. Again, like the other 
departments, the body concerned with the theatre had 
both a positive and a negative aspect to its work. 
Above all, its task was to scrutinise productions 
"from the point 0£ view of the conformity of its
spiritual content with National Socialist ideology." (4) 
On the one hand it sought to encourage'Aryan' plays and 
playwrights, while at the same time rooting out non-Aryan 
plays and actors. As with the Department of Music, the 
search for truly Aryan plays was to prove more elusive 
than was at first envisaged, becoming increasingly
-139-
equated with the production of the classics, 
The Reich Ministry of Propaganda was the chief ministry for 
implementing Nazi policies towards the arts, and was given 
priority over the other organisations at work in the field, 
The staffs of these departments were overwhelmingly made up 
of professional bureaucrats with few actual practitioners 
gaining any position of power. By and large practising 
artists were confined to positions inside the various Chambers 
of Culture, which will be described in more detail below.
(b) THE CENTRAL PROPAGANDA OFFICE: OFFICE OF CULTURE.
The Office of Culture was the officially recognised body of the 
party in matters of internal cultural supervision. It was just 
one of a number of compensations which Hitler granted to the 
party after the purges 0£ 1934. The elimination of the S,A. 
had finally established the authority of the state over the 
party in the matter of who was to lead Germany after the 
'revolution^, and autonomy in cultural matters was part of 
their reward for laying down their arms. Again, the basic brief 
of the organisation was that
"it should stimulate artistic production on the 
lines of the formative expression of the National 
Socialist weltanschaung." (5)
The office was divided into five sections covering an extraordinary 
range of internal party activities:
(i) the Office of Architecture: this was responsible 
£or laying down the official style £or all the party's 
buildings and its many constructional projects.
(ii) the Office of Design: this was responsible £or 
the design of a wide range of party symbols, £lags
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and uniforms. It was also responsible £or organising 
many aspects of the week-long Parteitag held each 
year in Nureml:Qrg.
(iii & iv) these two offices were responsible £or the 
creation and standardisation of the numerous rituals 
which accompanied the various stages of party member­
ship. For instance, they devised the official 
christening ceremonies £or the children of party 
members, as well as the .funerals 0£ any members who died,
(v) the Office of Folk Culture: this office became one 
ot the last strongholds 0£ the volkisch tendency within 
the party. Its brief was to encourage and spread the 
enjoyment 0£ German folk art and mu.sic. On the £ace 
of it one would have expected this office to play a 
central role in Nazi cultural policy. However, it 
never really established itself and was certainly 
never able to raise 'folk culture' to a position of 
importance in any way comparable to the status given it 
in the Socialist regimes of eastern Europe. The reason 
for this lay, very largely, with Hitler's theories on the 
role of art. Folk forms were never to provide a focus for 
his grandiose schemes, and his architectural projects 
were always thoroughly urban both in their .function 
and in their style. The dominant source was to be a 
type of baroque monumentalism rather than rural volkischness.
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{c) THE REICHS..CHAMBER OF CULTURE. The various departments 
which made up the Reichs Chamber of Culture were set up with 
the passing of the Reichskulturkammergesetz of September 22nd, 
1933. The decrees that were to govern its everyday ^^ing, and 
which were to determine its overall function, were passed in the 
months that followed, with the whole apparatus beginning to 
function effectively by November of that year. The decree 
passed on 1he 1st November set out most succinctly the basic 
principles which were to cover the workings of all the various 
chambers:
"The Chamber of Culture has the assignment ··· the 
cooperation of all involved in its various fields 
of activity and under the direction of the Minister 
of Information and Propaganda, of furthering German 
culture with responsibility towards the people and 
the Reich; of regulating the economic and social 
aspects o£ cultural affairs; and of balancing all 
activities of its member groups." (6)
The structure of the Chamber o£ Culture can best be sammaraised 
by a diagram:
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Each of the chambers, when they eventually began to be fully 
operational, constituted the only institution through which 
any kind of artistic activity could take place. They literally 
encompassed every aspect of each particular art form, to such an 
extent that failure to gain membership of the respective chamber 
meant a complete ban on the artist in question being able to work 
at all - (this applied even to working in private), The chambers 
were not state unions, rather state-imposed corporation-guilds, and 
were designed to include everyone who was associated, however 
remotely, with any cultural form:
"Anyone who takes part in the production, the 
reproduction, the artistic or technical elaboration, 
the publication, the presentation, the wholesale or 
retail selling, of cultural goods (x:ulturgute:a must 
be a member of the chamber which is relevant to his 
activities." (7)
Thus, for instance, membership of the Reich Chamber of Radio 
was compulsory not only £or producers and broadcasters, but 
also for the manufacturers and retailers of radio sets.
This grouping together of the nation's cultural activities 
into state organisations was not simply the working out of an 
abstract totalitarian urge. The Chambers were there to support 
and further a particular view of art which was best summed up 
by I.F. Schreiber, President of the Council for the National 
Chamber of Cu.lture in 1 936:
"The base underlying the three laws can be brought 
into a simple formula: within the unity of 
creative function (i) primacy of the spiritual; 
(ii) suppression of the economic; (iii) subjection 
to the laws of the people's community through filling 
the cultural professions with a definite sense 0£ 
responsiblity to the nation." (8)
This 'simple formula' combined the three major strands which we
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noted in the aesthetic thinking 0£ the Nazi leaders. First, 
there was the need to put art back in touch with the spiritual. 
Secondly, to cleanse it 0£ any lingering influence 0£ cultural 
bolshevism ie. 'suppression 0£ the economic'. Finally, the 
creation 0£ a more democratic form of culture,
The Chambers' scope was nationwide, being sub-divided along 
regional lines. Internally, they were structured according to 
the 'Fuhrerprinzip', power being concentrated at all levels 
in the figure 0£ the President and the hierarchy 0£ subordinates 
beneath him. Only the President could decide on questions 0£ 
membership, which am^ounted to having the power to decide who 
could practise within a particular art form, since exclusion 
from the chamber meant economic death £or the individual involved.
The Chamber of Fine Arts,
This Chamber was split up into a number 0£ sub-sections covering 
painting, sculpture, architecture, graphic design, arts & crafts, 
interior design, art dealers and publishers, and landscape 
gardening. The first President 0£ the Chamber was a Professor 
Zeigler, a personal favourite of Hitler, and it was by his appoint­
ment that the Fuhrer was able to give a clear indication 0£ what 
kind of painting style would meet with favour in the Third Reich. 
Zeigler^s forte was the production of minutely-detailed female 
nudes, an activity which had earned him the nickname of 'the 
master of the pubic hair'. The day-to-day tasks 0£ the chamber 




the organising of exhibitions of 'German art';
an attempt to clarify what was to be accepted 
as German art;
acting as a channel £or state sponsorship,
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purchasing and subsidising 0£ the works 0£ 
favoured artists;
(iv) acting, like all the other chambers, as the 
chief agents of the censorship laws.
Almost the first piece 0£ legislation enforced by the Chamber was 
the exclusion from membership 0£ any Jewish painter or artist. 
This was to be followed by a similar exclusion 0£ anyone who 
painted in the style labelled as 'decadent modernism^. This 
purge was effected by the application 0£ varying degrees 0£ 
censorship which at each stage entailed an increasing severity. 
The first level was 'LehrverboV, which deprived the individual 
of the right to teach. Second was the 'Ausstellungsverbot', 
which placed a complete ban on the artist exhibiting his work. 
The final stage was 1Malverbot1 , whereby the artist was forbidden 
to work at all, whether in public or in private. This last 
sanction was enforced by surprise spot-checks on the homes of 
artists known to favour modernist styles - (there are stories 
0£ the Gestapo examining the brushes of banned artists to see if 
they were wet). Lists 0£ Malverbot artists were circulated to 
art-supply shops in order to stop paint or canvas reaching them. 
The effect upon artists unfortunate enough to continue living in 
the Third Reich was disastrous. For instance, Oscar Schlemmer, 
a leading painter of the Expressionist school, was forced to 
earn a living by painting camouflage designs onto the 
municipal gasometer in Stuggart. But those choosing exile 
were always a minority: the majority of artists submitted to 
the demands of the Fine Arts Chamber such that by 1936 its 
membership consisted of 15,000 architects, 14,300 painters, and 
2,900 sculptors.
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The philosophy underlying the working 0£ each 0£ these 
Chambers derived directly from those elements of corporatist 
thinking which had been common in the pre-1933 Nazi ideology. 
Each chamber was represented as being a self-managing guild 
or corporation in which power was given back to the actual 
practitioners. However, the way in which each chamber 
actually conducted its internal affairs was, of course, in 
flat contradiction to this claim. The chain of command and 
the decision-making process was always strictly one-directional 
ie. from the top to the bottom. So although much was made of 
the £act that the chambers would enable practising artists to 
control the conditions under which they worked, the actual brief 
of the chamber had remarkably little to do with any notion of 
self-management:
those who mix up individual with community 
purposes in a way con£using to the 
public.·
(2) whoever is inclined to weaken the povA:!r of 
the German nation at home or abroad, the 
community will of the German people, the 
German military, Culture or Economy, or 
who injures the religious sensitivities 0£ 
others.
(3) who offends against the honour and values of 
Germans.
(4) who illegally the honour or prosperity of any 
other person,harms his calling, and makes 
him laughable or base.
(5) who opposes the customs on any other grounds." (9) 
shall be excluded from membership^and subjected to sanctions. The 
real target 0£ these decrees, which were established without prior 
discussion and remained unchanged, was the content of the various 
arts _ their public £ace - rather than an attempt to transform 
the conditions of artistic production. Thus, within the limits 
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laid down, Goebbels could stress "the healthy affect of private 
initiative and free competition":
"The Press [read ’culture] shall be uniform
in will and multiform in carrying out that will." (10
This was the ’freedom with responsibility· incorporated into the 
organisations of artistic producers, and "if the creative artist 
is conscious of this common need, then he is unhampered in his 
activity" (11).
ROSENBERG’S NATIONAL SOCIALIST COMMUNITY OF CULTURE
This organisation was the bone 
after his defeat in the controversies of the 1933-1934 period. 
The National Socialist Culture Group was set up on June 4th, 
1933, and eventually absorbed the old Iampfbund fur Deu.tsche- 
kultur. Rosenberg, in finally agreeing to head this organisation, 
was, in effect, ditching his old volkisch comrades who from this 
point on gradually faded into obscurity. The 'Community of 
Culture· was a non-starter from the moment of its inception, 
since Goebbels retained his grip on the arts through the various 
bureaucracies 0£ the Ministry 0£ Propaganda. The brief written 
for the organisation was for it to act as
"leader 0£ the entire programme for the education 
of the party in spiritual and weltanschaung 
matters." (12)
By placing its sphere of operation inside the party, Hitler 
gave Rosenberg the impression that his role would be one of 
overall watchdog, delegated to ensure that no new manifestations
The difficulty was
that Rosenberg was now cut off from access to the professional 
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artists and found himself limited to organising clubs for 
'concerned' laymen in the party, where stimulation of the 
approved art was to be fostered. All that was left of 
Rosenberg's vision of a radical volkisch community and a 
radical volkisch art was a vaguely-worded paragraph referring 
to his "responsibility for the cultural reconstruction of the 
people"(13).
As far as the practical implementation of any policies 
were concerned, the National Socialist Culture Group had a 
brief flurry of activity in the winter of 1934-35, and then 
went out of existence. The programme of events that he was 
able to stage in Berlin that winter replicated almost all 
of the confusion that we have earlier noted in Rosenberg's 
thinking. The first strategy was to make themselves 
responsible for what they termed 'workers' culture·. To 
this end, Rosenberg published a number of essays in which he 
attempted to define what he meant by the term. Again the old 
themes of the abolition of class differences by the initiation 
of Germany into a state of volkisch community cropped up: class 
differences simply vanished into thin air with the arrival of 
the Nazis. The old theme of the alienation of the artist from 
the community was dealt with at length:
11 occupations • • • became classes, and the classes 
gave birth to class war ••• and so art too became 
divided and isolated ••• till it, like all remain­
ing areas, was distant from everyday life." (14)
The answer to this dual alienation of the artist and the people 
was the creation of a situation where it would again be possible 
£or the artist to ’go amongst the pecple 1· To this end, Rosenberg 
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and the National Socialist Culture Group attempted to penetrate 
Ley's D.A.F. and set up exhibitions of German art in factories. 
After a few weeks, however, this project fell to pieces, largely 
because 0£ the hostility encountered from the defeated radicals 
who had found some kind 0£ shelter within D.A.F. This defeat 
led the Culture Group to try to stage exhibitions of 'model 
National Socialist products^ in Berlin. The 'products^ were 
largely the work of amateurs and were soaked in the old volkisch 
themes of Blood and Soil. One typical example of this Iulturfest 
was a cantata,by an obscure amateur composer, entitled 'A Man 
Builds a Cathedral'. A disillusioned Rosenberg grafted on to 
this minor work the whole battery 0£ his cultural regeneration 
ideology in one last £ling:
"it was the first attempt on a large scale to cast 
into the mould of art the great experiences of the 
last twenty years and the sentiment of the new myths 
••. and demonstrated the possibility 0£ giving a 
religious meaning to our national resurrection," (15)
By 1935 the 'NS Kulturgemeinde' had ceased to operate in any 
real sense, having been swallowed up by Ley's voracious 'Strength 
through Joy' organisation. In terms of art and cultural matters, 
Rosenberg was finished, and gradually began to move over into other 
areas which interested him eg. foreign policy. He still gave the 
ritual address during the 'Days 0£ Culture' which always opened 
the annual party rallies, but took no actual part in the implement­
ation of cultural policy. In 1937 he was awarded a prize £or his 
work in art and, with supreme cheek, Goebbels made the presentation,
* * * * *
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CHAPTER V,
Some Problems of Style in Nazi Architecture ,
This section is not intended to be an exhaustive account of the 
many-faceted building programme embarked upon by the Nazis 
during the period of their rule. Rather I want to address 
myself to certain problems which are raised by comparing 
certain types 0£ Nazi building, and, more specifically, the 
ideological meaning of the differing 'styles of these buildings. 
Again they can be related to the central problematic 0£ the thesis 
in that Nazi architecture claimed to be a radical-revolutionary 
form of architecture, capable of expressing £or the first time 
a truly communal public set 0£ values. The various styles 
utilised, which were invariably termed 'national', were in 
£act class-bound and incapable of fulfilling the revolutionary 
role envisaged £or them. Thus, in this section I wish to 
analyse the buildings in the following way:
(1) the overt, conscious ideological content 
embodied in the styles of certain buildings. 
This will involve looking at the way in which 
the buildings realise the ideas which the Nazis 
held about the role architecture should play.
(2) the covert ideological content of the buildings. 
This will be closely related to the failure to 
generate a distinctive National Socialist style, 
which in turn is part of the wider contradiction 
between the stated intentions of the Nazis and 
the real development taken by Nazi society.
(3) the more general question 0£ the set 0£ determinants 
which were operating on the choice 0£ building styles; 
in £act, the '£it' between architectural content and 
the political and economic forces at work in the 
society.
The Nazi building programme only really got under way after 
the aesthetic controversy 0£ 1934-1935 was brought to an abrupt 
end by the personal intervention of Hitler. Hitler's hasty 
attempt to construct a conS^sus in the arts, over the heads 
of the major participants in the debate, only half succeeded. 
What he did manage to achieve was to put an end, once and £or 
all, to any open debate about the role which the arts were to 
play. More specifically, he was able to silence any attempts 
to discuss culture in terms 0£ its 'revolutionary' role. 
However, he was never able, and possibly never willing, to 
give any clear indication of the direction in which the arts 
were to move. He established a consensus of £ear rather than 
one of agreement, and this produced a situation in which the 
old divisions still worked away, separated from each other and 
incapable of generating any general ideological justification. 
Thus, after 1934, there was never a monolithic unity vithin the 
Nazi movement, rather a confused diversity of silences: 
"Totalitarian uniformity was of the mental, not 
the material world (and even in the former 
sphere a wide range of contradictory virtues 
earned the label 'National Socialist'), 11 (1)
This ideological diversity in the practice of architecture was 
a continuation of the general problem of the resolution of the 
diverse elements which had contributed to the Nazi rise to 
power. The various class-factions which made up the Nazi 
constituency - lower-middle class disruption, sentimental
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artisanry, glorified peasantry, aristocratic contempt for 
democratic forms - all coupled themselves to the pervasive 
ideology of militarism, with the result that all these 
contradictory tensions were to manifest themselves in the 
Nazi outlook. After 1935, these diverse elements were 
'plugged into' the demands created by the real world. Houses 
had to be built, factories constructed, and the result was a 
complex whole in which the 'radical' thrust of Nazi architectural 
thinking was to be pushed aside. There is no one aesthetic face 
of German fascism, rather a collection of styles, in which 
certain more obvious 'political' styles operated within a 
privileged space. The vast majority of the building 
programme which took place in Germany was a totally pragmatic 
response to direct social needs. These social needs were made 
up of pressures issuing from the demands of industry and the 
military, especially after the rearmament programme got under 
way. In addition to this, there was the problem of providing 
housing in the public sector, as the Nazis had inherited from 
Weimar a chronic shortage of low-cost housing. All these 
pressures had to be dealt with immediately, and ideological 
intrusion,in the form of sharply delineated ideas about style, 
was the last thing they wanted to be bothered about. Moreover, 
the private building sector continued to £unction as before, 
so that Mstylen in Germany remained to a large extent the 
product of the taste of those who paid £or it, as in the 
rest of Western Europe." (2)
Thus the desire of the Nazis to lay hold of society and 
stamp their image upon it through the evolution of a single
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unitary style, faltered and fell back under social pressures. 
All the official styles taken up by the Nazis existed in 
architectural and social ghettoes, which were valued only 
in terms of their propaganda function of bearing witness 
to a more general 'delivery of the goods' and which their 
isolated status immediately denied.
The two major styles that I have selected for analysis are: 
(i) the remnants of the Volkisch tradition
(ii) the personal building projects of Hitler.
THE VOLIISCH IXAGE. The defeat, in September 1934, of the 
champions of the'volkisch way', had highlighted the central 
contradiction of the whole of their programme. How could a 
rural, pre-industrial social image provide the basis for the 
reorganisation of Germany, and yet intergrate into this image 
the industrial core that was essential £or the rearmament 
programme central to the notion of a strong Germany? The 
short answer was that it couldn't. By refusing to ally with 
the radical, anti-capitalist elements in the party, the Iampfbund 
found themselves left high and dry with no basis £or attaining 
power. After 1934, this failure of nerve ensured that any 
revolutionary content which remained in their aesthetic would 
be confined to the reproduction of images and styles which would 
achieve no deep penetration , in the sense of affecting social 
policy over a wide range of issues. Thus they became the official 
fantasists of the Third Reich, commissioned 'to: ,
"create an impression of rural life where none existed." (3).
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Even if the Volkisch adherents had gained a position where 
partial implementation of their social ideas were possible, the 
implications £or the social structure of Germany would have been 
nothing short of catastrophic:
(a) the working-class would have to be transformed 
into a peasant/artisan class;
(b) the cities, and their industrial and communication 
infrastructure, would have to be dismantled.
This was a task that even a 'totalitarian regime' such as Nazi 
society was incapable of realising. For Hitler, the problem 
after 1934 was how to tame the volkisch adherents who had 
always formed a very strong bloc within the rank-and-file of 
the party. The Ro..hm purges had certainly rattled many party 
stalwarts, who chose to remain silent rather than receive the 
midnight knock on the door. But they still had to be given the 
illusion of effectiveness, and this Hitler did by taking away 
their claim on 'totality' but giving them back the partial realm 
of the aesthetic. They could, within certain limits, build in 
what style they liked, just so long as this was all they did.
I have chosen two buildings to illustrate this containment 
of the volkisch element, and also to point out the inadequacy 
of the style in coming to grips with the real social forces at 
work in Nazi society:
(i) a Hitler Youth Hostel
(ii) an Air-Force weather service broadcasting station. 
It's worth remembering that, although frequently resorted to, the 
Volkisch style was never employed in any of the major building 
programmes of the Third Reich. It always occupied a position 
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on the periphery of Nazi society, and certainly never penetrated 
the industrial-military complex or the series of major symbolic 
buildings initiated by Hitler.
The Hitler Youth Hostel (see illustration No: 8)
The Youth organisation of the National Socialists was one of 
the major inheritors of the volkisch tradition as it had been 
constituted in the 19th century, and it had, until well on into 
Nazi rule, resisted any attempt to reduce it to a purely agit­
prop organisation. The spirit of the Wandervogel still beat 
in many a young breast, and this type of building catered 
directly to this illusion. Like many of the volkisch buildings 
it is:
(i) small-scale
:(ii) situated in a rural setting 
(iii) associated with leisure activities.
The building becomes a perfect setting £or a bucolic fantasy.
In achieving this end the architects drew heavily on the regional 
styles of pre-industrial Germany, especially in their utilisation 
of the sharply gabled roofs, the ornate balconies, and the use of 
'natural' materials. The sources £or these pre-industrial styles 
would vary from region to region, in each case drawing on the 
local traditions and even inventing some that had never existed. 
The volk becomes a reality only away from the cities, and only 
then in the dimension of leisure. These hostels provide an 
ideal stage setting £or urbanites romanticising the countryside, 
where the desired organic relationship between people and soil 
would be finally achieved but only in the mind. They are islands 
of organic unity, essentially designed to work on their occupants 
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for the short period of a holiday. They are heightened, 
idealised versions of the outside rural community which, 
during the period when these buildings were being used, 
was witnessing a rise in the rate of depopulation. For 
this process of idealisation to work, the peasantry always 
had to be kept in the background: no programmes involving 
actual work in the rural community were introduced until 
very late in the war and, even then, certain of the Nazi 
hierarchy ^e= the use of women on the land
until the food shortage drove them to it. These lovers 
of the rural life seem to have overlooked the fact that 
women in rural corrnnunities had always been an essential 
part of the labour force. The ousting of the volkisch 
style into a marginal position is best illustrated by 
comparison with the policies adopted by the 'Strength 
through Joy' organisation. One of the departments of 
this vast organisation was named 'Beauty of Work', and 
was under the direction of Albert Speer. The aim was to 
beautify the place of work through the provision of up-to- 
date canteens, rest rooms and parks. The design styles 
adopted were taken directly from the Bauhaus and utilised 
clean, simple lines, coupled with buildings relying heavily 
upon the use of concrete and glass. However, in the hostels 
which were erected to house holidaying workers, regional styles 
abounded. The volkisch style was reduced to providing play areas 
£or tired workers and exhausted party stalwarts. By 1938, even the 
party bureaucracy began to regard the volkisch tendency as some­
thing of a joke:
\,
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"The suburban Berlin type villa in a peasant 
village is no doubt nonsense. No less of a 
nonsense, however, is the white-washed Tyrolean 
peasant house transpl anted to a Berlin suburb. 11 ( 4)
The Air Ministry Weather Broadcasting Station (see illustration No:9) 
This building, with its slightly whimsical use of the thatched 
roe£ and half-timbering characteristic o£ the North Sea region, 
could be multiplied a thousand times, and illustrates the way 
in which the volkisch architectural vision was separated £rem 
any social content and reduced to the realm o£ pure style. Its 
most obvious characteristic is the clash between the .function o£ 
the building and the style in which it is constructed, with the 
modern world o£ telecommunications being dressed in pre-industrial 
clothing. The function of the building does not penetrate and 
organise the style of the building in order to produce a 
unified whole: rather the style is reduced to the level of 
a surface patina, with the product of an industrial technology 
being submerged beneath a rural facade. The ludicrous effect 
produced by this could be paralelled in the hundreds of garages 
along the autobahns dressed up as Tyrolean chateaux, or the 
art galleries which attempted to look like Gothic town halls.
One begins to wonder what might have been produced had the 
regime survived: atomic reactors with thatched roofs? I am 
not in any way trying to suggest that the use of pre-industrial 
styles is unique to German Nazism - witness the rows of mock- 
tudor houses in the London suburbs: what is unique is the use 
of these styles for overtly political ends, and 'revolutionary' 
political ends at that. The construction of these buildings in 
this meaner was a conscious political act, both for those who 
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commissioned them and for those who designed them: 
"For many Nazi officials it reflected a 
genuine ideological commitment." (5)
Thus the penetration of the Volkisch style into the fabric of 
the evt!Iyday life of the Third Reich was always miniffial, and 
in terms of its ability to constitute the essence of Nazi 
architecture it was a definite non-starter. In a competition 
held to design a new party forum, the veteran volkisch architect, 
Schultze-Naumburg, submitted a design which Hitler dismissed with 
the comment:
"It looks like an oversized market-place 
for a provincial town." (6)
The Utopia of Redeplooyment
As mentioned earlier, one of the major components of the volkisch 
ideology was the ensemble of ideas called 'Blood and Soil'. This 
had had a twin thrust: firstly it had been used to win the 
support of the peasantry during the 'days of struggle' by 
elevating them into a glorified model - along with the 
military - of National Socialist Man; the other prong of 
the attack had carried within it a very strong anti-urban element. 
The volk could only realise its potential if its members were 
rooted back into the soil and landscape of the German countryside. 
This aspect of the volkisch tendency had always been extremely 
ambiguous in its attitude towards the status of the proletariat. 
On the one hand the working-class was seen as a symptom of urban 
decadence; at the same time they were regarded as capable of 
salvation, if only they would see the error of their ways, give 
up their addiction to Marxist ideologies, and return to their true
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Nordic foundations.
The debate which the conservatives had had with the Bauhaus 
during the 20's had focused around the nature of the architecture 
of the modern metropolis. The Kampfbund had always claimed that 
the 'Neue Sachlichkeit'style of building was actively encouraging 
the tendency towards urban decadence: not only was the style 
thoroughly metropolitan, but the social relationships implicit 
• in the style were leading to a mass proletarianisation of the 
population. The implication at this stage was that, if they 
achieved power, the Nazis would not only utilise styles of 
building that were in direct contradiction to those of the 
Bauhaus, but would also attempt to create new types of 
existence which would reverse this trend towards escalating 
metropolitanism. The way to achieve this, at least in the eyes 
of the Blood and Soil proponents, was by the wholesale repatriation 
of the working-class back to the artisan or peasant role. Certainly 
for some of the more idealistic believers this would entail a 
geographical move:
"The dissolution of the metropolis, in order to 
make our people settled again, to give them 
again their roots in the soil •.• the metropolis 
had destroyed men's feelings for their homeland 
••• the reincorporation of the metropolitan 
populations into the rhythm of the German 
landscape is one of the principal tasks of 
the National Socialist Government." (7)
Feder (7a), the author of this lunacy, held power for only a 
year, and was therefore'spared a confrontation with the logical 
implications of his policies. However, certain housing projects 
were initiated in an attempt to realise this policy of massive 
% 
repatriation. They were to become the 'propaganda stars' of 
the new Reich, with the goverrnment advertising them as 'the
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Nazi housing programme', although in fact they always comprised 
only a tiny part of the total housing erected by the National 
Socialists. Three such housing projects were started _ in 
Aachen, Frankfurt and Munich. On t."1.ese estates the building 
of blocks of flats was taboo, since each family was to have 
its own individual dwelling. In terms of style, the hv:l.s es 
displayed the ubiquitO'.lS sloping roof, half-tb:be=-ing a.n.:i 
vindcw shutters. (illustrations no:IOill). Perhaps the 
Gost distinctive characteristic 0£ these estates .-as tl:e 
lavish provision of la."l.d allocated to each fa11ily, ,,.-hich 
in some cases amounted to a quarter of an acre. The aim of 
this allocation was, in theory at least, to allow each family 
to be sel£-su£ficient in food, and to give the occupants a real 
taste of the rural life. The objective aim of these project, 
however, was to undercut the base of the working-class, since 
it was never envisaged that the metropolis would be penetrated 
by the real peasantry; they were to continue to leave the land 
and to move to the towns as fodder £or the urban factories. Each 
of the estates was situated in the suburbs of large towns so as 
to provide the city-dwellers they were intended for with the 
illusion of 'going rural'. But, as can be seen from the 
illustrations, they actually looked like rather staid suburbs, 
having the unmistakeable £eel of a contrived urban rurality. 
Even in terms of the rationale of urban planning the estates 
proved totally unworkable, since they were occupied by workers 
in large-scale industrial concerns in which they continued to 
work. One of the results of this was that they had to travel 
double the distance to work, a £act that contributed to their 
inability to fully utilise the enormous grants of land that went 
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with each house. The final result was that the allotments 
had to be grassed over and converted into parkland.
The repatriation programme was just one of a whole battery 
of weapons that were used to overcome the divisions between 
labour and capital, and between the urban and the rural work 
force, the final ideological aim being to create the National 
Socialist Community of Work. But as the volkisch tendency 
fragmented and fell back from its claim on the totality of 
Nazi society, mere stylistic affectations were prised out of 
their political context and thrown about like so much architectural 
confetti. These estates can be seen as beached whales, fallen 
dreams of a self-sufficient urban peasantry \o/hich failed to 
materialise. In many of the estates the agricultural self­
sufficiency programme quickly degenerated into a passive 
appreciation of what must have seemed an inordinate amount 
of supervised greenery, and this at least may have provided 
the occupants with some form of consolation.
The true face of the Nazi housing programme was not to be 
found in these ideological adventures, but at the point where 
reality had to be immediately dealt with. As the ^ec^ae 
progressed, and the rearmament programme speeded up, an 
acute shortage of labour began to disrupt the efficient 
functioning of certain key industries, such as mining, 
engineering and the building trade. Despite numerous attempts 
to control the level of wages and direct the £low of the labour 
market, a savage competition between these sectors of industry 
had come into being. The various sections of industry turned
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on each other and began a wholesale poaching of each other's 
workers by luring them with an increasing proliferation of 
fringe benefits. This had a particularly disastrous effect 
on the building trade, which had been put under tremendous 
pressure by a flood of governmental commissions coupled with 
the demands made on it by the expansion of the armed forces, 
industry and the autobahn programme. The effect of all this 
was to increase the mobility of the work force, a £act which 
eventually played havoc with the Nazi housing programme. Any 
ideological intrusion into this situation was given short 
shrift, and blocks of flats were erected which were almost 
indistinguish-ble from those of the Weimar period. The 
rag-bag of volkisch stylistic elements were simply stuck 
onto the facades as a final dying nod in the direction of 
the volkisch commitment (illustration no:12 ).
As the shortage of labour got worse, with workers shuttling 
betveen those employers who offered them the best deal, the 
housing programme reached a pinnacle of pragmatism:
"The greatest problem was the catastrophic shortage 
of housing in the Third Reich ... however, the 
government increasingly resorted to the physical 
transfer of labour, housing workers in barracks." (8)
Faced with this situation, it was hardly likely that the 
wholesale conversion of skilled workers into a quasi-peasantry 
would be greeted with any great favour by those whose major 
concern was to get the Gennan armed forces up to strength.
By the end of the 19301s the volkisch ideology had been 
beaten back, finally coming to rest in the sugary canvases 
of pea3ant life and the bland prose of the official handout.
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The involvement 0£ the National Socialists in mass politics
had reduced the volldsch adherents to the status 0£ clockwork 
figures, hardly any longer even papering over the ideological 
and economic cracks that were beginning to appear in the alleged 
unity 0£ Nazi thought and practice.
NAZI BAROQUE. '
"what we now call 1monumental architecture· is 
first ot all the expression ot power, and that 
power exhibits itself in the assemblage 0£ costly 
building materials and 0£ all the resources ot 
art . .·· The purpose o£ this art was to produce 
respect.tul terror."
Levis Mumfordt ( 9)
Perhaps the most powerful and condensed image ot Nazi Germany 
is to be found in the mass party rallies which were held each 
year on the Zeppelin field in Nuremberg. The event, and its 
setting, through repetition in a thousand photographs, have 
finally merged so th.t it becomes difficult to separate the 
two elements which constitute this image •. Its persistence 
as the ultimate symbol ot Nazi •totalitarianism' would surely 
indicate that we have at last located the real aesthetic face 
ot National Socialism. However, as soon as we begin to deconstruct 
this popular impression, we once again find ourselves in a realm even 
more fantastic than that ot the volkisch tendency. Again the eyes 0£ 
the Nazis are firmly fixed on the past, just as in the halt-timbered 
mock rural. dwellings we have just been examining. What is often 
forgotten about the Nuremberg stadium is that it was only one 
element in a gigantic complex ot party buildings planned to cluster 
aroumd the stadium, and· that this Nuremberg complex was itsel£ only
one 0£ a whole series of such schemes which Hitler had planned 
to erect. So far I have deliberately resisted using any type 
ot analysis which relied upon the concept o£ 'personal taste· 
as a determinant 0£ style. However, when looking at these 
buildings it is hard to avoid explaining the style and £orm 
0£ these buildings, which were intended to be the crowning 
achievement 0£ the Third Reich, in terms 0£ the personal taste 
o£ the Fuhrer·. The incredible concentration of power in the 
figures which made up the Nazi leadership, and especially the 
seemingly unending horizon £or action invested in Hitler, would 
seem to make this a valid approach. But Hitler was not catapulted 
into some realm ot pure freedom: determinants were operating on 
him to £orm his taste,and these must be isolated it the category 
ot •taste· is not to be £etishised, leaving the ^analysis dependent 
on the operations 0£ a tyrannical, megalomaniac personality. To 
be a megalomaniac in terms ot architecture means that the position 
one occupies places no constraint on projects in terms 0£ labour, 
cost or scale. Having said this, it is still a £act that the 
imagination of the architect and 0£ the sponsor are still in 
the realm 0£ listory. At first sight it might appear that we 
are entering the realm 0£ some transcendent utopia, simply a mental 
construct, borne of the .fusion ot the personal fantasies 0£ Speer 
alld Hitler, until we realise that a start was in tact made on all 
0£ the buildings to be describei in the tollowing section. They 
may appear to be fantastic, and they certainly were, but they 
were all eminently realisable.
Hitler, during his days in Vienna, had tried and tailed to 
enrol as an architectural student, and this passion for building
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was to remain with him until the end. The architecture of a 
nation became, literally, his private hobby, and was the 
only area where he personally intervened to realise his 
aesthetic ideas. The power which his position gave him 
to largely ignore questions of materials and cost in his 
building projects was paralleled by a dropping away 0£ constraints 
on his imagination and that ot his architect, Albert Speer. Both 
Speer and Hitler finally coalesced, drifting ott into· a hermetic 
architectural heay-en •• And as Speer states in his autobiography:
"I was accust011led to his (Hitletl occassionally 
saying things that sounded hallucinatory." (10)
I have, therefore, divided the following section into:
(i) an account 0£ Hitler's ideas about the 
role ot architecture;
(ii) a description 0£ the major building projects;
(iii) an analysis ot why these particular styles
were chosen.
Hitler's Ideas About Architecture.
"It is essential that our adherents should mow 
that our buildings are arising in order to 
strengthen this authority."
Adolt Hitler , (11)
Hitler's ideas about architecture centred around the basic division 
which he made between public end private architec^^e·. By 'private 
he did not simply mean construction carried out in the private 
sector 0£ the economy, but construction which expressed private 
values. Only those buildings which were intended to express public 
and sx:ial values held any interest £or him. Thus he ignored the 
majority of the building progr^rnes of the Third Reich. Hitler· s 
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notion 0£ the social .£'unction of architecture was about the 
only area where he thought through aesthetic problems with 
any consistency·. He conceived of architecture as the most 
important of mass cultural modes: it was the most ideologically 
charged of man's artefacts and the only area which could most 
adequately give form to the spiri^tual aspirations o£ the nation·. 
For him, the crucial shift in the development of architecture 
was the movement from a dimension ot pure economics into a 
realm ot symbolism, since it was in his symbolic activity that 
man gave expression to the spiritual (which, in Hitler's aesthetic, 
was always communal). Thus the provision ot shelter or work-space 
was outside his interest and consideration. The buildings which 
attracted him were the Parthenon, the Pyramids and the Gothic 
cathedrals, and he saw himself as the continuation 0£ this 
building tradition:
"At the present moment the most important point would 
appear to me to be that we should make a distinction 
between the erection 0£ public buildings and private 
buildings. The building created by the people as a 
whole lltllSt represent those who <X>mmissioned it." (12)
His supreme ambition was to create National Socialist •monuments· 
which, in cOfflJllon with all previous examples of monumental architecture, 
wo-wl.d embody public values, only this time it would be expressive of 
the spirit ot the new Ge^^y. These •monuments· ^would constitute 
the new order in a concrete yet symbolic .t'orm. It is at this point 
that he came up against the general problems or representation, a 
problem that had dogged the architecture 0£ the 19th centllry. Where 
were the original forms and styles that would be adequate to the task 
which Hitler set the new German a-chitecture? His solution was no 
different trom that 0£ an earlier age ('bourgeois' he called it) and
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he sought refuge in the colwnns 0£ classicism, whilst at the 
same time condemning the 19th century:
"Unfortunately in a bourgeois age the architectural 
development in public life was sacrificed to objects 
serving capitalistic enterprises. The great task in 
the history of culture which lies before National 
Socialism consists above all in abandoning this 
tendency." (13)
This reduction of the public realm to a collection ot private 
interests lay at the root of the failure 0£ the 19th century, 
since private interest could never generate the •eternal 
monuments· that Hitler yearned atter:
"Therefore the building 0£ great architectural 
monuments ··· and the achievements the · 
results ingpired by this ambition have above 
all else mediated to humanity the true community 
spirit." (14)
This fixation on the past gave rise to certain bizarre 
elements in his approach to building. Firstly, there was a 
strong national in£eriority complex at work in which 'bigger' 
automatically equalled 'better'. He wanted to be the author 
ot the world's largest buildings - (Speer^s acc^mt of the 
planning stage is dotted with references to how mu.eh bigger 
-his buildings would be than any which had gone before). Secondly, 
this monumentality of scale was to be accompanied by an equally 
monumental time scale. The Parthenon, al though in ruins, retained 
its essence and was still able to speak to succeeding generations 
of 'the glory that was Greece·. Hitler wanted his buildings to 
do the same thing £or Germany, even though the political structures 
which had made them possible should eventually crwuble. In order 
to achieve this effect he decreed that his constructions should 
obey the •law of ruins 1 , so that in decay they ^would still convey
-167
the greatness of the Reich.
Zeppelin field:
"To this end we planned to avoid, as far as 
possible, all such elements of modern construction 
such as steel girders and reinforced concrete, which 
are subject to weathering. Despite their height, the 
walls were intended to withstand the impact 0£ the 
wind even i£ the roofs and ceilings were so neglected 
that they no longer braced the walls." (15)
The symbolic £\mction 0£ this public architecture was seen 
as flowing in two directions, in that it both e,cpressed the 
communal values otttie nation and renected them back to 1he 
mass, and it was in this second .f\mction that the architecture 
became directly political, with the line between public expression 
and public repression getting increasingly vague •• If the •community' 
didn't have these values before the buildings were constructed, then 
they soon would have:
"For it is precisely these buildings which will 
cooperate to unity our people politically more 
closely than ever before and strengthen it: £or 
the Germans as a society, these b\lildings will 
inspire a proud consciousness that each and 
all belong together: they will prove how ridiculous 
in our social life are all earthly differences when 
faced with this might, gigantic witness to the life 
we share as a community; they will, by their effect 
upon the minds of men, fill the citizens of our people 
with a limitless self-confidence as they remember that 
they are Germans." (16)
There are some very large holes in this logic, the most obvious
one being that the methods used to ascertain what precisely these
public values were, were virtually non-existent. The Fuhrer, as 
the embodiment 0£ the people, had no need to stoop to such vulgar,
mechanical operations. The result was that n^one, apart from
Speer and Hitler, had any say whatsoever in the planning ot these 
buildings. What would have been the largest building project ot all 
time was to be the responsibility ot just men. Even party 
otficials were excluded and took no part in the planning of these 
-168-
monumental complexes: in £act, they were to £requently complain 
about the amount of time that Hitler spent locked away with 
Speer, ignoring the more practical matter 0£ running Germany, 
Underneath the rhetoric embodied in the continual use 0£ such 
terms as 'public', 'communal' and 'national', the real nature 
0£ Hitler's buildings are clearly discernible: they are the 
expressions of an absolute power and conform to Lewis Mumford's 
first law 0£ monumentality in that they involve 
tta change 0£ scale deliberately meant to awe 
and overpower the beholder. 11 ( 17)
The 'heroic' phase 0£ Nazism was initially to find its image 
in the austere nee-classical columns 0£ Troost's 'House of German 
Art', but, significantly, this was to give way rapidly to an 
image derived from the Baroque 0£ the 18th century, an era that 
was dominated by centralised despotism, the rise of nationaliS!ll, 
and the spectacle of unrestrained militarism. The Baroque style 
was to prove the only one that allowed £or the construction of a 
total spectacle 0£ unified power. It is an architecture in which 
the mass of the people are singularly absent, where they are pushed 
to the edge 0£ the drama to witness passively their own enslavement. 
"Even the demented exponent of Nazism, with his 
deliberate regression to the savage gods of 
Germanism, cast his fantasies of dehumanised 
power into an appropriately classic extravagance 
of emptiness." (18)
The Building Projects, 
"The State must not be a force without beauty ": Hitler (19) 
"Power lives on stolen goods": Anon
Any analysis ot the building projects plumed by Hitler and Speer has
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to account £or the 'choice· o£ particular styles, and relate 
this to the real, objective development 0£ Nazi society. I 
want to deal with these problems in the .final section of the 
thesis and, £or the moment, bracket them out in .favour 0£ a 
description 0£ the personal architectural fantasies dreamed 
up by the Fuhrer.
The erection o£ •eternal monuments· to the power of the 
Third Reich began in a modest way with the commissioning 0£ 
the architect, Troost, to design the 'House 0£ German Art' 
in 1933. This building was intended to serve as home £or 
the regeneration of German Painting and Sculpture that was 
confidently expected at any moment. The eternal spirit 0£ 
art was, in this case, to be embodied in the use of Doric 
columns, and whilst the building hardly breaks new architectural 
ground, and in no sense of the term could be said to express the 
•uniqueness' 0£ the German soul, it certainly does not deserve 
the derision which has been heaped upon it by later coommentators: 
"The 'House of German Art' was a monstrous, 
outsized pastiche in the classical manner 
with an unaccented pillored £acade." (20)
The building was no better or worse than a thousand such examples 
0£ nee-classicism that were erected during the inter-war period 
{illustration No: I3 ). The building was finally completed in 
1937, the architect having died meanwhile in 1934. From all
I 
accounts Troost^s widow seems to have been one of the few people left 
in Germany to remain unimpressed by Hitler's charisma, and zealously 
resisted his persistent efforts to transform the building into 
'wedding cake' baroque. The trouble with all ^qualitative judgements 
about Nazi architecture is that they completely miss the point, and 
are based upon an over-eager desire to reject the values o£ the
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regime by a rejection of its cultural objects. The absurdity 
of the building does not lie in its style considered as an 
isolated fact, but in terms of a much wider configuration 
which has
the expression of German art which were installed inside it. 
It is only when we do this that we can begin to see what a 
hotch-potch 0£ art styles and muddled aesthetics had been 
institutionalised by the Third Reich.
of the 'House of Gennan Art' attempts to provide a spatial 
and ideological framework for the •masterpieces' 0£ the new 
Gennan art. But what were these paintings like? Immediately 
this severe neo-classical setting begins to jar since the majority 
of the canvases on show were detailed portrayals 0£ an idealised, 
sentimental vision of rural life. Even the kitsch 'classical' 
nudes are unmistakeably derived £rem the advances the invention 
0£ the camera made possible in the £ield 0£ pornography. This 
confusion was compounded by the festivals that were staged in 
and around the blli.lding on the holiday set aside £or the 
celebration 0£ Gennan art. In these parades S.S. men were 
dressed in mediaeval costumes and were made to carry examples
0£ German art which ranged £ran sickly nudes through to pre-
Roman teutonic symbols (Illustration No: I4 ). The combined
effect of this almost surrealistic collage of styles and periods
must have been truly bewildering:
"on the opening day of the First Exhibition of 
German Art, Munich hung out its flags. In the 
streets, perspiring Teuton warriors manhandled 
a giant sun and carried the tinfoil-covered 
cosmic ash tree Yggdrasil (of German legend) in 
solemn procession. ‘Nornen· on stilts dexterously 
sidestepped overhead tram cables as they continued 
weaving the loom of fate, and columns of wimpled 
chatelaines and mediaeval burgesses evoked the age 
o£ Albrecht Durer and Lucas Cranach." (21)
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The antics which took place outside the building were infinitely 
more interesting than the 'real' art hanging on the walls inside.
The Nuremberg Party Complex
This was the first 0£ the projects that Hitler and Speer planned 
jointly after the restraining influence 0£ Troost ceased in 1934. 
The immediate change is the enonnous jump in scale 0£ the buildings, 
and Hitler's obsession with the equation 'biggest is best' was £or 
the first time given full rein. If they had been completed, they 
would easily have constituted the largest buildings of their kind 
in the world. The whole complex has to be seen as a celebration 
0£ the failure 0£ the party to absorb the state and push through 
the 'second revolution' - (Hitler's planned reconstruction of 
Berlin was a massive statement that the state was supreme in 
the Third Reich). These buildings are not a sop, thrown to the 
party as some kind 0£ compensation, since every aspect of their 
layout speaks 0£ the overt subordination 0£ the party to the 
Fuhrer and the Nazi state. Hence the continuing replication of 
podia, 'triumphal arches· and avenues, plus parade grounds - 
all devices £or the party to parade past the leader, to be 
inspected, addressed and, finally, coerced. Like the example 
0£ the 'House 0£ German Art', these buildings are only •completed' 
by taking into account the £unction that they performed. In the 
case of the party complex, they were to provide a setting £or the 
creation of 'mass spectacles' and the Nazi version of national 
festivities. Again it must be remembered that these buildings 
were designed in total isolation from the rest 0£ the Nazi party: 
no one, apart trom Hitler and Speer, were to have any say whatsoever 
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in their design and layout. Thus they represent Hitler's 
conception 0£ the party, which was based on the absolute 
domination 0£ it by the state and the Fuhrer.
The Complex was to consist of a number 0£ major elements, 
of which the Zeppelin field, (the Uurembe.rg Stadiwn), was the 
only one to be completed (Illustration No:15 ). The other parts 
were:
(i) The Marzfeld. This was situated to the south 
of the complex and was a vast area of flat 
land (3,400 x 2,300 £eet ), designed as a 
forum £or the staging 0£ 'realistic' military 
manoeuvres. It was the 'Colosseum' o£ Nuremberg, 
and the £inal intention £or the building was to 
allow about 160,000 people to watch miniature wars 
staged by the German armed forces.
(ii} Alongside the Marz£eld was a complex of meeting 
halls where the party faithful could assemble to 
hear their leader address them. The largest of 
these halls could accommodate up to 100,000 people 
standing. There was even a special building set 
aside £or Hitler to expound on his favourite 
topic, Iultur.
(iii)... R^unning north from the Xulturhalle was a vast 
.......  tri^umphal avenue. This was made of granite and
was intended to be used £or military reviews. This 
avenue was actually laid down before the outbreak o£ 
war.
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(iv) The piece de resistance of the whole network o£ 
buildings was to be the party stadium (Illustration 
No: 16 ).
Again it must be stressed that we are not in the realm of 
utopia in the sense that (i) the buildings were technically 
possible to build; and (ii) the social system that produced 
them was able to realise them in terms 0£ materials and labour 
ie. they were not beyond the resources available to Germany at 
that time. 1£ the stadium had been completed its overall size 
would have been colossal. It was meant to seat 400,000 people 
at one meeting and, in order to achieve this, the topmost stands 
would have been 300 £t. high. In his memoirs, Speer rather 
sheepishly confesses that it would have enclosed a volume three 
times greater than the Great Pyramid.
The Berlin Project, .
I£ the Nurem^rg Complex was to provide the party with its own 
playground, the problem of providing the Nazi state with a fitting 
stage-set still remained. Hitler was acutely conscious of the 
'accidental' nature 0£ Berlin as the capital 0£ Germany. In his 
eyes it was still primarily the capital of Prussia, and as yet 
did not dominate the rest of Gennany in an adequate manner. Very 
soon after assw:ning power, he began to plan the reconstruction 0£ 
Berlin in order to bring it up to date with its new role - the 
capital 0£ the Third Reich. In con£ormity with Hitler's 
domination by the Baroque model ot the city, the triumphal 
avenue was to provide the axis around which all the ether elements
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would be organised. Hitler's avenue was to outdo all others, 
and was to be a three-mile long processional way, cutting 
through the suburbs 0£ Berlin and gradually drawing the 
spectator towards the climax 0£ the whole project - the 
fuhrer himself:
"All the main avenues would lead to the palace. And 
when one raised one's eyes in the street, the palace, 
as often as not, would close the vista." (22)
The vistas that Hitler planned would start at the moment 0£ 
arrival in Berlin with the new central railway station, which 
always seemed to provide a central focus £or fascist architectural 
fantasies. This new station was to be built to accommodate £our 
levels of tra££ic:
"The station plaza, 3300' long by 1 000· wide, was to 
be lined with captured weapons after the fashion 0£ 
the avenue 0£ Ramses which leads .from I:arnak to Luxor." (23)
The avenue was to be lined with the buildings housing the bureaucracies 
0£ the state, all 0£ which were to be designed in a uniform style. One 
of the high points 0£ these buildings were to be the private palaces 
0£ the Nazi leadership, 0£ which the most fantastic was to be that 
0£ that Nazi arch-hedonist, Goering. This ornament-encrusted 
monstrosity was a pure hymn to •un^qualified power·: 
"Alleging the need £or air-raid protection, I 
decided to cover the roof with thirteen feet 
of garden soil, which meant that even large 
trees would have been able to strike root 
there (it was May 5th 1941 ). Thus I envisioned 
a 2} acre roof garden, with swimming pools and 
tennis courts, and finally a summer theatre £or 
240 spectators above the roofs or Berlin."(24)
Speer breaks in at this point in his narrative to provide us with 
a glimpse 0£ the sort 0£ transformation he, and the party elite, 
had been going through since the seizure of power:
"The whole thing was pure spectacle. This was 
a decisive step in my development from the
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neo-classicism I had first espoused ••• to 
a blatant nouveau-riche architecture of 
prestige." (25)
The Grand Avenue was to be framed with a triumphal arch in the 
style of the Arc de Triomphe. Hitler intended it to be an eternal 
monument to the German dead 0£ the 1st World War and , as such, it 
had to be 0£ a suitable dimension. The plans demanded that the 
arch be 400 ft. high - (41 times the size of the Arc de 
Triomphe) - and encrusted with Nazi symbolism.
Through the arch one could see, in the distance, what was 
probably the most extreme of all the architectural fantasies 
dreamed up by Hitler - the great meeting hall o£ the Reich. 
What exactly the £unction of this building was to be is 
extremely vague, since Hitler planned to retain the Reichstag, 
even though he saw it as a de£unct institution. From what one 
can make out, the Great Hall was to be the place where it would 
be possible tor the Fuhrer to address all the 'representatives· 
0£ the Greater Reich all together. The building was designed to 
hold between 150,000 and 180,000 people standing, and was organised 
around a central podium from 'Which Hitler would address the assembled 
throng. The crowning feature 0£ the building was, of course, the 
dane which, if completed, would have been 726 £t. high - (again, 
trial foundations were sunk). The square in front of the Great 
Hall, named the •Adolf Hitler Platz·, was designed to hold a 
million people. Speeds description of the whole complex 
spells out the extent to which Hitler, who in his personal habits 
was both ascetic and modest, came close to the realisation of his 
most •utopian' dreams:
"The avenue between the two central railroad 
stations was meant to spell out in architecture 
the political, military and economic power 0£ 
Germany. In the centre sat the absolute monarch 
0£ the Reich and, in his immediate proximity,as 
the highest expression 0£ his power, was the great 
domed hall." (26)
But the 'utopia' he produced in these buildings is neither 
the ravings 0£ a megalomaniac, nor the •communal dream 0£ a 
classless society· envisaged by the adherents o£ the volkisch 
ideology: rather it was the architectural £0:rm 0£ a totally 
unfettered capitalist state. Hitler's architectural 'playfulness' 
is a £unction 0£ the enslavement 0£ the working-class, and it is 
precisely in terms 0£ this relationship that the Baroque style 
0£ so many 0£ these buildings can be explained. The Baroque 
is an architecture 0£ exclusion, and it is precisely the 
exclusion or the Gennan proletariat that delineated the freedan 
of Hitler. As Speer, looking back on the products 0£ this period, 
was to comment:
"When I once again saw the colour photographs 
of the model, after a lapse 0£ more than 21 
years, I was struck by the resemblance to a 
Cecil B. de Mille set. Along with its fantastic 
quality, I also became aware 0£ the cruel element 
in this architecture. It had been the very 





"Hitherto art is inseparable from morality 
and utility."
Baudelaire, ( 1 )
In this section of the thesis I want to analyse certain types 
of painting which were encouraged under the Nazi regime and 
which were even^tually elevated to the stams o£ •National 
Socialist Art·. As I tried to draw out in an earlier section, 
the relationship between painting and the state - and society 
in general - was formulated in a very different way from that 
which existed in societies organised on liberal democratic lines. 
Under Nazi rule, painting was conceived of as the aesthetic £ace 
of the regime, and was therefore always regarded as being in an 
intimate relationship with the political forms and aims 0£ the 
National Socialist movement. Thus the role 0£ the state was 
seen,not simply as one ot general 'h^ane· patronage ot the arts, 
but rather as the highest form of aesthetic expression, occupying 
a space where art and polities became £used. In the minds o£ 
many 0£ the Nazi elite, it was impossible to separate a purely 
political practice from a purely artistic practice. Thus any 
analysis,which does not, £rom the outset, £ace up to the nature 
0£ the Nazi state, is bound to confront a number of problems 
which it will find impossible to solve. In a sense, the 
analytical tools £or such an analysis have to be generated 
from scratch, since the equipment available within traditional 
art history is totally unsuitable, i£ not to say irrelevant, to 
the task of such an analysis. The reason £or this inadequacy
lies in the nature o£ the painting which has become identified 
with the European artistic avant-garde. Within the study of 
modern European art, the output, premises and assiumptions of 
the avant-garde have become synonomous with painting generally. 
In £act, 'modern art' has come to stand £or the complex, inter­
national tradition o£ formalistic experimentation which developed 
inside European painting after the Impressionists. This has 
created a situation in which any painting which does not '£it' 
into this generalised historical schema becomes an ambiguous 
object £or study. The discourse within the discipline has 
become firmly fixed, and is based upon the ass^option that 
art always oc^cupies an autonomic realm, ultimately independent 
o£ society. Any att^^t to subvert this claim to autonomy, or at 
least to qualify it, is immediately seen as non-art. Certain 
political assiumptions are, o£ course, embedded in this set o£ premises: 
firstly, that it is self-evident that artistic freedom must be preserved 
at all costs; secondly, that art and politics ^must always remain 
separate. Any att^^t to challenge, or to explain socially, the 
features of the extreme individualism so characteristic of modern 
art or of the hidden congruence between art and politics, is seen 
as lying beyond the province of art history. Thus, within the 
body o£ art history there is a theoretical absence which makes it 
very difficult £or the discipline to come to terms with any type 
o£ painting that takes place outside the avant-garde - (the 
sycophantic response to 'primitive' painters has in no way led 
to a reformulation ot the discipline's approach to popular culture: 
these ex^tples are simply reprocessed in terms o£ the 'vitality o£ 
the forms' type ot arguement). Another result o£ this absence is 
that its Msponse to systems o£ aesthetics which deny the equation
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painting • avant-garde has always remained crude and unthought-out. 
The two major examples 0£ this are socialist realism, and the type 
of painting produced under the Nazis. In terms of Uazi painting, 
we can reduce the discussions 0£ it to three basic approaches:
(1 ). The Moral Approach: with this type o£ approach, the initial
response is one 0£ laughter. The paintings are self-evidently 
absurd, and technically bad. Neither 0£ these responses are valid. 
First, the paintings were not absurd to the masses of painters who 
came in out 0£ the cold during the Nazi rule, nor were they absurd 
to the millions 0£ people who apparently queued up to see them at 
the exhibitions staged by the Nazis. Secondly, the concept 0£ the 
truth of a painting lying in its status as a highly-wrought piece 
of craftsmanship was given a final death lilow, even within the 
tradition 0£ high art, by the explicitly grubby quality of 
Dadaist works. In £act, in terms of their ability to render 
visual reality in an immediately graspable £onn, many 0£ the 
works are 0£ a high quality. Certainly they are no worse, or 
better, than the work of painters outside Germany who were still 
operating within the realist tradition eg. Norman Rockwell, or 
the paintings hung on the walls 0£ the Royal Academy during its 
summer exhibitions. What really lies behind this rhetorical 
dismissal in terms of craftsmanship is a critique of their spiritual 
content, and this leads straight to direct political considerations 
and the whole Pandora^ box which had been blocked o££ by 'formalist^ 
categories 0£ analysis.
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(2) . The , Propaganda Argument: this school o£ criticism is based 
upon a series of premises which, to some extent, replicate
the arguments outlined above. The crudest form 0£ response to 
the entry of political content into artistic practice is the 
simple belie£ that the two realms should always be kept separate; 
that the task of art is not to convey a political •message', but 
rather to rise above mere politics and aspire to the spiritual, 
the general, or to a 'common h^^ity·. Thus, the most damning 
judgement which can be passed on a work 0£ art is that it is 
'simply propaganda' • The problem here is that propaganda is 
defined as that which displays a purely political content.
Thus, it is not propaganda as such which is disturbing, but 
this particular form 0£ propaganda. After all, many 0£ the 
high points 0£ European painting have consisted 0£ gratuitous 
propaganda £or the almighty and his earthly representatives. 
What is being objected to is the particular historical confrontation 
between radical politics and the aims 0£ the avant-garde, and the 
difficulties which are involved in such a conjuncture. The plea 
behind the cry 'It's all propaganda' is that the separation 
between avant-garde art and politics should continue.
There is a more sophisticated version 0£ the propaganda 
argu..'11.ent which does not object to political involvement and 
political content per se, but which then goes on to point out 
the dangers inherent in such involvement. " , For instance, the 
incompatibility of the demands of the revolution and the pursuit 
0£ a personal vision may result in a situation where one is laid 
open to manipulation and artistic sell-out - (the Surrealists 
were to part company with the French Coi^mmunist Party on precisely
these lines). It is only by remaining true to one's personal 
vision, so the argument goes, that one is able to resist such 
pressures. There is now a great deal 0£ experience to back 
up this nervousness which many advanced artists £eel in the 
£ace 0£ radical politics, Stalinist Russia and Germany during 
the thirties providing the two most obvious examples, But again, 
behind this arguement, there lies the same assumption that we 
encountered in its more simple version. What is being resisted 
is the collapse 0£ artistic practice into purely political practice, 
and it completely overlooks those situations where, £or admittedly 
only a short time, some kind 0£ congruence was possible between 
personal vision and political ends.
There is, also, a rather ironic rejoinder to the claim that 
all Nazi painting was merely political propaganda: this is that 
it is precisely the elimination 0£ certain kinds 0£ political 
content which makes Nazi painting distinctive, The elimination 
0£ politics is the political mode 0£ the painting, and what was 
seen as a purely aesthetic project by many 0£ the artists and 
critics 0£ the avant-garde was, quite correctly, seen by the 
Nazis as being implicitly political.
(3) . The Theoretical Absence: this type o£ approach we have 
touched on earlier. Here the subject simply does not 
exist and can, therefore, be care.f'ully avoided in any history 
of modern painting. The way in which this becomes possible is 
very close to Raymond Williams' notion of the 'received tradition'. 
According to this, one's history is accepted as a final and completed 
whole. Each stage in the past irresistibly led to its following stage, 
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and the whole edi£ice moves inexorably towards the validation 
of the present. Thus the history 0£ European painting in the 
20th century becomes a series 0£ extraordinary jumps in time 
and space, with the assumed 'thread' being blandly traced 
from the emergence 0£ one 'ism' to its inevitable successor. 
The e££ects 0£ this approach upon the period we are studying 
can be judged £rom the chapter headings of a number of standard 
reference works on the art 0£ the period:
(i) Gerhard Handler: 'German Painting in our Time·. 
In this book, '^^ time· o££icially ends with 
1945, but could just as easily have been terminated 
in 1933. The discussion is confined to a £ew select 
painters of the Expressionist school, and, although 
just over half 0£ the period he is discussing was 
under the domination 0£ the Nazis, they are never 
mentioned once.
(ii) Hans Roethel: 1Modern-German Painting·. Again 
the sole mention which the period 1933-1945 
gets is the £ollowing quotation:
"When the horror 0£ National Socialism destroyed 
humanity and the arts in 1933 • • • • " (2)
Again there is the ass^wnption that what the Nazis 
were doing was •non-art· and can, therefore, sa£ely 
be ignored.
{iii) Xristian Setriffer: 'Modern Austrian Art' 
Again, the sequence o£ chapter headings 
tells the same story: 'New Developments after 
the Secession 1 (ends in 1930); 'New Beginnings 
in 1945 I • ( 3)
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(iv) Georgs' Schmidt: 1 ¥[ilerei im Deutschland·.
The chapter headings here looked more 
promising in that there seemed to be an 
attempt to relate the art 0£ the period to 
the wider historical context 0£ the Weimar 
Republic. However, the •received tradition' 
was at work even in this book: 'Chapter II: Von 
der Stabilisierung bis zum Irise. 1924-1929. 
Einkehr und Ausbruch'; 'Chapter III: Das Bauhaus: 
1919-1932. Werkplatz der Zukun£t1; 'Chapter IV: 
Vorkreig und Ireig, 1930-1945, Unter^grund und 
Emigration·. (4)
The type 0£ approach which I want to adopt in the analysis 
0£ Nazi painting is twofold. Firstly, there JltllSt be some attempt 
to describe the range 0£ themes, the style adopted and, just as 
important, the themes and styles which were shunned or forbidden, 
in short a typology 0£ depiction. Secondly, there must be some 
kind 0£ consideration 0£ the ideological claims made by the Nazis 
that they had replaced, and overcome, the tradition 0£ the avant­
garde - what Benjamin calls 'the tradition 0£ alienated sensuality'. 
There must be some assessment 0£ their claim to have succeeded in 
creating a totally radical set of conditions under which artistic 
practice was to take place: in d:her words, of the 'truth' of' 
their claim to have created a radical National Socialist culture.
THE TYPOLOGY OF DEPICTION IN NAZI PAINTING
"In the second case, history is transformed into
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the 'irrational rule of blind forces' 'Which is 
embodied at best in the 'spirit of the people' 
or in 'great men'. It can, therefore only be described pragmatically, but it cannot be 
rationally understood. Its only possible 
organisation would be aesthetic, as i£ it 
were a work of art."
G. Lukacs. (5)
The central rationale behind most 0£ Nazi culture, and especially 
underlying the painting, was the claim made by the Nazis that the 
•revolution' 0£ 1933 had brought into existence a transcendent, 
ideal community, a society dominated by the principles 0£ 
•volksgemeinschaft'. Their supposed transcendence of the liberal 
democratic forms characteristic 0£ the 'Weimar Republic, and their 
substitution of a form 0£ national and racial community, 1 ead 
logically to an intolerance of any factional or separated 
constituency within this seamless bond of blood. This desire 
£or social intergration, which was not simply the result 0£ some 
abstract totalitarian urge, was the very basis 0£ the policy 0£ 
'Gleichschaltung'. This was aimed at every aspect 0£ German 
society in order that it might both renect and realise the 
coming into being 0£ the national community. I have already 
hinted, in the section on crchitecture, that the achievement 
of this ideal cornnnmity became increasingly elusive and peripheral 
to the general dynamic of the society after the taking over 0£ 
power.· However, in the realm of painting, these illusions were 
sustained £or a much greater length 0£ time. The paintings came 
to provide both the rulers and the ruled with windows into an 
idealised world, where reality and ideology achieved the illusion 
o£ a perfect '£it'. This, I think, is one of the reasons why the 
Nazis were so concerned with the establishment o£ an ideological 
and ^altural ' conformity in painting. The images presented by the
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paintings maintain this picture 0£ an ideal community and, at 
the same time, provide proo£ that it is in existence. The 
acute paranoia displayed towards the avant-garde was, 0£ 
course, partly ideological - they just did not like that 
sort 0£ painting - but it was also based on £ear 0£ what the 
whole 0£ the avant-garde represented, namely an artistic community 
still alienated from the general social reality and, £lowing from 
this, the implication that there was a continuing search £or 
spiritual and social ideals within a fragment divorced from 
the rest 0£ society. The continuing existence 0£ the avant­
garde was living proof that the 'total spiritual renewal' had, 
in £act, been only partial.
Within the total spread 0£ the paintings, it is possible 
to identify a number 0£ comm.on characteristics, both in terms 
0£ content (theme), and in terms 0£ style. The feature wnich 
strikes one immediately is the unity 0£ their style, achieving 
such a high degree o£ •coherence^ that only a close study of the 
pictures will allow one to begin to distinguish the work of 
individual artists. Above all, it is an art totally lacking 
in stylistic surprise or experimentation - a characteristic 
which derives from an absence 0£ any personal component or 
subjective vision - and, as such, it stands in complete 
opposition to that body 0£ work which has come to be called 
1 modern art 1· This unity of style is, in itself, a political • 
act, and only achieves its political message by presupposing that 
which is absent, namely modern art. By this I mean that the paintings 
can only work as a contrast to the work of the avant-garde. The 
'I 
dominant style o£ all Nazi painting is an extreme form o£
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representationalism, in which each painting allows an immediate 
recognition 0£ the objects depicted. Thus the paintings of the 
Nazis are ancestors 0£ the tradition 0£ photographic realism and 
are, therefore, despite the apologists for Socialist Realism, 
sharers 0£ a common heritage with the anodyne images 0£ perfect 
workers produced in the Eastern bloc. This allegiance to a 
kind 0£ photographic reworking of reality fulfilled Hitler's 
precis 0£ German culture in which he stated that •to be German 
is to be clear". But beyond this, the style is able to achieve 
two major ends. Firstly, it satisfies the desire of the mass 
of the population to recognise what it is that is being depicted, 
thereby immediately answering the first question directed at an 
image ie. "'What is it?". Secondly, it performs a vital cultural/ 
political task in that the style reassures the spectator that 
obscurantism of form has at last been abolished and that 
everyone can breathe easily again. In terms of their style, 
these paintings are saying, in a covert way, "Isn't it good to 
be able to recognise the world again" and also, by implication, 
"Isn't it good to be able to recognise oneself again". This 
element of mass reassurance is the •work' per.formed by the style 
ot the paintings, quite apart from their content. Thus, from the 
outset, we have a political statement embedded in the paintings 
which conforms to the demand £or 'An art £or the Pecple' .
Having said this, however, there are still wider questions 
which need answering: why was such a style able to achieve this 
at this particular historical moment? To answer this we have to 
look at the historical development 0£ realism in painting in the 
19th century. As a cultural form, painting had never been a 
popular art since the production 0£ religious icons in £eudal
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times. In the 19th century/realism^ in painting had achieved 
a brief period o£ popularity, especially in France, but this 
popularity had been cut short by the rise of photography as a 
means o£ dispersing visual images on a mass scale. After its 
displacement by photography, painting, when it did impinge 
upon people's lives, had certain demands made o£ it, the 
most important of which was that the image depicted be 
immediately recognisable and self-evidently o£ the world as 
it was then perceived. Thus Nazi painting displays a kind o£ 
stylistic populism which slotted into the popular notions o£ what 
•art·, and especially painting, were thought to be about. However, 
having •selected' this style, the Nazis quickly began to ^m into 
problems. They had promised a cultural and spiritual revolution, 
but were unable to avail themselves of the revolution in form 
which was such a major characteristic of the •non-realistic' 
modern movement. ^s their revolution quickly ^turned into 
a cultural restoration. - its only vehicle being a mode of 
painting which was already in decline by the end of the 19th 
century. I do not want to convey the impression of a conscious 
searching ar^md £or a suitable painting style - this cultural 
restoration was simply the aesthetic equivalent 0£ the inability 
0£ the Nazi revolution to abolish the bourgeois mode 0£ production 
which they claimed to have superceded.
The art was a restoration because the type 0£ painting 
chosen to carry the •revolutionary· message of National Socialism 
was, by the turn 0£ the century, already a defunct and exhausted 
cultural mode. It was the fag end of the great wave of realism 
which had dominated a large part of progressive European painting 
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in the middle o£ the preceding cent^^. At the outset, this 
version o£ realism had had a two-£old thrust. Firstly, it 
had attempted to be a simple mirror to the world and to 
'show things as they really were·. At this stage there 
had been a rough approximation to photography, plus the 
carrying 0£ an irnplicit critical stance towards the world. 
In showing the world as it really was, there was the desire 
to portray people and situations stripped 0£ idealism and 
sentimentality. However, in Germany this critical impulse 
quickly ran out 0£ steam: the critical edge was lost and 
romantic idealism began to creep back in again. Here the 
Socialist Realist critics are quite correct when they say 
that it gradually lost its grip on the totality, and that 
what was to take its place was merely the sentimentalisation 
of the fragments 0£ a shattered world. The final result was 
that, by the early twentieth century, this sentimental genre 
painting became almost indistinguishable from the corrupt
art 0£ the Academy which it had set out to displace:
"Round about 1900 all possible subjects had been 
painted • • • this genre - painting had quite 
arbitrarily portrayed everyday life, and had 
extracted details from this arbitrariness.
Animal pictures, pictures about sport, about 
a village, about a deer; even art itself was 
painted; architecture, both inside and outside. 
Runge had painted poems, the tourists were 
followed into the mountains, workers into the 
factories, the children into school, the travellers 
into the Orient. Every theme had been exhausted.The 
sea had liberated itself from the landscape, the boats 
from the sea, the waves from the sea, and in one 0£ 
Leibl's paintings the girl from the bra." (6)
And yet it was precisely this deflated genre ' painting that was 
to be taken up by the Nazis and given the status o£ the •new· 
revolutionary German art. Why? It happened, I think, £or two 
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reasons. Firstly, as I mentioned earlier, what strikes one 
immediately about Nazi painting is its total lack o£ •subjectivity^. 
There appears to be no working up by the individual artist 0£ the 
elements 0£ reality into an idiosyncratic vision. The painting 
seems to be trying to inhabit a completely public and communal 
universe. I want to deal with this at greater length, but it 
is worth noting at this point that, in however distorted a 
manner, Nazi culture did aspire to brealc with an art based 
exclusively on private visions - the sort 0£ art which still 
clung to the romantic image of the lonely artist working in 
isolation. There was an attempt to enter a genuinely communal 
realm where public vision would displace private subjectivity. 
In its one-sided resolution of the public/private dilemma, it 
stood in direct opposition to the assumptions 0£ modernism. Its 
answer was to adopt a £orm 0£ painting that would be immediately 
accessible to the mass 0£ the population, and, at the same 
time, render the new communality visible to them. The second 
reason £or its adoption lies in the £act that they chose a type 
0£ painting in which content was restored to its primacy over 
form or style. The iaintings directed themselves to rendering 
images of what was tangible and recognisable, and this was based 
upon the Nazi's need to locate a metaphor to encapsulate their new 
sense of German communality.
Thus we have arrived at a point where we can begin to map 
out a typology 0£ <epiction £or the category 0£ Nazi painting. 
Above all, it will have to be a typology which uses content as 
the main axis £or the division of the paintings, since it lifted 
almost directly the main content divisions which had characterised 
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late 19th century German genre painting. In this situation, 
painting becomes structured in terms 0£ the topics and themes 
which the pictures depict, and, 0£ course, there was again a 
certain amount 0£ 'political work' performed by such a structuring. 
By being of-the-world in such an immediate phenomenal sense, it was 
an easy step £or the artists to rework that world into its required 
ideological image. The rigorous subdivision 0£ this 'revolution 0£ 
content· had, implicit within it, a corresponding structuring and 
subdivision 0£ the reality it set out to depict. The world becomes 
a secure place to live in; it is held steady by this parallel 
ordering 0£ the content. Thus a kind 0£ counterfeit legitimacy 
is injected into the world and, above all, to man's place in it.
But, over and above this, there was another advantage which genre 
painting conferred on the Nazis. By the end 0£ the century, genre 
realism had shed its critical inheritance and had once again begun 
to sentimentalise its subject with a kind 0£ late Romantic glow. 
This was to prove ideal £or the Nazis, who had erected an aesthetic 
ideology which elevated art into the realm 0£ the eternal and the 
spiritual. This process 0£ elevation was already well under 
way in genre art, with men and landscapes gradually becoming 
cyphers £or this transcendent spiritual realm, mere symbols 
0£ a higher order 0£ reality. Thus it only needed a small push 
£or this type 0£ art to transform the contemporary reality of 
Germany into a symbol 0£ the eternal. In this way, Nazi society 
and its dominant ideological types were turned into moments 0£ a 
natural, racial order which simply was· This leads to the last 
general point that I want to make before we analyse the paintings 
more closely, and this is that there was not, and never could be, 
any stylistic development or change. The style itself partook o£
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this naturalness: all that could develop were themes in line 
with the changing direction taken by Nazi society. Thus it 
is possible to trace an increase in the occurence of militaristic 
themes towards the close of the period under discussion as the 
preparations for war were stepped up. Again it must be emphasised 
that only rarely was this a question of conscious manipulation, but 
was rather a function of the Nazis’ inability to control the overall 
trajectory of their society.
I have broken down Nazi painting into a number of categories, 
each of which is determined by the topics and themes dealt with:
(i) Rural/Artisan oaintings: here I have included 
not only the ’typical’ characters in ’typical 
situations’ kind of painting, but also the 
flood of landscape and animal paintings, since 
they all focused on the primacy of the rural 
scene in the overall scope of Nazi art;
(ii) those paintings which employ a kind of neo­
classical iconography;
(iii) the representations of industrial workers and 
of large-scale industry generally;
(iv) the depiction of women - almost overwhelmingly 
of women in the nude.
In each of these categories I have attempted to relate the pictures 
to the general structure of Nazi ideology, and also to spell out 
some of the connections between the images used and the more 
general features of Nazi society·
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The Rural/Artisan Pictures
From our earlier discussion it will now be clear that one focus
0£ Nazi aesthetic thinking was what I have called the volkisch 
image, Here the ideological aim was to depict the Nazi revolution 
as one which was directing Germany along a pre-industrial path, 
where the mode of production would be based on a regenerated 
peasantry and artisan class. Politically, this tendency had 
been defeated during the struggles 0£ 1933-1934, but aesthetically 
the image of the volkisch community was allowed to persist and 
dominates the paintings of the 1934-1939 period. Pictures in 
which either peasants or artisans were depicted made up about 
25% of the total paintings exhibited at the 'Great German Art 
Exhibitions', held each year in Munich after 1937. I£ one also 
includes landscape and animal paintings, then this percentage 
becomes much higher. So even if the volkisch ideology had 
ceased to have any practical implications £or the direction 
taken by Nazi society, it was to continue to play a crucial 
role as one of the dominant self-images of this society after 
1933. The reason £or this must, above all else, lie in the £act 
that it was this image which was capable 0£ gaining a level of 
generality £or many sections of German society, Although the 
peasant and artisan classes made up only a small percentage 0£ 
the total population - (in £act, they continued to shrink in 
size after the Nazi takeover) - it was in the rural/artisan 
image that there was to be found a general metaphor £or dignified, 
non-alienated lab011r. It became a symbol of what the Nazi revol­
ution had promised, but had £ailed to deliver. In addition, it 
was an image in which there was the perfect ideological '£it' 
that we mentioned earlier. Of course, there was another reason 
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why this image was adopted so readily: the peasantry and artisan 
groups had provided the bedrock of the Nazi party as well as its 
voting constituency, and these pictures are almost all soaked in 
the sentimentalisation and idealisation of the social milieu of 
these two groups.
(illustration No. 17 & 18).
In the painting 'The Shoemaker', by Adolf Wissel, the artisan 
is depicted as being a sel£-su££icient unit, making his way in the 
world solely by the skill invested in his hands and by the manipu­
lation of the tools of his trade. He becomes a paradigm £or 
meaningf'ul. labour and a symbol 0£ what the Nazi revolution was 
aiming for on a mass scale. In Werner Peiner's 'Deutscher Erder· 
(1932), both the landscape and the men working in it undergo an 
intense spiritualisation and romanticisation. Here the peasant 
has been given a superior metaphysical status to every other type 
of labour, and is depicted as being somehow •earthier·, closer to 
the basic reality underlying all human action. He is to be contr­
asted with the anomic urban masses, cut 0££ from both their own 
and Germany's reaknature. In this way, the peasant becomes a 
model £or everyone. He alone does not have to struggle since he 
is already in a condition of spiritual grace. It must be noted 
that in these pictures individuals are rarely portrayed qua 
individuals, with their own particular life histories, but are 
immediately elevated to a general symbolic level. Hence the 
frequency ot such titles as 'Der Schlosser·, 'Deutsche Erde', 
etc. This, again, is a general feature of Nazi painting, in 
wich there is a 'hierarchy of concreteness' moving as follows:
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idealised types----- - general title ------ symbolic generality
------ participation in the völkisch connnunity. It is this 
which accounts £or the quasi-religiosity 0£ so many 0£ the 
pictures, especially those in the rural category. (Illustration 
No: 19). These artisan/peasant paintings also partake of a 
spiritual naturalness, in that men, animals, simple craftsmen 
are constantly depicted as 'doing what comes naturally': they 
are all involved in the eternal round 0£ the seasons, or are 
in contact with the earth, all 0£ which is seen as the 
expression 0£ a canpletely natural order. But this order 
has a covert political content in that it is to be taken 
as just one moment in the naturalness 0£ life under Nazi rule. 
Men, horse, plough, furrow are merged into a sel£-evident unity 
and, as such, need no overt, political justification. The political 
message is already implicit in this sacred unity, and it is the 
Nazis who have enabled it to come into being:
"In such paintings, Leibl ••• is without any 
overt social and propagandist intentions; 
to him the rural milieu is nature, it 
radiates and expresses a human nature 
which is resting in itself." (7)
This idealism of man and nature makes irrelevant those 
criticisms levelled at it by Socialist Realist critics that 
these pictures distort the reality in which they are set and, 
therefore, £or£eit the right to be called realist. The Nazis 
never saw art as primarily the signifier o£ reality 'as-it-was·, 
but rather as inhabiting the realm of the spirit and the ideal, 
where such contradictions cease. In £act, on closer inspection, 
many 0£ these paintings are much closer to the conception 0£ art 
held by the Socialist Realists than might at first sight be
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imagined. For instance, the radical rhetoric of the early phase 
of Nazi ideology did find expression in a few paintings. Apart 
from the obvious anti-semitic references in the figures of the 
two landgrabbers in 'Robbed o£ House and Home^ by Adolph Reich 
( Illustration No:20 ), there is little to £au!t in this painting 
according to the canons of Socialist Realism. The critical edge 
is there, as is the attempt to portray one specific incident of 
misfortune in terms of the general social processes underlying 
this 'typical situation'. This is backed up by a Nazi version 
of the fundamental premise 0£ the Social Realist aesthetic ie. 
the depiction of the individual character within the totality 
of his social relationships:
"It would be a limitation to just depict individuals 
in our paintings; therefore our artists are eager 
to show the German man in the middle of his social 
and material conditions. This must mean in the 
framework of his family, in communal work, together 
with his animals •••• " (8)
Since the peasantry inhabit an eternal realm, it follows 
that there must also be a standard, timeless and unhistorical 
quality about the paintings, such as Wissel's 'Farmer's Family 
from Iahlenberg' (Illustration No^I ), which depict them. Thus 
any contemporary references are glossed over. Work is on the 
land and with animals. There is no machinery present, no 
tractors, and all architecture is in the regional styles 
so beloved of the volkisch tendency. Since they have achieved 
the perfect state of non-alienation, everyone glows with health 
and seems never to experience poverty. The obvious question at 
this point is that, if these paintings were in such opposition to 
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the reality of the people depicted in them, why did they not 
see through them'? The answer to this must be that they were 
not primarily intended for the rural peasantry, but £or the 
urban masses. These paintings are not the products of the 
peasantry, are not 'folk art^ in the English sense of the 
term, but are rather an urbanite, idealised view of what 
rural life is like. This is precisely why there is this 
lack of •reality': they were never intended as accurate 
pictures of rural life, and it is exactly in their unreality 
that the secret of their popularity lies. They were a general 
metaphor for an ideal way of life, held by large sections of the 
non-rural population - {folk clubs have always flourished in 
large cities). Thus, despite the lingering influence of the 
volkisch tendency, they should not be read literally as 
implying a widespread desire £or a return to a pre-industrial 
mode of existence. These images of the good life set in the 
countryside are the property of those living in cities, and 
provide a resolution point £or their anxieties about their 
present reality. They portray a world which was secure and 
harmonious, where work had meaning and dignity, and where the 
conflicts between labour and capital, man and nature, and 
the generations, were resolved. Thus, again, they can be seen 
to conform with the slogan 'Art for the People', but they 
resolutely remain not 'of the people'. These rural paintings 
are a refracting glass £or the urban supporters of Nazism in 
which the promised land could be glimpsed and imagined. The 
problem was that this promised land did not arrive. Rural
. r
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depopulation continued; small £armers were swallowed up by the 
large estates; and there was no general return to the land £or 
the urban masses. For anyone remaining in opposition to the 
real direction taken by Nazi society, there remained a chilling 
alternative:
"We £armers must learn in the new state and in 
the economic epoch which is to come, that we 
are there £or the common good; those who will 
not learn this lesson in the next £ew years 
can be taught the correct attitude to this 
common good in the more beautiful areas 0£ 
Bavaria ie. Dachau." (9)
The Classical Allegory
"The unearthing and the measurement 0£ classical 
monuments ••• all this threw a garment 0£ aesthetic 
decency over the tyrannies and debaucheries 0£ the 
ruling powers."
Lewis Mumford (10)
In the earlier section dealing with architecture, I tried to link 
the gradual' domination o£ a nee-classical style o£ building 
with a parallel domination 0£ Nazi society by the institution 
of the state. I suggested that the Nazi state had originally 
posited itself as the mediator 0£ the interests 0£ the petit­
bourgeoisie, but had in £act discarded this role and achieved 
a high degree 0£ autonomy from its social base. This autonomy 
had led to the trimnph 0£ a statist ideology over that 0£ the 
volkisch tendency. A similar process was at work in painting, 
but here the conflict is much more muted and disguised. All 
that one can say is that, corresponding to the rise 0£ the Nazi 
state, one can see an increasing use 0£ nee-classical imagery.
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But this was always used alongside the image 0£ a volkisch 
paradise. The overtly public and communal nature of 
architecture necessitated the more speedy adoption of a 
definite line on style than was the case with painting. 
Again, as with architecture, it must be emphasised that 
in matters of taste the Ministry 0£ Propaganda were always 
drawing from an already constituted pool of themes and imagery 
which had been in existence £rom the outset:
"Goebbels and his team tended to understand 
and use the ideology as an instrument 0£ 
domination, the content 0£ which could be 
manipulated at will." (11)
In the rural/artisan paintings, the aspiration towards 
universalism had been achieved by the elevation 0£ a particular 
class-fragment and its mode 0£ work into a paradigm £or the whole 
nation. In the case 0£ the use 0£ classical imagery, the state 
was attempting to find an iconography that would allow it to 
clothe itself in the appearance of general values. This in 
its turn must be seen as part 0£ its wider problem, that of 
finding a mode of representation beyond the simple mediation 
0£ the interests 0£ the peasantry and the small craftsmen. It 
was £or this reason that it turned to the adoption of a classical 
iconography, and especially the resuscitation 0£ the classical 
allegory. This painting ensemble, like that 0£ the genre 
painting, was a decrepit form long since exhausted. Again 
we must speak of a cultural restoration rather than a cultural 
revolution.
By the time that the Nazis came to pick up nee-classicism as 
-199-
a mode in painting and sculpture, it was beginning to look 
distinctly threadbare. As with genre painting, the Nazis 
attempted to breathe new li£e into a decadent form, trying 
to make it per£onn a number 0£ important tasks in the range 
0£ self-images which German society constructed £or itself 
after 1933. The reasons £or this are, as with the artisan 
pictures, very varied. First, there was Hitler's penchant 
£or regarding his creation as the Sparta 0£ the North and, 
given that his personal tastes had to some extent become 
synonomous with the tastes 0£ the Nazi state, this must 
be seen as an important £actor in its resuscitation, 
Alternately, neo-classical imagery was made to represent 
the ideal 0£ beauty, usually feminine and nude; the ideal 
worker; the ideal citizen; and the ideal warrior. The physicality 
and the nudity 0£ the classical figure was refracted through the 
ideology 0£ a racially-pure community to produce a typology 0£ 
exemplary types. Unfortunately, the Gennan citizen with his 
clothes 0££ became a hybrid 0£ Adonis and Mr. Universe.
In Iampps' 'Venus ^d Adonis' (1933), (Illustration No:22 ), 
the ideal 0£ racial purity has been combined with the image 0£ the 
ideal warrior, while in Saliger^s 1The Judgement of Paris' (Illustration 
No: 23) 'ideal' feminine beauty bizarrely confronts the 'ideal' citizen. 
I£ it were not £or the horrors inflicted in the pursuit 0£ this ideal 
racial community, it would be hard to control one's mirth at these 
awkward attempts at synthesis. In each case, the golden rule in 
handling the neo-classical allegory is broken: the pictorial 'dream'
!.,-41
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is interrupted by contemporary references. In both examples, 
realistic elements intrude into what had always been a symbolic 
language 0£ an idealised realm. In the first painting the dream 
is punctuated by the austere 19301 s haircut, whilst in the second 
painting the lederhosen of the Hitler Youth per£onn a similar 
deflationary £unction. In both these examples it is clear that 
neo-classicism is no longer a viable vehicle £or the state's 
representation 0£ itself as a general institution. The mass 
origin and nature 0£ National Socialist society can no longer 
be disguised in the form 0£ nymphs and warriors.
A second aspect 0£ the 'work' performed by these paintings 
is as examples of political anthropology. Here it becomes 
difficult to pin down whether these ideal images of physical 
and racial types are intended to stand as direct portrayals 0£ 
Aryans already in existence, or whether they are intended simply 
as signposts £or the German population to get breeding and produce 
actual specimens. Certainly these paintings were effective only 
among those sections o£ Nazi society which took these breeding 
policies seriously ie. the S.S. As the decade progressed, the 
percentage 0£ such works produced began to grow and is symptomatic 
0£ the increasing isolation 0£ the Nazi state and its domination by 
those sections which were working £or the :ealisation 0£ the racial 
aspect of Nazi ideology. During the latter half 0£ the thirties, 
as the preparations £or war got increasingly under way, the 
depiction 0£ the ideal physical type became transformed into 
the depiction of the ideal warrior, eg. the Wehrmacht in the 
nude. Parallel to this, there was a tendency £or these neo-classical
201-
nudes to become transformed into social types, simply by 
clothing them in the garments 0£ their work (Illustration 
No:24 ). As the nation was exhorted to steel itself and 
display self-sacrifice, the use of neo-classical imagery 
came to reflect this emphasis. Roman austerity finally 
triumphed over Greek sensuality.
The Worker As Hero
"The barriers have fallen ••• the poison has 
been drawn from the atmosphere • • • the 
community 0£ the people in which brother 
respects brother ••• has opened the way to 
a new •workers art'."
Rosenberg (12 )
Any attempt to depict the working-class, or £or that matter 
the process of large-scale industrial production, was fraught 
with pitfalls and anxiety £or the Nazis, and they were at all 
times £ully conscious 0£ this. The difficulty lay in a number 
of areas. Firstly, there was the experience wich the German 
working-class had undergone both during and after the rise to 
power of the Nazis. Secondly, there was the problem caused 
by the very nature 0£ the National Socialist ideology. Finally, 
there were the added complications arising from the historical 
class nature 0£ painting itself'. I will try to deal with the 
repercussions which each 0£ these areas had £or the Nazis in 
their attempt to aesthetically incorporate the ...orking-class 
into the •new order·.
Having gained power by destroying the institutions 0£ 1he 
working-class and by eliminating their political representatives, 
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there remained the problem 0£ what to do with them, since it 
was unlikely that they would simply go away or undergo the 
kind 0£ social transformation 'Which the volkisch tendency 
would have liked. Whilst it is certainly not true that no 
members 0£ the working-class had supported the Nazis prior to 
1933, or that they did not receive some support from this class 
after 1933, it is the case that as a class the Ge^^n proletariat 
never formed a major part 0£ the Nazi constituency. Again, 
although it is d££icult to substantiate in detail, it is clear 
that Nazi ideology was unable to penetrate and shape the everyday 
life 0£ the working-class after 1933 - (in terms 0£ culture, it 
is lcnown that Goebbels sent out requests £or the production of 
more 'fantasy' literature and entertainment cinema, in order to 
canbat the drop in book purchase and cinema attendance. Illusion 
had to supplement the purely political work which had dominated 
these two media since the arrival 0£ the Nazis). One thing is 
clear, however: some compensations had to be offered to the 
working-class £or their loss 0£ political power; they had 
to be contained in some way i£ the state was to continue to 
rely on, and exploit, their labour. This containment, in the 
period under discussion, was not achieved solely by the use 0£ 
terror, but rather was done by a combination 0£ rising wages. - 
("hourly earnings in industry rose by 25% between 1933-45." (13)); 
full employment; and the provision of a wide range 0£ consumer 
goods and cheap holidays through the schemes run by the D.A.F. 
In this way both entry into, and membership 0£, the national 
conmnmity by the working-class could be claimed by the Nazis 
with something like a straight £ace. At a guess, I would say
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that a £orm 0£ sullen resentment was raised to something or an 
art-£orm by the German working-class during the period under 
analysis.
The second area 0£ di.£.ficulty lay in the nature of the 
National Socialist ideology itse1£. The Nazis had gained 
pover by using an overtly anti-working class political rhetoric. 
It would be an easy task to assemble any number 0£ quotations 
made by the Nazi leadership during their pre-power days which 
were downright abusive 0£ the working-class. At best, the 
industrial proletariat were seen as misguided children, lost 
in the labyrinth or the Marxist city: at worst, they were a 
corrupt menace to the soul of the nation. Thus the Nazis were 
caught in a contradiction: on the one hand they remained totally 
reliant on the labour power which this class could deliver, while 
on the other hand they lacked a 'sa£e' ideological category by 
which to intergrate them into the fabric 0£ Nazi society. In 
contrast to the deafening rhetoric poured out on the small 
landowners and artisans, the Nazis maintained an awkward silence 
on the problems 0£ the German working-class.
Artistically, and especially within the medium 0£ painting, 
this reticence was compounded by the £act that, as a cultural 
medium, painting had never been .2!, the working class. In £act, 
it was a medium which the working-class had mrely, i£ ever, 
participated in or contributed towards. The working-class had 
had depictions of itself created in this medium ie. the tradition 
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0£ 19th century realism, but as a class it had rarely utilised 
painting. Thus, within the category 0£ those paintings which 
dealt with the industrial \Orking-class, the Nazis were attempting 
to make general both the content of the paintings and the medium 
itself, and, as I hope to demonstrate, they were unable to 
escape from the general cultural problematic implied in the 
slogan 'Workers Art'.
The most immediate manifestation of the difficulty which 
they encountered in the representation 0£ the working-class can 
be seen in the percentage of pictures devoted, however remotely, 
to them in the 'Great German Art Exhibitions·. This oscillated 
between 2% and 5% and, considering that the \Orking-class formed 
the overwhelming bulk 0£ the population, it is syrrg;>tomatic of a 
deep disquiet among the Nazis about this whole area. In the 
peasant/artisan paintings and, to a lesser degree, in the neo­
classical paintings, they had symbolically created general 
anthropological types which were intended to be applicable 
to the whole of society. The problem £or them then was how, 
having created an ideal type 0£ man based on the peasant and 
the artisan, could they do the same thing using the industrial 
labourer as an archetype. This in itself was just one facet of 
the general problem confronting the Nazis after 1933, namely how 
could they appear as the true bearers of the interests of the 
German proletariat? I want to suggest that they attempted to 
do this by a combination of 'techniques, and it must be said 
that they never really achieved mu.eh success in this field. 
Firstly, they resorted to using the cultural fo^^ of the
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bourgeois state ie. they took over the 'general' language 
which this institution had appropriated for itself, Secondly, 
they imposed a kind of cultural and social isolation on these 
paintings. This overall ambiguity in the £ace o£ the German 
proletariat can be seen in the following two quotations:
"In the factories, lawless proletarians were again 
made into human beings with the values o£ person­
ality. Giant organisations came into being which 
were given great tasks, such that the artist was 
able to find a true El dorado o£ material that was 
only waiting to be shaped." (14}
"Don't be misled by the wording o£ our public posters. 
It is true that there are such slogans as 'Down with 
the capitalists, the Jews, etc.· but they are 
absolutely necessary, £or we will not reach our 
goal if we gather only under the slogans o£ German 
nationalism, or just nationalism. We must therefore 
speak the language o£ the embittered socialistic worker 
in order to get him on our side, otherwise they would 
not £eel at home with us." (15)
Thus, in those pictures which do occur depicting the working­
class, there is the constant stressing of such themes as co­
operation and •the c^rnon good'. This, in itself, is a significant 
shift in content from the rural/artisan paintings, where individuals 
are depicted as self-sufficient and where the 'common good' is already 
implicit in the •naturalness' o£ the environment in which the scenes 
are staged. For the working-class, this 'common good' had to be 
spelt out both symbolically - (in the elevation of the worker 
to membership o£ the national co^mmunity); and also naturalistically - 
{they literally had to be made aware that such an entity existed). The 
reason £or this .was that it was precisely in its relationship with the 
German working-class . that the shortcomings of the Nazi revolution 
were directly revealed. {Illustration No:25 ) — this painting 
o£ 'Die Werksoldaten· by F.Staeger,(1938), should be compared 
with the artis^an/peasant pictures used earlier.
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I want now to deal with some examples 0£ this type o£ 
painting in order to show the main ways in which Nazi painting 
tackled the problem 0£ depicting the working-class and the 
industrial labour process.
(i) Industrial Landscapes: (Illustration No:26 ).
This type 0£ painting was the safest way £or 
the Nazis to deal with the problem 0£ the 
industrial working class. Firstly, such 
depictions 0£ factory landscapes had become 
a legitimate topic within late 19th century 
genre painting. These industrial landscapes 
were the final gasp of the realist tradition 
which had seen as its task the depiction of reality 
•as-it-really-was·. The critical element implicit 
in that slogan had almost completely vanished in 
such landscapes as Domnich's 'Winter Night Above 
loenigshutte·: all that remains is the object o£ 
the painting ie. the factory. Again, all we are 
left with in these industrial landscapes is the 
abstract technical process which talces place in 
the factories, plus the surface appearance of 
machinery. The human labour implicit in such 
canplexes is either left out or ignored. Thus 
factories appear either to be operating at full 
blast, seemingly without the help 0£ human beings, 
or they display a strangely deserted air in \1/hich 
the work force is apparently out on strike. In the 
case o£ both •Winter Night Above loenigshutte· and
I·
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'Freibsto££werke im Bau, G.D.X.1 by R.Gessner, 
(1941), (Illustration No: 2T ), there is hardly 
a proletarian in sight, with the factories 
appearing to have sprung into life f'ully 
formed. This 'naturalism' 0£ origin was o£ten 
complemented by titles in which the industry in 
question was denoted as just another aspect of 
Germany's renewed greatness, £or instance pictures 
0£ blast furnaces would be titled 'From the Forge 
of the Reich!. Either way, the paintings repeatedly 
skate over the tricky problem of who actually worked 
in them. (ii)
(ii) Monumentalisation: this tendency within Nazi art 
is really a sub-category 0£ the neo-classical mode, 
since the workers are usually depicted as muscular 
ancient Greeks with working clothes added, as in 
A. I^amp£'s 1 Walzwerk' (illustration No:24 ). This 
type 0£ painting, (plus an important series of 
sculptures), aims at aesthetically depicting the 
worker as a useful member 0£ the national community. 
He is shown in heroic situations 0£ a social nature, 
and is always cast on a massive scale in order to 
stress symbolically his final intergration into the 
'great national tasks' which lay ahead 0£ the German 
proletariat. Tamed and crushed, he is now ready to 
undergo the full treatment 0£ Nazi flattery and 
be admitted into the company 0£ the great:
"Only the Third Reich created the real monuments
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to labour. In the old days monuments 
were £or counts, great statesmen, artists 
and inventors, but the worker was never 
represented in this select crowd. But the 
Third Reich will create the greatest monu­
ment to labour." (16)
However, it always remained a purely symbolic 
elevation; the working-class were simply being 
given a seat at the aesthetic table, and this in 
no way implied a policy 0£ attack upon the economic 
forms under which they laboured. In £act, in all 
these paintings, the industrial labourer is never 
given the status 0£ a general paradigm, He never 
becomes a model £or the whole of society; rather 
the paintings are talking back to the working­
class and attempting to portray the illusion 0£ 
intergration, solely for their own benefit. They 
have the unease of those trying to reassure a 
condenmed man. They are never directed outwards 
to Nazi society as a whole. Again these works 
correspond to the political relationship between 
the Nazi state and the working-class. They are 
monuments erected to the worker by the cultural 
bureaucracy, but they do not come £ran him. Hence 
their eager tone with regard to what •we· are going 
to do £or 'labour'. (iii)
(iii) The Worker As Artisan: in this type of depiction 
the proletarian's membership of lis class is simply 
denied. In Sohn-Skuwa's 1937 painting 'Mortel end 
Stein1 (Illustration No:28 ), the bricklayer is
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transformed into the image of the ideal artisan, 
He is depicted as a self-sufficient and solitary 
worker, with the emphasis of the picture being 
placed upon the skill in his hands and the 
symbolic implication of the tools 0£ his trade 
ie. he is a craftsman. He has become the equi­
valent of the I Shoemaker' (Illustration No: IT ), 
and is thus separated from the values and experience 
0£ his class. It is useful to c01q>are this tendency 
to transform the worker into a solitary artisan, with 
the depiction of the working-class as a naturally 
communal work unit as in illustration no. 15.
I have not attempted in this section to give an exhaustive account 
0£ the ways in which women were depicted in Nazi painting. What I 
want to do is to pick out certain features from the general 
depictions 0£ the female, to illustrate further the central 
point I have been trying to make throughout this section on 
painting. Nazi art presents what, on the surface, appears to
The Image of Beauty: Women in Nazi Paintings,
"Coming home £rem the front, they the troops 
have a physical need to forget all the £ilth 
by admiring beautiful women."
Hitler (17)
"Fascist art displays a utopian aesthetic - that 
0£ physical perfection. Painters and sculptors 
under the Nazis often depicted the nude, but they 
were forbidden to show any bodily imperfections. 
Their nudes look like pictures in male health 
magazines: pin ups which are both sanctimoniously 
asexual and (in a technical sense) pornographic, 




be two contrary depictions of German womanhood. First there 
are the 'heroic' depictions of the ideal Aryan woman, usually 
resplendent with blonde hair and a child at her breast. Against ' 
this tendency must be set the masses 0£ semi-pornographic nudes, 
usually painted in the decadent style 0£ the 'naughty nineties' 
(Illustrations No: 29 ). Diebitsch's •XiTter und Kind' is
typical 0£ a whole series 0£ pictures that were produced by 
Nazi artists. Often they had titles such as 'Guardian 0£ the 
Species' and 'Mother 0£ the Reich', and directly reflected Nazi 
ideology which, in theory at least, placed the woman firmly in 
the home. In this analysis of Nazi painting,! have deliberately 
tried to avoid any position which relied, even in part, on any 
brand of conspiracy theory. However, in the case of the depiction 
of women, the contradictions both within the ideological formulations, 
and in the relation 0£ this ideology to the reality of women under 
the National Socialists, become so glaring that one is tempted to 
resort to a notion 0£ a conscious manipulation 0£ this ideology.
Throughout the whole 0£ the period of Nazi rule, women's 
labour was utilised, both in public works and on the land, on 
a large scale. Admittedly, even at the height 0£ the war, tjlere 
was a reluctance by the Nazi leadership to 04fk-A V....^ . the
labour power 0£ women, but the situation never came anywhere 
near corresponding to the'Kirche, Xind , luche' element in 
Nazi ideology. Yet this myth remained one o£ the strongest 
elements in the Nazi pantheon:
"There is no place £or the political woman in the 
ideological world 0£ National Socialism ••• The 
intellectual attitude 0£ the movement on this 
score is opposed to the political woman. It 
refers the woman back to her nature-given sphere ·
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of the family and to her tasks as a wife. The 
post-war phenomenon of the political woman, 
who rarely cuts a good figure in parliamentary 
debates, signifies robbing woman of her dignity. 
The German resurrection is a male event," (19) 
Thus German womanhood was to be returnmed to her •natural· milieu 
but, like the repatriation programme intended £or the 'lawless 
proletarians', it remained an unrealised project. Often the 
Nazis made an advantage of their puritanical sterness towards 
women by contrasting it with the 'effete· muddling of the sexes 
which had taken place during Weimar. The public image of women, 
depicted to the German people by such paintings as 'Muter und Zind/, 
attracted around it a mountain o£ stalwart adjectives:
"audacity and pride, circumspection and reserve, 
earnestness, resolution, integrity, loyalty - 
these are the qualities which can be perceived 
in the £ace 0£ a typical Nordic German such as 
this." (20)
Why then was there such a flood 0£ titillating nudes, even 
to the extent 0£ adorning the mantlepiece of the ascetic Fuhrer? 
(Illustration No:3O ). Part 0£ the answer lies in who the nudes 
were painted £or. They were largely commissioned by, and intended 
£or, the elite 0£ the Nazi party and o.f German society. The paintings 
reflected their privileged position within the society and were closely 
related to the changes which had taken place within the movement 
since the taking of power. As we have already seen, after the 
'heroic' phase 0£ struggle was over, the Nazi state achieved an 
unparalleled concentration o£ political and economic po^r. The 
ideology, and, therefore, also the paintings, continued to proclaim 
the virtues which had been prized during this period - hence the 
depiction 0£ women as hard-working mothers supporting the party
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stalwarts. But the increasing domination and isolation of the 
state apparatus and the party elite, led to the development 0£ 
a rigid hierarchy, not only within the nation, but within the 
party as well. Those at the top 0£ this apparatus had immense 
power and, also, the economic privileges which went with it. We 
have already seen how Speer, looking back over his career as the 
Reich's chief architect, referred to his design £or Goering's 
Berlin palace as "blatant nouveau-riche architecture 0£ prestige". 
The rapid 'embourgeoisement' 0£ the party elite was re£lected:in 
its increasing taste £or luxury - (despite Hitler's noted 
asceticism). It is this, I think, which lies behind the 
desire to possess paintings 0£ nude women, since they were 
the classic late 19th century symbol 0£ having 'made it'. As 
one commentator has noted, the majority 0£ the Nazi elite were 
growing up at precisely the time when these types 0£ painting 
were so fashionable. In the privacy 0£ their homes and o££ices 
the Nietzschean s.a.^r"'""" . proved to have the taste o£ inflated
shopkeepers. A final ironic conunent on their 'revolution'.




"But you want to know the nature 0£ these 
festivals and what is shown there: nothing, 
i£ yoo will. Wherever liberty and affluence 
reign there is the seat 0£ true happiness.You 
may plant the maypole in the middle of the 
square, and crown it with £lowers; let the 
people be assembled round, and this shall 
be called a festival. You may do better 
still: let the spectators be exhibited 
as a show: let them be actors themselves; 
let each man see and love himself in others, 
to the end that they may all be the more 
intimately united."
J-J. Rousseau: 'Lettreocl 'Alembert· (1)
Problems in Nazi Ideology
One 0£ the most striking features of National Socialism is the 
contrast between its ideological traditionalism and the modernism 
0£ its technology and political life: in other words, the contrast 
between its ability to wage the most sophisticated warfare the 
world had so tar seen, over and against its self-image as a 
£eudalistic, pre-industrial society. In the sections on 
architecture and painting, I have attempted to lay bare the 
tension which this contradiction produced in both the £orm and 
the content 0£ these cultural modes. In this final section, I 
want to widen the analysis in order to take in other areas of 
social life, and,especially,to try to intergrate more fully the 
material presented in the introduction. One of the initial impulses 
to embark upon this piece 0£ research was to try to explain certain 
correspondences which I had noted between Nazi society and the 
early period 0£ post-revolutionary Russia: to try to explain 
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certain parallels that I found between the Russian avant-garde 
and the art 0£ Nazism. Whilst the 'totalitarian' debate had 
constantly pointed out the similarities between Stalinism and 
Nazism eg. Socialist Realism/Nazi Realism, Soviet Baroque/Nazi 
Baroque in architecture, these correspondences with the pre­
Stalinist phase 0£ the Russian revolution have always been 
overlooked.
The constrast between the Nazis ideological traditionalism 
and their political modernism, largely accounts for the £act that, 
while Nazi painting had been consigned to oblivion, the style 0£ 
Nazi politics and their general mode 0£ domination has achieved 
an almost mythical status. It has even generated a series 0£ 
cliches about Nazism in the popular consciousness of the West - 
such comments as "the Nazi system derived from the demonic power 
of Hitler's oratory'', or the shudder of admiration/repulsion 
which is commonly felt as the audience emerge £rom a viewing 
of Reifenstahl's 'Triumph 0£ the Will'. However, there has 
been little serious analysis of the style 0£ Nazi politics 
and the organisation 0£ their political spectacle. What 
analysis there is tends to restrict itself to simply pointing 
out the epiphenomenal nature of these elements within the more 
fundamental development 0£ Nazism (2 ). But the nature 0£ the 
political spectacle seems to me to raise vital questions about 
the essential nature 0£ Nazism, and is the point where our central 
problematic begins to manifest itself. Whilst the paintings remain 
flat and awkward, the wheeling formations on the Zeppelin field gave 
the Nazis an enduring form and image £or their society. It is to
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the answering of why this should be the case that this final 
section of the thesis addresses itself.
Far from being a monolithic, coherent bloc, Nazi ideology 
was not only contradictory and muddled, but was differentially 
distributed over the various sections of Nazi society, with 
each section producing a different set of emphases and variants 
0£ this ideology. In a recent analysis, Poulantzas (3) has 
attempted to set up a global explanation 0£ Fascist ideology, 
based upon the nature of petit-bourgeois consciousness in periods 
0£ economic and political crisis. Thus the often contradictory 
elements within Fascist ideology are represented as corresponding 
to the differing economic positions of the various groups of the 
petit-bourgeoisie which went to make up the central component 
0£ the Fascist constituency. 'While there is much that is valuable 
in this to explain the attraction 0£ Fascism £or this group, the 
analysis lacks a dynamic element, since economic variations are 
elevated in a simplistic manner to explain varying ideological 
focii. It is the case, however, that many elements of fascist 
ideology were derived .from the developmental logic wich a 
successful Fascist movement finds itself in: that is, the ^.f 
which emerges between its original intentions and what it actually 
does. A more fruitful line of analysis would seem to be the contrast 
between:
(i) Fascism/Nazism as a movement - a party;
(ii) Fascisny'Nazism in power a state.
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Nazism as a Movement
One of the crucial defining features 0£ Nazism as a movement 
was that it developed, and gained power, within the context 
of' a breakdo-wn in the workings of liberal capitalism. The 
deepening of this general crisis with the economic recession 
of 1929, led to the Nazis increasingly emphasising that they 
were the party which could {a) cure this crisis; and (b) go 
beyond the form of society which was responsible £or the crisis. 
The context in which these claims could have some kind of credence 
was one in which there had been a failure in the market mechanisms 
and in the general conditions which ensured capital's continuing 
accumulation. This economic distress was to be paralleled on a 
political level in that the traditional ruling groups within 
Germany had found it increasingly difficult to guarantee the 
continuation of such conditions inside the political forms of 
the Weimar _Republic. Their response to this situation, even 
before the Nazis' seizure of power, had been to adopt a quasi­
authoritarian solution, in the form of rule by cabinet decree. 
There would seem to be at least some degree of coherence in 
Marxist analyses of National Socialism in that, as the political 
forms of Weimar became increasingly irrelevant to the curing of 
this situation, the Nazis were able to recruit, and rely on in 
times of election, the petit_bourgeoisie, combined with certain 
sections of the middle-class. Thus, at this stage, the Nazi 
economic and social programme was little more than a 'catalogue 
of petit-bourgeois greviances' which were generated in the £ace 
of a capitalism in deep trouble. But there were also components 
of an ideal nature, over and above this simple listing of direct
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economic demands. The penetration of these ideal ideological 
elements among their constituency, allowed the Nazis to 
transform economic discontent into a form of 'radical' politics. 
They were able, as a movement, to unite their constituency into 
an autonomous mass, movement in revolt , against the capitalist 
system.
(1). It was autonomous, because it lay between the 
socialist proletarian parties and the tradit­
ional parties of the bourgeoisie, and saw itself as 
an alternative to both. The key element in this was 
its ability to articulate and take advantage 0£ the 
radicalisation and alienation 0£ the middle-class 
from the traditional bourgeois and proletarian parties.
(2)· It was a mass movement in that it was able to 
mobilise, either within the party or at elections, 
certain major groupings in German society. They were 
major in that they constituted a considerable portion 
0£ the population. However, they were a mass movement 
in another sense: they saw as their aim and object 
the encompassing of all the groups of society within 
their conception 0£ a 'National Community'. In other 
words, they were after the total "transformation 0£ the 
whole 0£ German society.
(3). They were a party of revolutionary intention. 
Throughout the thesis I have attempted to bring 
out those elements in the movement which were aimed
at destroying and replacing the whole structure 
of bourgeois capitalism. Thus, at the stage 0£ 
being a movement in a pre-power situation, the 
Nazis represented, both in intention and function, 
a real revolt against the conditions 0£ capitalism.
Nazism in Power
One 0£ the major concerns 0£ the recent work done on Nazism, and 
on Fascism in general, has been to try to understand why "where 
fascism succeeded, it did not carry out the interests of its 
followers" (4); why, when it gained power, it suppressed or 
eliminated those elements which had initially been in revolt 
against capitalism? - (in terms 0£ our schema, what was it 
that happened during the transformation 0£ the Nazi movement 
into the Nazi state?). The Marxist analyses conducted during 
the 30's tended to turn the success and subsequ.ent development 
0£ fascism into a £unction 0£ the money and continuing influence 
0£ big business. Thus, the totality of fascism becomes a manipul­
ative screen behind which monopoly capitalism consciously set about 
ensuring the continuation 0£ its markets and profits. However, in 
recent years, analyses have moved away from this conspiratorial 
theory to a more subtle and mediated type 0£ explanation. In 
terms of the German experience, the nature 0£ Nazi rule after 
1 933 would appear to have two interlinked aspects:
(1) . The exact nature 0£ the relationship between 
the Nazi elite and the economic ruling groups 
after 1933. How was the influence 0£ these dominant 
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groups mediated, if at all, into Nazi policies, 
and how were the aims of such groups altered and 
deflected by the economic and political arena 
established by the Nazis?
(2) . The effect which the unfolding of the 'logic 
of power' had, especially on the nature 0£ 
the Nazi state and its total appropriation of 
the political forms, which, together with the 
high concentration of power in the hands 0£ the 
leadership, enabled the state to gain an unprecedented 
independence £rom the rest 0£ society.
The capture of power by the Nazis seems to have rested 
on the forging 0£ an alliance bet'Aeen certain sections 0£ 
large capital and the Nazi party elite. This came about because 
of the increasing inability of these nil.ing groups to ensure the 
maintenance in German civil society 0£ the conditions £or the 
reproduction o.f' capital. This resulted in these groups handing 
over control 0£ the political realm to the Nazis, but at the 
same time retaining their economic power. The intention of 
these groups seems to have been to allow the National Socialists, 
thr011gh the instruments of the state, to usher in a period o.f' 
authoritarian rule, which would have guaranteed the continuation 
of capital accumulation. This alliance between big capital and 
the National Socialists was founded upon a number 0£ promises 
made by the Nazis. They were to:
(i) guarantee the formation 0£ a strong state;
(ii) attempt to overcome the economic crisis by 
a policy 0£ rearmament;
(iii) embark on a policy 0£ militarist expansionism; 
(iv) smash the workers' movement and, at the same 
time, suppress the anti-capitalist elements 
within their o.m party.
Thus the state and its institutions were to be gained at 
the expense of precisely those elements in their own ranks who 
were in revolt against capitalism. The period 1933-35 was to 
see the banning and elimination 0£ the 'revolutionary' elements. 
The major task 0£ the Nazi state during this period became the 
creation 0£ an administered economy based upon a strengthened 
state:; with this went the dragooning 0£ the middle-class 
supporters away £rorn an ideology 0£ disruption towards one 
which emphasised work and obedience. Therefore, in the period 
prior to 1936, the conspiratorial model would appear to have some 
basis. However, Mason (5) has documented how, during and.after 
1936, the con^asus between big industry, the military, the 
civil service, and the party elite began to disintergrate. 
The immediate reason £or this was the state's need to keep 
the working-class sweet by supplying an increasing amount of 
consumer goods and allowing wages to rise, which cut across the 
demands of industry and the military for plant and machinery to 
be assigned to the rearmament programme. The overall result was 
that the various groups within this consensus ceased to operate 
as an homogexfous power bloc, allowing the Nazi state to pursue
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and achieve policies with purely political ends, policies 
which were cut 0££ £rom the 'rational' economic aims 0£ 
the former ruling groups. Thus an independent state was 
able to set in motion its plans £or the realisation of 
the 'racial-ethical' utopia, a utopia that was now shorn 0£ its 
radical, mass content.
I£ this more dynamic type o£ analysis is retained, it will 
enable us to explain the presence o£ two conflicting societal 
images that were operating within the wider spectrum o£ Nazi 
ideology. These are:
(i) the volkisch-based imagery which was centred 
on the history/role o£ the party as an auton­
omous, mass-based movement in revolt against 
capitalism, and composed o£ a radicalised/ 
alienated middle-class and petit-bourgeoisie. 
This imagery revolved around the notion o£ the 
regenerated Nazi society as being a pre-industrial, 
artisan-orientated community;
(ii) the image o£ Nazi society as a sjtrong militaristic 
state, dominated by a ruling elite and characterised 
by a high concentration o£ personal power, plus 'a 
degree o£ independence ··· unparalleled in History'. 
Certainly, by 1936, the tension between these two contradictory 
notions o£ the nature o£ Nazi society had been 'resolved' by the 
elimination o£ the more 1le£tist' elements, followed by the gradual 
subordination o£ the party as a movement to the authority o£ the 
state. But this mass base was never completely eliminated: it
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still existed, albeit in an inferior position, and had to be 
contained and recognised - (in Benjamin’s terms, given some 
•means o£ expression·). In the earlier discussion concerning 
Nazi architecture, I tried to trace the con£lict between the 
two societal images embodied in certain buildings - the 
Voll::isch and 1he Baroque - and attempted to locate this 
division in the unresolvable tension between the party and 
the state. The argument so far has been an attempt to ground 
this ideological split in the real nature and structure 0£ Nazi 
society. What follows is the extension 0£ this argument into 
those areas which I have designated the 'spectacular' aspects 
0£ the society.
The. Nazi Spectacle
"Unlike art, which in its aims is equally ideal, 
the festival realises in a more active manner 
the aesthetic trans£ormation 0£ reality. 11
Mazaev (6)
By the term 'spectacular',I simply mean those areas within a 
society which are devoted to the organisation and projection 
0£ that society's self-image: that is, the way in which a 
complex stream 0£ images and appearances is organised to 
create a quasi-coherent picture 0£ the society in question, 
and which is intended £or internal, consumption. In society 
the realm 0£ the spectacular is based largely upon the circulation 
0£ commodities and their mode of appearance in the society. In Nazi 
society, however, the realm of the !l)ectacular was almost completely 
political, and, above all, centred on the image which it had of 
itself as a unified, politically-aware, classless National Comnrunity. 
I have chosen three areas in which to try to analyse the nature and 
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the meaning o£ the Nazi spectacle and to bring out the real 
tensions which we have seen at work in the areas 0£ painting 
and architecture. These areas are:
(i) the 'Das Thing' theatrical movement 
(ii) the Mass Rally
(iii) the strong state 'fantasy'.
Again I must stress that I start from a position which 
does not see Nazi ideology as either a homogenous monolith "
or simply a manipulative/cynical conspiracy. It is still 
quite common to talk 0£ 'Nazi Ideology' as if it were an 
. \
undifferentiated thing. Not enough attention has been paid 
to the clash of societal images, to the false starts, sudden 
reversals, and 'marginal' projects that somehow quietly disappeared. 
As Xracauer has stated (7), it is precisely the unconscious nature 
of cultural 'trivia· which allows the observer to move to "the 
underlying meaning of an epoch". There is no one comm.on set 
of determinants which are operating to produce a unified ideology. 
The area 0£ art is particularly suited to such a study, since the 
political implications o£ artistic objects and projects are never 
immediately obvious. Thus sudden changes of direction in art, 
particularly those at the centre of a society's self-image, are 
particularly instructive in illustrating the tensions at work 
within that society.
DAS THING, 
One o£ the best examples o£ the way in which these •marginal' 
projects allow one to glimpse "the underlying meaning of an 
epoch" is contained in the development, and eventual demise,
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o£ the only 'specifically National Socialist £orm of expression', 
the Thing theatrical experiment. 'Thing' is the old Germanic 
word £or an assembly o£ free men, and certainly in some of its 
manifestations, particularly its attempts to recreate the 
ancient assemblies o£ the Teutons, it came to oc^cupy a place 
midway between the tradition o£ art as objectified representation 
and art as a species o£ active, symbolic politics. There had been 
a number of precedents £or this type o£ theatrical production, 
beginning in 1907 with Ernst Wachler's establishment of an 
open-air theatre in the Harz mountains. Wachler, a volkisch 
idealist, had used this amphitheatre, not to stage conventional 
thematic plays, but to re-enact modern reconstructions of ancient 
teutonic rituals. The Nazi interest in this type of theatre had 
got underway prior to their taking over power in 1933, but it was 
to reach a :i;eak in 1934, only to be eventually phased out and 
officially closed down by Goebbels in 1937.
The aim o£ the 'Thing' experiment was to create a form of 
theatre that w^dd be adequate £or, and give expression to, 
the newly created 'Co^mmunity o£ the People'. It was a movement 
that was self-consciously plumed to go beyond the 'theatre o£ 
bourgeois privilege', and the original theorists of the movement 
were able to submit both the form and the £unction of conventional 
theatre to a series of articulate critiques. The attack they 
launched was to focus on the relation of this type of theatre 
to the traditional ruling groups of the society under capitalism. 
For instance, they criticised the £act that conventional theatre, 
both in the size and separation of its buildings, had been the 
'plaything' o£ the small privileged groups who had constituted
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its principal patrons. These buildings, and the sort of plays 
that were staged in them, were declared to be completely 
inadequate for the new audience that National Socialism had 
brought into being ie. the 'People' and the 'Nation·. Plans 
were, therefore, submitted £or the construction of new theatres 
on completely fresh sites, which were especially designed to take 
account of the new theatrical form. Most of these sites were 
designed as open-air amphitheatres - (conforming to Wachler's 
original plans) - and each one was to be situated on a site 
which had some reference to Teutonic history eg. an old 
meeting ground or burial site. The intention was to recreate 
the spiritual and collective experience of the Teutonic ancestors 
within the new context of Nazism. A series of 400 of these 
theatres was planned, but only a hand.ful. were ever completed 
before the movement was stifled.
The 'plays' themselves, and the language and symbolism in 
which they were cast, relied heavily on a spiritual, quasi­
religious set of values. Each element of the production - 
the plot, the settings and the audience - were designed to 
facilitate the realisation of the chief aim of the experiment,= 
namely the £usion of players and audience into a 'collective 
holy experience',described by the protagonists of 'Das Thing' 
as 'the elevation from low to high Volk'. The first of these 
productions, staged in 1 933, played initially only to very 
small audiences, but their popularity was to rise spectacularly 
so that,at the peak 0£ their success,they were being presented 
to audiences of 20,000 to 50,000. The 'plots· o£ these 
productions ranged over a wide variety of subjects, but each 
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one always had as its central intention the merging 0£ actors 
and audience into a passionate collective experience. The 
most common theme was the tri^umph o£ · the good new days· 
over 'the bad old ones', or a depiction 0£ the 'paradise 
on earth' which National Socialism had made a possibility. 
The theoretical underpinning was decidedly anti-naturalist, 
with both bourgeois and folk forms being rejected because 0£ 
their inability to cope with the needs 0£ a mass audience:
"it bourgeois/folk theatre deflects .•• away 
away £rom the desire of our path £or tragic 
heroism and myth." (8)
The revolutionary characteristics 0£ 'Das Thing' were to be 
contrasted with those 0£ bourgeois theatre, and they make 
interesting reading since, despite the spiritual and 
nationalistic fog in which they are shrouded, they in 
many ways run parallel to the theories which lay behind






























































The thematic content 0£ these productions was, 0£ a.ourse, very
different from that o£ Meyerhold's 'plays', but the style of 
the staging, plus the similarity of the contrasts between 
'bourgeois' and 'mass' theatre, have a great deal in common:
"In addition to the obligatory apparatus 0£ 
musical sound and lighting,effects were 
utilised. Loud speakers carried echo­
effects in every direction, and the masses 
sang. There were processions and marches 
between, behind, in front 0£, all around the 
audience. A great levey 0£ £lags, emblems and 
unifonns drenched the arena in brown and red." (10)
By the end of 1935, . the 'Thing' productions began to get much 
more exuberant and sensual, striving ever more turiously to
reach an even greater intensity in mass festive union. For 
example, Michels, the propaganda chief £or the Cologne region, 
wanted to put on a production that would use all the senses, 
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including that 0£ smell, The planned production was to
include the burning 0£ herbs and plants so that their
scents would waft over the audience:
"For the nose, or rather the sense of smell, 
torches can be effectively used, but in 
addition use should be made of quite special 
plants and the conifers 0£ the German forests. 
These last give of£ a beneficent and strengthen­
ing aroma when burnt in open dishes. Further, 
from the symbolic viewpoint, the souls 0£ our 
German forefathers were imaginable from the 
Harz aromas, just as the burning of Juniper 
twigs could be understood as a sign of driving 
out all the evil spirits." (11)
Sensuality and festivity were in danger of gaining precedent
over serious political propaganda, and these more exotic
works were soon to be seen as a threat to 'a·· state- based 
ideology that was increasingly attempting to emphasise hard
work and duti.f'ul obedience. The result was that a memorandum 
was issued, which called £or 'more restraint' with regard to an 
art-form that was"also an expression of state-political will" (12). 
The declaration by Hitler, after liquidating the S.A. leadership, 
that'the 1German revolution is over', resulted in the banning 
of any reference to 'revolution' in Thing productions.
This entire theatrical movement should be seen as an eruption 
of the radical mass-following that National Socialism had called 
into being in its striving £or political power, and, in the domain 
of art, its implications £or the traditional forms 0£ artistic 
representation were as threatening as those which had cropped 
up in the first years of the Russian revolution. The Thing 
experiment did not £all apart because 0£ the recurrence 0£ bad 
weather or because of the lousy acoustics, as has been suggested 
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by some commentators (Brenner, Grunberger): it £ailed because 
the Nazi state was beginning to assert its dominance over the 
National Socialist movement, gradually suppressing any of 
those elements which had carried over their pre-1933 radicalism. 
It needed to establish a tighter control over the people it had 
mobilised, and part 0£ this desire £or increased control was to 
be satisfied by giving them a much more highly structured and 
administered form of expression. It had to set up an arena 
in which the movement's solidarity could be paraded, where 
the self-image 0£ a classless national community could become 
a reality, if only £or a brief period. The 'Thing' experiment 
had not developed in this way: it had proved too chaotic, too 
prone to deviation from the strict path laid down by the State. 
As a result, it was quietly smothered, to be superceded by the 
State-administered mass rally. As one contemporary observer 
noted, the Reich party rally was 'the Thing idea become flesh 
and blood' (13).
THE MASS RALLY
"Spatial images are the dream 0£ a society." 
Iracauer (14)
The rallies which were held each year at Nuremburg have become, 
£or the post-1945 generations, the most enduring image 0£, and 
the key symbol £or Nazi society. For these later generations 
these gatherings have come to represent a society which was 
able to combine ruthless efficiency with the most complete 
loss 0£ individuality yet experienced by 20th century European 
man. As such, they are both hated and admired at one and the 
'-·
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same time. As one recent commentator has said:
"What characterises Nazi art and the ?fazi 
State is not so much its content but the 
unnerving efficiency of its presentation. (15)
What this particular observer is referring to is not the 
bland paintings exhibited each year in Munich, but rather 
the manipulation 0£ emblems and symbols throughout the 
length and breadth 0£ Nazi society, and especially during 
the mass parades of the parteitag. Even today, the spectacular 
image that the Nazis constructed of their society exerts its 
desired effect, and yet this image of ruthless efficiency can 
hardly bear close examination if the bureaucratic war-of-all- 
against-all, which was systematically encouraged by Hitler, is 
understood. 0£ course the rallies did impress foreign visitors, 
and they certainly had a strong public relations element built 
into them, but primarily they were designed £or internal consumpption, 
and it is in the dynamics of Nazi society that their true meaning 
lies. The rallies were primarily an expressive exercise: a£ter 
1934 their actual political work was very limited.
Every description 0£ the Parteitag emphasises the all-pervasive 
feeling of festivity and relaxation which seemed to grip Nuremberg 
during the week these events were staged. However, these rallies 
always differed from those which took place in^Russia, in that 
the Nazis never self-consciously linked the changes taking place in 
the traditional aesthetic realm with their organisation 0£ the 
political spectacle. One of the reasons £or this was that they 
were still expecting a renascent German culture to appear in 
traditional forms ie. within the frame of the picture or the
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proscenium stage of the theatre, I£ they did make any 
connections between cultural revolution and political 
spectacle, then it was only at an ironic, half-glimpsed 
level, such as illustrated by the preceding quotation 
concerning the equivalence between the party rally and 
the Thing theatre. The elements 'Which would have made such 
links had been suppressed or liquidated with the disappearance 
of the artistic avant-garde. Moreover, the blinkered tradition­
alism of their aesthetic ideology guaranteed that they would never 
be able to understand rationally the neal trajectory of the society 
they had created.
I£ we begin our analysis from the point 0£ vi_ew that the 
main £unction 0£ the rallies was to produce a self-image or 
Nazi society, then it becomes impossible to deal with them 
as past commentators have done. Both liberal and Marxist 
analysts have used variations 0£ the argument that the 
rallies were either the supreme example 0£ mass manipulation 
or the pinnacle 0£ 'Fascist mysticism' (16),
"At night the political leaders met in the 
Zeppelinweise £or their annual ceremony, 
Dramatic lighting, £lags, martial music, 
and slow marching were again used to 
mesmerise the masses." (17 )
"Fascism appeals to the lower instincts of 
crowds." (18)
My point is that a truer way to view these rallies is as a 
species o£ administerd festival, in which the various groups
within Nazi society presented themselves before that society 
constituted as a whole. They were manipulative in the sense 
that the State retained overall control of their organisation, 
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but the dialectic always has two terms, in this case that 
of the State and the mass nature of Nazism as a movement, 
and they should not be viewed as a simple piece 0£ one­
way political cynicism, since this £ails to relate them 
to the inner tensions o£ Nazi society. There would seem *
to be two aspects from which to approach the problem of 
the rallEs: firstly, as an example of the interaction 
between the aesthetic and the political within a society 
that had been'invaded' by a mass-political movement;and 
secondly as the point at which the two major ciomponents 
o£ National Socialism - the State and the •movement· - 
met each other, and where the tension between the two was 
neutralised and contained.
Firstly, the aesthetic/political dialectic. The Thing 
experiment provides us with a clear example o£ a Nazi art-form 
undergoing a ^fundamental reformulation under the imp act of mass 
politics. The impetus £or this reformulation came from the 
need to develop the traditional theatrical form in order to 
encompass the new social reality ie. 'the Co^^ity o£ the 
People'. I have already argued that the rallies must be 
located somewhere along a spect^rum between the Thing and 
the expression o£ the Statens ideology in the architectural 
projects initiated by Hitler. They (the rallies) are the 
clearest vindication o£ Benjamin's claim that Fascism aestheticises 
politics. However, the mode o£ aestheticisation present in the rallies 
is very di££erent from that which occurs in the architectural fantasies 
The rallies claimed to be a general form o£ expression £or Nazi society 
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as a whole, and are the location 0£ the spectacular appearance 
0£ the various groups which constituted National Socialism as 
a movement. It is an aestheticisation 0£ politics, but 0£ a 
politics which has become the expression 0£ the mass. The 
themes and displays which were 'featured' at each year's 
meeting were centred upon one specific group ie. 'The Day 
of Labour', 'The Day of Youth', 'The Day 0£ the Army'. Each 
group manifested itsel£ as a social category, not as a 
collection of individuals, and it was as a social category 
that they acted out the expressive symbolic politics - {the 
creation 0£ the 'mass orna,nent', as Kracauer called it) - which 
was central to the public activity at Nuremburg. Three types 0£ 
mass activity utilised by the Nazis had echoes in the experiments 
conducted by the Russian avant-garde:
(1 ). The Mass G^ymnastic Display. In their post-1933 form, the 
mass gymnastic displays organised by the Nazis had lost 
the ideological Wl.derpinning which was so characteristic 0£ 
their Russian counterparts. Class content had been replaced 
by an openly nationalistic rhetoric, with the activities of the 
performers becoming hymns to the Aryan physique and to the health 
of the nation. Despite this, it is worth remembering the list 0£ 
oppositional characteristics which were thought to be displayed 
by Thing theatre ie. 'drama-chorus-polyphony-open £orm', all 
qualities included by Meyerhold in his experiments in mass 
theatre. The aesthetic core 0£ these mass displays were, 0£ 
course, now contained within the ideology 0£ the nation and the 
Fuhrer, but they still displayed the Wl.derlying link which the 
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encroachment of the aesthetic on the political had created: 
"There were present 18,000 members of the 
nation's military and semi-military 
organisations, in their uniforms 0£ 
brown, black, dark blue, grey and green. 
The army, navy, airforce, Labour service, 
special guards, Hitler youth, political 
leaders and police were present •.. from 
above, the mass 0£ men and banners represented 
a huge tulip field" (19).
(Illustration No. 3I ).
(2) . The Military Display. In Russia during the early period 
of the revolution, the display 0£ military stfugth had 
always been intergrated^and made subordinate to,a general 
revolutionary socialist theory. Within the context of the 
Nuremburg rallies, this subordination 0£ military might to 
politics had ceased, and militarism had become an and in itself, 
an autonomous value to be pursued over and above what critical 
element remained in the ideology:
"all efforts to render politics aesthetic 
culminate in one thing, wa,." (20)
This reversal 0£ the aesthetic/political dialectic within Nazi 
Germany must be contrasted with the experiments conducted by 
Mayalcevsky, in which he used the Caspian fleet to construct 
'symphonies'. Here military strength is redirected to both 
playful and political ends, whilst in the Nuremberg displays 
'pure' destructiveness is simply given an aesthetic gloss ie. 
turned into another version of the mass ornament. The culmination 
of this trend would have been the planned construction of the 
Marz£eld, where up to 100,000 spectators would have been able 
to witness mock-battles staged by the Reichswehr.
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(3) . The Architecture of Light. One of the most dramatic
effects devised by Speer to heighten the mystery 
surrounding the Nazi spectacle, was his 'cathedral of ice'.
This consisted of ringing the Zeppelin field - (and many 
other Nazi spectaculars as well) - with search lights, 
their beams directed skywards. The holding of these emotional 
high spots at night beneath the gigantic beams of the lights, 
strengthened the feeling which the Rallies induced of a secret 
band of blood brothers uniting in cemtunion:
"The actual effect surpassed anything I had 
imagined. The 130 sharply defined beams, 
placed around the field at intervals of 401, 
were visible to a height of 20,000 to 25,000', 
after which they merged into a general glow.The 
feeling was o£ a vast roan,with the beams serving 
as mighty pillars o£ infinitely higher walls. Now 
and than a clound moved through this wreath o£ 
lights, bringing an element of surrealistic 
surprise to the image. I imagine that this 
•cathedral of ice' was the first luminescent 
architecture o£ this type." (21}
This 'painting with light' as a mode o£ mass expression, also
had its parallels in the Russian experience - both post-
and pre-Stalinist. Popova, the stage designer, in her plans
£or some o£ Meyerhold's spectacles, created a design which 
relied heavily upon the use of airships and the illumination 
o£ searchlights to pick out the socialist slogans which they 
were carrying. As with Speer, the beams were designed to provide 
an aerial frame £or the activities on the ground (Illustrations 
No. 32 ). Leger, an avant-garde artist £i^aly within the
socialist c^xp, had become fascinated with the idea that the 
architectural forms o£ his 'heroic' period o£ painting coald, 
in £act, be realised within the context o£ the modern city:
"During the first World War I used to spand my 
furloughs in Montparnasse where I happened to 
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meet Trotsky and we often talked about the 
thrilling problem of a coloured city. He 
wanted me to go to Moscow: the idea of a 
blue street, a yellow street, aroused his 
enthusiasm." (22)
"Leger then reveals that in 1937 he had 
proposed the following: the 300,000 
unemployed in Paris were to be given the 
job of cleaning all its buildings;by day 
Paris would thus be pure white. At night, 
however, the entire city would be bathed in 
coloured light, the whitened buildings serving 
as screens £or projectors, some 0£ which would 
be stationary while others would be mounted on 
airplanes £lying overhead." (23)
Again, the point that I wish to make is not that there was 
some kind 0£ underlying •totalitarian unity' at work, but 
rather that, in both cases, what was taking place was the 
impact 0£ the masses upon the traditional forms of high art. 
This was to evoke, in very dissimilar circumstances, the same 
side-stepping of these traditional forms into the realms of mass 
expressivity, and both were to focus upon the festival as the 
most adequate form £or containing this expressivity.
The rallies occupy a position midway between the initially 
non-administered form 0£ 'Das Thing', and the baroque cult 0£ the 
dead, planned and executed by the state and its leadership. The 
structure 0£ the rallies continually made clear that the state 
had achieved a position of dominance over the party and also 
of Nazi society as a whole. The party was present and visible 
as a solid mass, only because the state had decreed this week-long 
period of festivity. During these Parteitag, the social and political 
spectacle was always one 0£ a united, classless community: an arena 
was created in which this mass expressiveness was to be permitted.
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However, cutting across the ranks 0£ the £aith.f'ul. was the 
presence 0£ the victorious state. They organised and 
administered the rallies, and they ensured that there 
was a plethora 0£ podiums from which they could overlook 
the marching grounds, Here the leaders could look down upon, 
and address, the led. The •mass ornaments' produced by those 
assembled below were only decipherable by an external spectator, 
and preferably one with an aerial view - (in this they depart 
significantly from those spectacles organised in Russia). Audience, 
performers and leaders were care.f'ul.ly separated from each other, 
always remaining distinct, with the high points of fusion being 
determined by the ruling elite, and these moments were usually 
those occasions when the leaders chose to address the masses. 
The whole event was interlaced by a strict hierarchy, with the 
state always firmly at the top. This complex separation of 
leaders and led 'betrayed' the real nature 0£ Nazi society, 
since the masses they had called into being had now to be 
contained and 'administered'. The image of the 'high Volk', 
where leaders and followers met each other in an emotional 
symbiosis, and where all the intermediate political structures 
were swept aside, was in reality a vast cage where, £or a week, 
the party could celebrate its defeat by the state.
,THE FANTASY OF THE STATE,
If the mass-rally represented an area of mutual overlap, where 
the movement and the state neutralised that tension which existed 
between them, and where the construction of a political spectacle 
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in which the ideal 'National Community' was realised £or a 
week, the Nazi state was to produce its own autonomous form 
0£ aesthetic/symbolic politics. However, its version 0£ the
'National Community', and the symbols which it deployed to 
express this, were very di£ferent from those used by Das 
Thing movement and the mass-rallies.
To understand this symbolism, we have to return to the 
analysis of the Nazi state and its general relationship with 
Nazi society. I have already tried to outline how, in the 
specific historical conditions 0£ Germany, the Nazi state 
after 1936 was able to achieve an extraordinary degree 0£ 
autonomy from those ruling economic groups which had allowed 
the movement to assume political power. In addition to this, 
it had cut loose from many 0£ the 'ideals' which had been the 
property 0£ its followers prior to 1933. This autonomy had 
come about through the process 0£ the dual resolution of a 
crisis situation. The first resolution had occured in 1933, 
and the second in 1936. In the first crisis, the Nazis had 
been supported and encouraged to take power because of the 
inability of the con£licting industrial and political blocs 
to reach a concensus over how to solve the economic crisis· 
within the institutions 0£ Weimar. The Nazis were brought 
into the picture in order to impose an authoritarian 'solution' 
to this dilemma. On gaining political power they were to smash 
the workers' movement, but they also agreed to eliminate those 
elements within the party who were calling £or the completion 
0£ the anti-monopolistic 'second revolution'. In 1936 this
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authoritarian spiral was given another twist, this time because 
0£ the state's ability to dominate,and make capital out 0£,the 
continuing splits within the ranks 0£ big industry. This was 
to grant them an independence from their own political base, 
as well as from the the pressures applied by the large economic 
groupings. The net result 0£ the state's success.f'ul navigation 
0£ these two crises was that:
"The political leadership constructed £or itsel£ 
a position 0£ supremacy which, in institutional 
terms, was autonomous and unshakeable and which, 
through its control of foreign policy, determined 
the direction 0£ the system as a whole." (24)
This then was the structural basis upon which the elaboration
0£ a state-based fantasy was able to exist. This was to provide 
the institutional bedrock which allowed Hitler to elaborate his 
gigantic architectural programmes in complete isolation from the 
rest 0£ the Nazi system. However, there still remains a series 
of questions about the nature and content 0£ these schemes which 
I think resolve themselves into three fundamental issues:
(i) Why was the realm 0£ these symbolic architectural 
projects so large in the Nazi system? What was it 
that led the state to have such a predilection £or 
this kind 0£ activity?
(ii) The scale and •monumentality' 0£ such projects. 
Why dd the Nazi state £eel that it had to build 
on such a huge scale?
(iii) The symbolic themes and content deployed in these 
projects.
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I want to deal with the £irst two questions together, since 
I think they form part 0£ the same problem: why was there so 
nuch symbolic architecture, and why was it planned on such an 
enormous scale? The motivation to commit so much effort and 
resources to the building 0£ monuments to itself lies in the 
general ideological framework of Nazi politics. The two major 
influences at work here were (i) the notion that the Nazis 
held 0£ politics as the highest expression 0£ the aesthetic 
impulse:
"Politics is the highest and most comprehensive 
art there is, and we who shape modern German 
policy £eel ourselves to be artists ••. the 
task 0£ art and the artist being to form, to 
give shape, to remove the diseased and create 
freedom £or the healthy." (25);
and, closely related to this, (ii) the idea that the state was 
the most important institution in enabling this realisation 
of aesthetic politics. We have earlier seen that the Nazis 
had dismissed the idea of the state as the •ensurer of £air 
play' as being liberalism, and that they had substituted the 
idea o£ the state as an active shaper of the social reality. 
But, having said this, we still have the problem of explaining 
why this was the ideology of the Nazi state, and the answer to 
this lies at a much deeper level. One of the major initial impulses 
0£ the Nazi movement had been one of revolt against capitalism, 
with the aim 0£ its eventual supercession. It had, however, been 
unable to master either the dynamics of the society it had taken 
control 0£, or the inner logic of its own development in relation 
to this society. Instead of destroying the existing property 
relationships, it had become trapped inside them. The preservation 
of this capitalist system, in addition to its inability to master
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its own development, had allowed the state to attain an 
^matched concentration of power, making it independent of 
the society ar^md it. This led to a situation where it had 
at its disposal the tremendous resources of a modern technological 
society, but had failed to master them and to bring them under any 
kind of rational control, even in terms of the ^^ands of German 
industry. Its failure to achieve a true supercession had left 
it with only one route by which to deploy these resources, the 
politics o£ style, where, in Lukac$" terms, the only possible 
method of social organisation would be an aesthetic one in which 
society and the state would be regarded as works of art. Thus, 
the construction of these monuments was the aesthetic equivalent 
of its need to wage war: it was the only way to direct the 
technological resources at its comuand. This, I think, goes 
a long way to explaining the scale of these architectural projects; 
it was simply that, given the *gree of power at the disposal of the 
Nazi state, it was able to build on a scale which had been impossible 
£or societies before. In this context it must be Kmembered that all 
the projects dreamt up by Hitler were possibilities, and were 
definitely not beyond the means of Nazi society.
The final problem is the thematic content of these projects. 
In an earlier section I have argued that, given the situation o£ 
a strong authoritarian state, the most obvious stylistic model 
to be taken from the past is that of the Baroque, since this 
too had originated in a situation where the state and its political 
leadership had played a similar role. But, beyond the utilisation 
of this style of 'State Baroque', there was an equally persistent 
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theme ^^ing through these projects, and this was death, 
its most practical realisation being in the war-memorial. 
Here the Nazi state, albeit at a symbolic level, betrayed 
its ultimate bourgeois nature. Almost the only examples 
of the use of 'public' symbolism by the 19th century bourgeois 
state had been either the representation of its heroes, national­
istic or imperialistic, or the construction of more impersonal 
monuments to the masses who had died in their war projects. 
The Nazis, appearing during the '-^unheroic' phase o£ capitalism, 
latched onto the latter form, and were to produce a whole range 
of projects devoted to the celebration o£ their mass dead - either 
o£ the First World War, or o£ the Party, or to those who were to 
come. One of their first projects on taking power was to be the 
complex on the Xoenigsplatz in Munich in celebration o£ the dead 
of the party. The increasing ac^^ulation o£ power by the state 
as the decade proceeded, allowed them a £ree rein to indulge this 
obsession with the dead:
"after this, any place and any reason were used to 
justify the erection of a monument. There were to 
be submarine monuments, air-force monuments, and 
FreiCorps monuments; what the Republic had £ailed 
to do in terms of ^dlding war-memorials was now 
done by the Nazis a thousand times over." (26)
The high point of this tendency was reached in two such projects. 
The first was the triumphal arch described earlier, which was to 
provide one o£ the focal points of Hitler's plans £or the 
reconstruction o£ Berlin. On it were to be inscribed the 
names o£ the six million Germ^w who had been killed in the 
first World War. The second of these projects was only 
intended to be realised after the successful termination 
o£ the second World War. The Nazi Empire in EEurope was 
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to be marked out by a series 0£ huge war-memorials cum symbols
0£ conquest:
"On the rocky coast of the Atlantic there will 
grow up grandiose structures facing west, 
eternal monuments 0£ the liberation 0£ the 
continent from British dependence ••• Massive 
towers stretching high in the eastern plains will 
grow into symbols of the subduing 0£ the eastern 
steppes through the disciplined might 0£ the 
Germanic forces of order." (27)
(Illustration No.33 ).
In the words 0£ Walter Benjamin, in its symbolic architectural 
fantasies, had reached a position 'Where "its self-alienation had 
reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction 
as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order", (28).
* * * * *
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